Iran's Foreign Ministry Spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh, on April 4, stressed that Tehran is willing to go back to the nuclear talks in Vienna only to finalize a nuclear deal with the world powers. He noted that the ball is now in the United States’ court, implying that Tehran is not willing to discuss with Washington about any outstanding matters already agreed upon.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, on April 7, noted that he is not optimistic about reaching an agreement in Vienna on Iran’s nuclear program despite all the efforts being made. He also noted that he is “not overly optimistic” at the prospects of actually getting an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program to conclusion in Vienna despite all the efforts being put into it. He said that the US is prepared to deal with other scenarios in coordination with his European counterparts should diplomacy with Iran fail.
Outstanding Matters
Although the nuclear talks between Iran and the world powers in Vienna recently made little progress in Vienna, there are signs that issues are still outstanding between Washington and Tehran. These can be outlined as follows:
1. FTO designation of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC):
Iran’s demand that the United States lift its designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist organization, is the major sticking point in the nuclear talks. The issue has brought the talks to a halt, after the sudden return of Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Bagheri Kani to Tehran on March 7. Iran insists on this demand and views it as a condition for finalizing the nuclear deal, according to Kamal Kharrazi, a senior adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in statements made on March 7.
At the start of talks, Washington appeared to have responded to the Iranian demand of reversing the US blacklisting of the IRGC in return for Tehran’s pledge not to cause escalation in the region in the future, a proposal that Iran rejected.
Later, the US put forward an alternative proposal. It would lift the designation of the IRGC as a terror organization while keeping the Quds Force, its extra-territorial arm, on the terror list. But Iran rejected this offer too. Moreover, about 80 Democrat and Republican Congress members and senators, in a collective message, warned the White House not to take such a move.
Accordingly, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in a joint press conference with his Israeli counterpart Yair Lapid reiterated that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps is a terrorist organization, which means the disagreement with Iran over this matter still outstanding.
2. Removal of sanctions:
Iran keeps demanding that all US sanctions, including those imposed by the Biden Administration and the former Trump Administration, be lifted. The latest sanctions imposed on March 30 target entities involved in obtaining supplies for Iran’s ballistic missile program.
Iran believes that these should include sanctions related to its nuclear and missile program, its regional role and even those regarding human rights violations. Tehran went further to demand that Washington lift a part of these sanctions as a sign of goodwill and seriousness. This was reiterated by Iranian foreign minister Amir Abdollahian during a meeting of the Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee held on April 10.
But Washington emphasizes that such demand is impossible to fulfil because some of the sanctions are related to other issues not included in the 2015 nuclear deal, according to statements made by US State Department spokesman Ned Price on April 5. Additionally, Congress members’ rejection of President Biden's approach to Iran as indecisive will make fulfillment of this demand extremely difficult.
3. Legal guarantees:
Tehran demands that Washington give legal guarantees that it would not quit the nuclear deal again in the future, and that it would not use pretexts to trigger the snapback mechanism, under which sanctions on Iran would be immediately reinstated.
These guarantees demanded by Iran require approval by the Congress, which is unlikely especially after Congress members pledged to cancel any agreement signed by the Biden Administration with Iran if Republicans retake the White House in the next elections.
Moreover, Iran wants Washington to pledge to allow foreign companies planning to invest in Iran to continue to operate from 4 to 6 years through legal acts issued by the US Department of Treasury and made public to all companies.
But this demand was rejected by Washingon. Blinken said that if this can be guaranteed as long as Biden is in the White House, future administrations cannot keep promises.
Iran Pressure Instruments
Iran went beyond taking a stern position to adopt escalatory policies to place pressure on Washington. These can be explained as follows:
1. Nuclear escalation:
Iran uses nuclear escalation to place pressure on Washington and other western countries to force them to fulfill its demands. Tehran increased its ability to enrich uranium to the 60% purity level using advanced nuclear centrifuges to produce about 33 kilograms, according to announcements in March. 90% purity is the level needed to produce a nuclear weapon.
Moreover, Iran continues to block International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from completing their job by keeping all recordings from the cameras at its nuclear facilities and refusing to hand them over until the nuclear deal is signed in Vienna. This was reiterated by Mohammad Reza Ghaebi, head of Iran's Permanent Mission to International Organizations, in statements he made on April 8.
Additionally, Tehran vowed to enrich uranium to continue to enrich uranium to 20% purity even after a deal is reached in Vienna, which is higher than the 3.67%, which is the level stated in the text of the 2015 deal.
2. Posing threats to regional stability:
Iran’s Supreme Leader, in March, emphasized that Iran will not give up its regional influence or our defense capabilities. This shows Iran’s insistence on refusing to negotiate other issues together with its nuclear program, especially its ballistic missile program and its regional role. In a statement on April 1, the IRGC said Iran’s missile power and regional influence are red lines that cannot be given up. This is despite the fact that Iran demanded the delisting of the IRGC’s terrorist designation, which is also an issue irrelevant to the nuclear talks.
Over the past period, Tehran opted for escalation and attacked Irbi, the capital of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region in early March. In the same month, the Iranian-backed Houthi group intensified its attacks on economic and civilian sites in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, a rocket attack on a US military base in eastern Syria on April 9 left four US troops injured.
Potential Consequences
The following are potential scenarios for a nuclear deal in light of the aforementioned Iranian demands and its nuclear and regional escalation.
1. Collapse of the nuclear talks:
This would be caused by Iran’s insistence on its demands and Washington’s refusal to fulfill them. Washington believes that these demands are exaggerated and has even put forward new conditions that Iran says are irrelevant to the nuclear deal, according to statements made by its foreign minister on April 11.
Additionally, Blinken clearly said that he is not optimistic about reaching an agreement in Vienna on Iran’s nuclear program, and even threatened to seek non-diplomatic approaches to deal with Iran, which implies more sanctions against Tehran and even the use of military power in coordination with European allies.
2. Successful talks:
In this scenario, Iran and the US would be willing to revive the nuclear deal and both would take a hard-line approach to each other only as a way to reinforce their positions at the talks and obtain as many concessions as possible from each other. Within this context, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has the final say on the nuclear talks, announced, on April 13, that he endorses the government of Ebrahim Raisi at the Vienna talks, and noted that the negotiations are going ahead properly. The statement serves as a green light for the Iranian negotiators to strike the potential deal.
3. Partial deal:
This possibility is endorsed by several facts. Most importantly is the willingness of both the Iranians and the Americans to reach understandings despite the outstanding issues at the talks. It basically hinges upon an agreement implying that both Washington and Tehran would reciprocate concessions such as Washington’s release of some of Iran’s frozen foreign assets in return for halting uranium enrichment. But the main issue here is that this option would ease economic pressures caused by the US sanctions and consequently lead to a lack of incentives that would encourage Iran to sign a new deal.
In conclusion, uncertainty appears to be prevailing in the nuclear talks in Vienna, especially after Iran adopted escalatory policies regarding the nuclear program or its interference in regional states, although, as observed, the United States’ interest in reaching a new deal while ignoring Iran’s provocations is a sign that prospects for reviving the nuclear deal remain to be seen.
