In early 2024, the Middle East seemed to have reached a low point, particularly concerning the Arab World. Gaza had endured massive bloodshed, while Sudan grappled with a violent civil war. Libya remained a failed state, and Syria stood disfigured with more than half its population forcibly displaced. Lebanon continued to struggle, unable even to fill the symbolic post of President. Positive trends towards stability in Iraq were threatened by the reemergence of extremist groups. The Yemen conflict and Red Sea region grew increasingly insecure. Various states progressively occupied territories in neighboring vicinities.
Economies across the region faced challenges from persistent societal disparities. Climate change exacerbated water scarcity and food insecurity, while pressures to rapidly shift away from fossil fuels tested numerous regional economies. The list of issues seemed endless.
Nevertheless, many believed a turning point was imminent, especially considering the wide-ranging ramifications of the prevailing paradigm on the interests of many in and around the region. Such optimism, however, has proven misplaced.
In the last twelve months, death and destruction have intensified in Gaza and the West Bank. Despite potential interim agreements, we remain far from resolving or stabilizing the situation in Gaza or concluding the Palestine-Israel conflict. Regional problems have seen little progress, with minor advancements in Yemen and an agreement between Lebanon and Israel to contain cross-border incursions, which still awaits testing.
Violence has escalated throughout the region, with Israel expanding its occupation of Arab territory to include more parts of Syrian Golan and frequently targeting assets in Iran and sites in Yemen. A coalition of forces has overthrown the Syrian government, potentially leading to years of transition. An unstable Syria could naturally have consequences for neighboring states, particularly Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey.
Such is the state of play as we enter 2025.
Nonetheless, just a few days ago, I found myself once again part of a discussion where I encountered the view that the region had hit rock bottom and could only move forward. This perspective fueled a heated debate.
I am not a doomsday proponent, nor have I lost all hope that the Arab World and the Middle East can navigate the future more positively. However, this positive trajectory depends on objective, evidence-based policy-making and good, rational, efficient strategic governance.
The resolution of the aforementioned acute problems is imperative, particularly given the level of death and destruction witnessed. Yet, with both the international and regional orders in complete disarray, such resolution seems unlikely in the near future. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to highlight particular points of emphasis for several key issues.
Libya
Libya is a wealthy yet failed state, where national leaders prioritize themselves over national interests, and international players feast on the chaos. Both these trends need reversal. Egypt, possibly with Algeria and/or the United Nations, can take the diplomatic lead in this respect, ultimately convening a conference similar to that previously held in Berlin. The specific purpose would be ending foreign interference and establishing national institutions responsive to all sectors of the Libyan community but subservient to none.
Sudan
The Sudanese civil war is a humanitarian disaster and a moral epiphany. Arab states, in particular, must unite to pressure and incentivize the parties to end the conflict and choose a neutral transitional government. This government should be capable of providing basic services towards holding elections for Sudanese to freely choose new leaders. Peacekeeping support from the United Nations and African Union will be crucial in this process.
Palestine and Syria
Death and destruction in Gaza must end. Reconstruction of the sector is an urgent necessity for Palestinians to return to their dwellings. Achieving stability requires a two-pronged, interconnected approach. The first prong deals with the Ceasefire, which will involve hostage and prisoner exchange, withdrawal of Israeli forces, security arrangements, humanitarian support, and reconstruction. The second prong focuses on Conflict Resolution / End of Conflict, providing for the establishment of a Palestinian State based on 1967 realities, with a priori agreed-upon concrete steps implemented and fulfilled over a 3-5 year period.
Determining the direction of Syria's transition is a paramount concern for many in the region. An inclusive, tolerant, and centrist Syria that respects its diverse facets and ethnicities while maintaining a clear Arab identity is imperative. The potential for implosion or sectarianism poses dire consequences domestically and a potential cross-border threat to neighboring countries. Arab engagement must be vigorous in its commitment and brutally candid in expressing the expectations of the Arab world. Allowing regional states to exploit present circumstances or future power vacuums is a dangerous proposition.
Non-Arab states
Arab relations with the three non-Arab members in the region will be tested and redefined this year. Israel, beyond its occupation of Arab territories, has unabashedly affirmed its willingness to use force wherever it serves its interests. Such a dangerous trend needs to be contained, not only for its own sake but also to prevent emulation by others in the region, which could create an unstable paradigm.
Turkey, a significant competitor with multiple relations extending well beyond the Levant, does not hesitate to exercise its muscle. Arab relations with Turkey must recognize it as a significant regional player with legitimate interests while simultaneously blunting any aspirations of hegemony or superiority.
Iran is undergoing a transition with a new President and an aging Supreme Leader, providing an earnest reason for recalibration. An assertive yet non-warmongering Donald Trump, coupled with Netanyahu's keen interest in sustaining tensions with Iran, will factor into this calibration. Calculated and considered Arab engagement could be worthwhile and possibly helpful. At the very least, it will prevent unpleasant surprises that may have consequences for the Gulf and beyond.
Navigating the International Stage
On the global level, the Arab world will increasingly be asked to take sides between the United States on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, particularly the latter. While the Biden administration made cooperation conditional on containing relations with both Russia and China, Trump will mostly focus on China, which remains the largest single trading partner for many in the Arab world, especially in the Gulf area, albeit its energy imports have decreased. Playing superpowers against each other can be costly, but cowing to their concerns or threats is even more so.
Future Challenges
In 2025, Arabs need to address a number of generic and regional issues. Serious reflection is warranted on reaffirming or asserting the "political identity" of the Arab world. With about 65% of the Arab world below 30 years of age, Arabs seem torn between two conflicting perspectives: an imprecise and artificial belief that the Arab world had and should always be unanimous, and a generation that has never witnessed wide regional commonality and is focused on national identity and individual self-interest. The choice should not be between these two artificial and destructive trends. Instead, the challenge is best addressed through greater social and economic interaction, creating a platform for interstate and community relations.
Most Arab countries face severe domestic technological deficiencies, importing but rarely generating new technologies. This situation places them continuously on the short end of the value chain, fostering an unhealthy dependency on others. The issue spans both military and civilian industries, particularly in smart technologies.
I have repeatedly cautioned against water scarcity problems in the region, especially in the Arab world. Socioeconomic trends and regional political hegemony, predominantly by non-Arab and water-abundant nations, exacerbate this situation. Moreover, the ramifications of climate change in the Middle East are more extreme than in other regions, further aggravating food insecurity.
Lastly, it is imperative for Arabs to propose visions for future regional security structures. These should embody an agreed set of highlighted principles and mechanisms to preempt and address imminent threats, as well as resolve ongoing conflicts.
