Will Russia or China fill the geopolitical vacuum caused by America’s so-called “pivot,” “withdrawal,” or “decoupling” from the Middle East? Traditionally, in contemporary history, Russia was the primary competitor in the region, thus the potential alternative. However, China has now joined the fray, possibly even surpassing the Eurasian power.
After the presumed end of the Cold War in its favor and the emergence of new technologies that make it less dependent on Middle Eastern oil, the United States has become less motivated to endure the harsh political sandstorms and complexities of the region's intractable problems. This is especially true when it means sacrificing blood and treasure in an increasingly transparent, networked global village with constituents who have a reduced appetite for losses, as evidenced in recent conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
This is a valid question from many perspectives, but it does not sufficiently take into account the historical legacy of relations between either of these two countries and the Middle East, or their contemporary interests and needs. China and Russia have been involved in the region for a long time, and their policies are not exclusively focused on competition with America.
Russia's Historic Association and Contemporary Motivations in the Middle East
Russia has a long and complex history with the greater Middle East, which includes Turkey, as recognized by the contemporary United Nations depiction of the region. Twelve wars occurred between the Russian and Ottoman Empires between the 16th and 20th centuries, with most ending in favor of Russia, except for the Crimea war of 1710-11. However, post-World War I, France and Great Britain conspired against both empires and drew and divided the Levantine map to serve their interests, excluding their original co-conspirator, Russia, which had replaced its Czar.
During the Cold War in the 1950s, the Soviet Union established a new paradigm with a much stronger component of geopolitical strategies in competition with the United States. Initially, its regional friends were left-leaning Arab Republics shedding European colonialism in Syria and Iraq, ultimately joined by Egypt and Algeria.
Russia's relations with Iran had historically been tense, particularly from the Persian perspective after several conflicts in the Caucasus with Aran, Georgia, and Armenia, as well as Dagestan. Tension spilled over into the Pahlavi era, with Iran clearly siding with the West. However, it is often forgotten that the Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the State of Israel on May 17, 1948. Relations went through tense phases as Arab-Israeli wars broke out, but rising demographic communities from Russian origin in Israel have shifted relations significantly, with security and technological cooperation growing in both directions.
I mentioned this historical background to emphasize that the withdrawal of the United States from the region after the Cold War in 1990 was an aberration because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Russia's presence and interest in the Middle East are not exclusively USA-centric.
Analytical analysis and personal discussions with the highest national security officials suggest, I believe that Russia's most important motivations in the Middle East are consistent with its perception of its civilization and global roles, reflective of its demographic composition, as well as its reading of the challenges and opportunities of the world order.
In essence, I think it is safe to assert Russia's motivations are not to replace the United States in the region but rather to achieve a level of geopolitical parity without overextending itself. This basically means keeping the military and security facilities it has in the region and ensuring access to warm water ports in the Mediterranean and secure passage in other waterways.
Preempting extremist elements converging towards its borders is a primary interest given already existing breeding grounds in Chechnya, Dagestan, North Caucasus, and Bashkortostan in the Volga River basin. Defending Orthodox Christians in the Middle East is prominent on their agenda as well. Access to Israeli technologies and Arab Gulf investments are substantially important, as is market access for Russian arms, nuclear technology, oil and gas, as well as food products.
The Evolution of China's Relations with the Middle East
Chinese relations with the Arab world have undergone four major turning points, with Egypt, Syria, and Yemen leading the way in establishing diplomatic relations after the Bandung Conference in 1956. China's support for decolonization in the Arab world helped expand formal relations, including with Morocco, Algeria, and Sudan. As China tempered its cultural revolution policies, relations were established with Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan, Oman, and eventually Saudi Arabia. Further economic and multidisciplinary engagement led to relations with UAE, Qatar, Palestine, and Bahrain. Official visits have increased in recent years, and dialogue fora and action plans govern the new Arab-Sino Partnership, most recently hosted in Saudi Arabia.
Since 1992, China's relations with Israel have evolved significantly. On the 25th anniversary of relations, the Israeli Prime Minister led a delegation to Beijing to forge a Comprehensive Innovative Partnership in infrastructure and technology. American resistance quickly heightened, citing cybersecurity and espionage concerns even on civilian projects, as well as ongoing concerns about Israeli technology access for Chinese firms. However, there is no evidence that China is trying to replace America's role in Israel or that Israel wants China to do so.
Imperial China and Ancient Persia had long-standing trade relations, including a strong maritime dimension during the Ming dynasty. Diplomatic relations with Iran were established in 1971, and as Western sanctions against Iran were imposed in 1979, China became a strong arms supplier for Iran and its Arab neighbors. China's strategy for Iran and the region aims to prevent any single power from controlling the region, opposing support for Taiwan, and ensuring fulfillment of energy needs. Access to the regional market, which is already significant, will be the backbone of economic relations.
China, despite not being a direct part of the Cold War, has emerged as a competitor and potential adversary to both the United States and Russia. Until recently, China has been reluctant to enter political landscapes beyond its region. However, it has recently offered principles for resolving the Ukraine crisis and ensuring peace and security in the Middle East through dialogue. Despite this, it is unlikely that China will provide substantial security guarantees to the Middle East like the United States and Russia have done for their allies.
The Growing Presence of China and Russia in the Middle East"
The perceived vacuum in the Middle East created by a less operationally committed United States policy did not generate the presence of Russia and China in the region. They had already been there for some time. The vacuum will not be filled exclusively by Russia or China, but rather by both, as well as by increased regional activism and calculated multipolarity in relations with foreign powers. China has a vastly growing economic footprint, which is a reality that America should start accepting. There are several areas of ongoing and potentially growing cooperation between China and Russia, including combating extremism, nuclear nonproliferation, and ensuring safe passage on international waterways. Considering both powers as adversaries and potential threats in the Middle East, as has been done globally, may actually drive them closer together and become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
