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Why “Small Cities” Have Become Increasingly Significant in Crisis Countries

20 ديسمبر، 2016


Historically, most regional and international powers involved in current Middle Eastern conflicts have focused on the major battles in major cities, such as Aleppo in Syria, as the main conflict zones between the regime in question and the armed opposition. Another such city is Mosul in Iraq, which the Iraqi government and its allied militias are attempting to retake from the Islamic State (ISIS).

More recently, some smaller cities, which hadn’t been pivotal to these regional conflicts, have begun to draw the attention of the regional power players, including both major states and armed militias. This is due to a number of strategic considerations, the most significant being how these cities are tied to the regional agendas of the different players seeking to enhance their strategic gains in these conflicts.

Numerous Examples:

In this context, the Iraqi city of Tel Afar constitutes one such previously marginal city which has become of increasing significance. The city has become one of the vital arenas in the regional power struggle, especially in the struggle between Iran and Turkey.

Iran considers the city of vital importance in the upcoming battle with the Islamic State, whose main stronghold now lies within the Syrian city of al-Raqqah after being driven out of Mosul. Tel Afar lies along the international road connecting Iraq and Syria, and was thus a logistic pivot for ISIS reinforcements upon the commencement of the battle to retake Mosul. 

Yet Tel Afar means much more to Iran, which sees it as a potential cornerstone for a regional corridor connecting Iran with its allies in Syria and Lebanon, specifically the regime of Bashar al-Assad and the Lebanese party Hezbollah. Iran’s vision for Tel Afar may be related to preparations for the different potential outcomes of the Syrian conflict, which will impact Iran’s regional ambitions. 

Numerous reports have stated that this corridor begins within Iraq on its borders with Iran, specifically from the Diyala governorate, and extends across north eastern Tikrit, and ends in Tel Afar. Tet Afar in turn lies on the road to Sinjar on the border with Syria, which increases its significance as the main pivot in this passage.  This may explain why the Iranian-backed militia, the Popular Mobilization Forces, has insisted on participating in the battle to liberate Mosul from ISIS, as it has recently opened a new front west of Mosul through to Tel Afar. 

This has led to increasingly intense disputes between the Kurds and the central government in Baghdad. The Kurdistan government considers Tel Afar a natural extension of what Masoud Barzani refers to as, “blood borders”. The central government considers the Popular Mobilization Forces as a component of the state’s armed forces, which means that the militia’s participation in the Mosul offensive has legal and political legitimacy, a legitimacy that has been cemented by the ratification of the Popular Mobilization Committee law.

More importantly, the Popular Mobilization Forces’ participation in the Mosul offensive has shed light on the “hidden” regional conflict between Turkey and Iran over the city of Tel Afar. Turkey has shown its fears of the possible inclination of the militias to institute a demographic alteration program, seeking to increase Kurdish presence in Tel Afar at the expense of its resident Turkmen majority. The Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) is centered west of Nineveh on the Dhamar-Sinjar axis, and is in cooperation with the Popular Mobilization Forces, and this increases in Ankara’s eyes the possibility of an alliance among its foes.

As Tel Afar is of strategic significance to Iran, it is also a strategically significant corridor for Turkey, since it links Turkey to Iraq through the Ovakoy passage on the borders, which Turkey set up to back the Turkmen against Kurdish power.

Turkey has threatened to militarily intervene in the Mosul offensive if the Popular Mobilization Forces participate, justifying this on the grounds of human rights violations carried out by the militia in areas recently reconquered from the Islamic state, such as Tikrit and Fallujah. Turkish president Erdogan stated on Oct. 30th, 2016, that there will be, “a different response should the armed Shiite militias spread fear in Tel Afar.” This statement increased tensions between Ankara and Baghdad, especially after Erdogan’s criticism of Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, who had called on Turkey to withdraw its forces from northern Iraq.

A Kurdish Arch:

In this context, the Syrian city of al-Bab holds the same level of importance. The city has become a main theater in the struggle between Turkey and the Kurdish militias. The Kurds seek to benefit from the escalation of the Syrian conflict through joining in the war against the Islamic State, in order to establish what is known as the “Kurdish arch”, which extends from Kobani in the east, through Manbij and al-Bab, to Afrin in the west.

From Ankara’s perspective, Kurdish militia control over al-Bab, as part of the Kurdish project in Rojava, will create a natural link with the Kurds inside Turkey. This of course is unacceptable to Ankara. The Turks have come to consider the “Euphrates Shield” military operation as an opportunity to halt the establishment of the Kurdish arch. The operation began upon the entry of Turkish Special Forces into the city of Jarabulus in Aleppo’s northern countryside on Aug. 24th, 2016, and is aimed at defeating terrorist groups, such as ISIS, and driving them back up to 50 kilometers from the Turkish border.

Al-Bab also constitutes a strategic pivot for forces and militias aligned with Turkey to threaten areas under the control of the Syrian regime and its allies in Aleppo. In addition, control of the city might hamper dealings between the Kurdish militias and the Syrian regime. These dealings are founded upon the Kurds backing the regime in Aleppo, in exchange for the regime supporting the Kurdish militias in their advance towards the Turkish border.  

In conclusion, it can be said that the significance of small cities in countries experiencing conflict will increase in the coming period, as they constitute important pivots in the development of these conflicts. These cities will have an important role in determining the balance of power between the actors fighting over them, as well as the course of these actors’ regional projects and agendas, especially after military operations against the Islamic State are concluded