أخبار المركز
  • أحمد عليبة يكتب: (هاجس الموصل: لماذا يخشى العراق من التصعيد الحالي في سوريا؟)
  • محمود قاسم يكتب: (الاستدارة السريعة: ملامح المشهد القادم من التحولات السياسية الدرامية في كوريا الجنوبية)
  • السيد صدقي عابدين يكتب: (الصدامات المقبلة: مستقبل العلاقة بين السلطتين التنفيذية والتشريعية في كوريا الجنوبية)
  • د. أمل عبدالله الهدابي تكتب: (اليوم الوطني الـ53 للإمارات.. الانطلاق للمستقبل بقوة الاتحاد)
  • معالي نبيل فهمي يكتب: (التحرك العربي ضد الفوضى في المنطقة.. ما العمل؟)

Under Observation

The Libyan conflict and the election of a new government

27 فبراير، 2021


The internationally-supported political dialogue forum in Geneva succeeded in selecting a new government, including Abdul Hamid Mohammed al-Dabaib as Prime Minister, and Muhammad Al-Manfi as President of the Presidential Council as well as two other members of the Council. These results were well received internally, regionally and internationally, which raises a key question relevant to the ability of the new government, though temporary, to effect positive accomplishments leading to the general elections in December 2021.

New Faces:

The Geneva Political Dialogue forum led to the formation of a new executive authority, led by figures who were not previously visible in the Libyan political scene and who were welcomed by the figures that have dominated the Libyan political and military society.

1-    A Punitive Voting in Geneva: 

The Dabaib-AlManfi list was not expected to win the elections for the new executive authority in Geneva on February 5. The list received 39 votes versus 34 votes for the Saleh-Bashagha list that was expected to win, and which included Aguila Saleh, the Tobruk Parliament Speaker and Fathi Bashagha, Minister of Interior in the Government of National Accord.

Bashagha's influence in West Libya and the support that Saleh enjoys in the East made them seem to be the appropriate option for the transitional phase. However, the voting ran contrary to that, and appeared to be a punitive voting against figures affiliated with the conflict in East and West Libya. Thus, new figures were selected in an attempt to abolish the severe polarization in the country.

2-    The Election of a New Executive Authority: 

The forum led to the election of Abdul Hamid Dabaib as Prime Minister, who is originally a businessman from Misurata in the West. Muhammad al-Manfi, who was mainly affiliated with the Eastern city of Tobruk, was selected to head the Presidential Council. The latter was an ambassador to the Government of National Accord in Greece, until his departure in light of the Greek rejection of the suspicious agreements between Turkey and the National Accord government in November 2019.

3-    The Support of the Current Political Institutions: 

The Geneva results were well supported by figures in the Libyan authority, primarily Fayez al-Sarraj, President of the Presidential Council and Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord. He announced his blessing for the success of the political dialogue in selecting a new executive authority, and congratulated those chosen to assume these responsibilities. On the other hand, the Supreme Council of State announced its appreciation of the recent elections, calling for supporting this new executive authority until the elections due to take place end of this year.

Meanwhile, Aguila Saleh, President of the Libyan Parliament in Tobruk, congratulated the elected members and welcomed the election results. This reflects a more positive political scene in Libya, since the welcoming came both from East and West Libya.

4-    The support of the Libyan National Army: 

Many awaited the Libyan National Army's stance regarding the Geneva results, which was quickly expressed as deep support. Libyan National Army Spokesman, Ahmed al-Mismari, congratulated the new figures, who have been elected and commended the endeavors to elect a new executive authority aspired by all Libyans. He expressed the army's hopes to prepare the country for the elections due end of 2021.

Active Steps:

After the election of the new authority, Dabaib and Al-Manfi took quick steps, in an attempt to resolve the situation and contribute to the success of the transitional phase, as follows:

1-    Intensive Visits in the East and the West: 

On his first tour in Libya, Al-Manfi headed East to meet political and military figures, particularly Khalifa Haftar, Commander of the Libyan National Army. This came as a very positive step that reflects that the army will not take a neutral stance on the situation at Turkish instructions. Furthermore, Al-Manfi met with Aguila Saleh, despite the latter's loss in the elections. Saleh expressed great support for the new authority, which is another positive sign of a smooth transition of power.

Then, on February 16, 2021, Al-Manfi headed to Tripoli to emphasize the need for harmony amidst Libyan institutions and for coordination regarding the new government. Moreover, Dabaib called on Misrata to reconcile with the rest of Libya to overcome the regional dispute with Tripoli, as well as the disputes with Eastern and Western Libya.

2-    Mutual Political Flexibility: 

One of the main features of the current Libyan scene is the political flexibility between the new executive figures and the ones who have been influential in the scene over the past years. This was demonstrated in the positive interaction with the commander of the Libyan National Army, the Tobruk Parliament Speaker, the Consultative Council and the Government of National Accord. Regarding the concerns about Bashagha's stance, due to his great influence in Western Libya and his unexpected defeat in the Geneva elections, on February 13, 2021, Abdul Hamid Dabaib stated his intentions to assign Bashagha a role in the upcoming government. This was quite expected in light of them being from the same city, as well as Bashagha's control over the Misrata militia and other militias in Tripoli, and the risk of his exclusion from the transitional phase.

On the other hand, this raises a question relevant to the Ministry of Defense in the new government, in terms of who will assume the leading position and their stance towards the Libyan National Army. This is crucial considering the great Turkish pressures to keep Haftar neutral to the scene, in addition to Ankara resuming the formation of a parallel army of militias in Western Libya, as an obvious challenge to the new government.

3-    Parliamentary Efforts to Grant Confidence: 

On February 15, the Parliament made its final decision to hold its session relevant to granting confidence to the new government in Sirte, which has no militias, and which is accepted by most political and military forces. This comes in light of a dispute over this between the Parliament of Tobruk and the dissident representatives of Tripoli, whereas the government must be formed within 21 days from the date of its election in order to present the formation to the Parliament to be granted confidence. In case this is not possible, the formation is to be presented to the political dialogue forum.

4-    Dealing Positively with External Forces: 

The new executive authority confirmed that it works in the interest of all Libyans, and that it interacted positively with the various external forces, which welcomed and supported the Geneva results. However, this government's ability to manage a successful transitional phase is greatly dependent on its ability to stay neutral to any external party, especially to Turkey whose role is quite suspicious. It is also necessary to take a strong stance against foreign mercenaries and the militias in order to create the appropriate climate for the elections due in December 2021. These positive developments also depend to a large extent on the Biden administration’s position on the Libyan political and military situation due to its regional and international implications on the Libyan conflict.

In general, the election of a new executive authority that has broad acceptance locally, regionally and internationally is a positive indication and a good basis for the success of this transitional period leading to the general elections. However, these developments remain linked to tackling the variant internal challenges, such as the unification of the country's institutions, with the existence of the Tobruk and the Tripoli Parliaments, a national army in the East and an army of militias in the West, in addition to the interim  government in the East as well as the National Accord government in the West.

There are also vital issues that represent an obstacle to the success of the transitional phase, with the spread of more than 20,000 foreign mercenaries, most of which are supported by Turkey. This comes along the presence of militias in Western Libya as well as the political forces which seek to be involved in the Libyan scene. Furthermore, external forces play a role in fueling the conflict. Therefore, the new authority is before a tough mission, and it yet possesses many components for success and for launching a new phase in Libya following a decade of violence and conflicts.