On July 26, 2021, Lebanese President Michel Aoun appointed former Prime Minister Najib Mikati, to form a new government, after Saad al-Hariri's apology ending a rough 9 months path of fruitless negotiations with President Aoun. Despite optimism surrounding the formation of the new government by Mikati, highlighted by President Aoun’s statement on August 14 that he hopes "white smoke" will appear soon with regards to the formation of a new government, a key question remains: Will Mikati succeed in dismantling the complications that hindered forming a new government, particularly with the emergence of new domestic and regional dilemmas?
Successive developments
The key political developments in Lebanon that followed Najib Mikati's assignment to form the new government can be determined as follows:
1- A new segregation by political forces:
The results of the consultations which led to assigning Mikati for the formation of the new government reflected divergent choices between Hezbollah and its ally, the Lebanese National Movement. The Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc (Hezbollah) chose to vote for Mikati, while the Free Patriotic Movement abstained from nominating anyone. This is an attempt by Hezbollah to present itself as a facilitator of the formation process and to dismiss the suspicions around its attempts to hinder any new government.
Hezbollah's support for Mikati may also contribute to securing a comfortable majority for his government during the vote of confidence in the Parliament, which was a key contentious issue that led to al-Hariri's apology for not forming the government.
2- The military confrontation in Khaldeh:
Amidst the controversy surrounding the distribution of the Ministries of Interior and Justice portfolios, which overshadowed the appointment of al-Hariri for around 9 months, and which constituted the core of the negotiations over the formation of the new Mikati government, the military confrontations that erupted in August 2021 between Hezbollah and the Arab tribes in the Khalde area, South of Beirut, reflected the danger of practicing double standards, when it comes to maintaining stability and security of the area. The military confrontations erupted as a result of the failure to extradite one of Hezbollah’s perpetrators to the court in a security incident that dates back to September 2020, when a child from the tribes was killed. These confrontations may have also spread on a wider geographical level, due to the overlapping places of residence of the tribes with the living quarters of supporters of Hezbollah.
3- The first anniversary of the Beirut Port blast:
Saad al-Hariri’s apology for not forming the government last July 16 coincided with the French Foreign Ministry’s announcement of organizing an international conference to support Lebanon on August 4, 2021, the first anniversary of the Beirut Port blast. This was interpreted by some as an encouragement on the part of French President Emmanuel Macron to the Lebanese political forces to announce the formation of the new government on the anniversary of the explosion.
Others believe this to be a continuation of the mismanagement of the complexities of the Lebanese crisis by France, through the haste response to the demands of Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement and the withdrawal of requiring early parliamentary elections from the French initiative. This implies holding equal responsibility of all instead of limiting it to the forces that violated the commitments made at the Pine Palace meeting in August 2020.
Additionally, France has overlooked the intentional obstruction attempts by the Lebanese President to the former Prime Minister-designate, al-Hariri in the process of forming the government. This achieves a dual objective, giving the impression of a “strong president” by portraying Aoun as able to circumvent any binding parliamentary consultations should their results be unfavorable, as well as perpetuating the amendment of the “Taif Agreement” by deliberately imposing new norms that are not stipulated in the constitution.
This also highlights the President's need to distract the Christian public with these “fake achievements” to cover up the exasperating living and economic conditions, and the lack of progress in the investigations around the port explosion case. No objective official data was presented around the truth of what happened, as the investigations tended to adopt a hypothesis of neglect.
Furthermore, the issue of lifting the immunities of the representatives required for questioning through parliamentary voting turned into a battle of public opinion, which some political forces tried to exploit to prove that the party objecting to bringing the representatives to the ordinary court is covering up the real unknown criminals. Those objecting to the issue of lifting immunities justify their position by the fact that according to the constitution, parliamentarians and ministers are subject to the Supreme Council for trials, and not to the ordinary judiciary. These intensifying controversies led to the Parliamentary Bloc of the Future Movement to submit a bill for suspending all constitutional provisions pertaining to immunities, starting with the President of the Republic all the way to deputies and ministers.
4- Stirring the South Lebanese Front:
After targeting an Israeli oil tanker in the Arabian Sea off Oman, 5 Katyusha rockets were launched from the Lebanese territories adjacent to Israel, and which landed near Kiryat Shmona in Israel on August 4. This was considered a preemptive warning message to deter any potential Israeli military response that may target Iran. For the first time since 2006, the Israeli response was remarkable, reaching deep in Southern Lebanon, as Isreal carried out two air raids on August 5 on a location between the districts of Marjayoun and Nabatieh, unlike the previous Israeli responses, which were limited to bombarding the locations from which the rockets were launched by Lebanon.
On August 6, Hezbollah was forced to launch a new batch of rockets against Israel, after the people of the Lebanese town of Shoya intercepted a camouflaged convoy that turned out to contain a Hezbollah rocket launcher. This incident almost ignited a Druze-Shi’ite sectarian conflict over the ensuing controversies. It also led to people's displacement from the area where the rockets were launched in anticipation of the Israeli reaction. However, a key conclusion from the recent developments in the Southern Lebanese front is Hezbollah's confirmed preference for the Iranian agenda at the expense of dealing with the Lebanese devastated domestic situation.
Breaking the impasse
In light of the current situation in Lebanon, various points can be proposed to get out of the current political crisis in the country, which are as follows:
1- Forming a government headed by Mikati to curb the collapse:
The most appropriate and realistic solution to get out of the current political crisis in Lebanon remains to be the formation of a government led by Mikati and technocratic ministers, where their nomination is agreed upon by the Prime Minister-designate and the current political forces. The proposed cabinet’s mission should be defined in four key areas, namely:
A- Halting the economic collapse in Lebanon or curbing it without claiming any capability of performing miracles.
B- Re-initiating discussions and preparing for negotiations with the IMF.
C- Preparing for the upcoming parliamentary elections in the spring of 2022.
D- Facilitating channels for dialogue between Lebanon and fellow Arab countries.
According to most of the statements by Mikati, he believes that he has the potential, the connections and perhaps the external guarantees to succeed in this task. However, the following facts point to the challenges that may hinder forming the new government:
A- Hezbollah and Iran’s regional calculations, which includes targeting ships in the Sea of Oman as well as stirring the Southern Lebanon front.
B- The calculations of President Aoun, who prefers to maintain the current caretaker government, which allows him to control the basic pillars of the country by controlling key ministerial portfolios such as foreign affairs, defense, justice and energy, in addition to his heading the Supreme Defense Council in light of the caretaker government's inability to convene. This allows President Aoun to portray himself to the public opinion as the president who succeeded in restoring the authority of the “President of the Republic” which he had prior to the "Taif Agreement".
2- A caretaker government until the next elections: It seems that President Aoun's options are limited to continuing with the caretaker government until the next elections are conducted or to come up with a government of one tone similar to the recent government of Hassan Diab, meaning it would be entirely affiliated with the March 8 Alliance, where the President owns a blocking third. Apparently, Aoun's marketing of the option to come up with a government of this single tone is not consistent with the priorities of the Shi’ite duo of Hezbollah and the Amal movement. The more likely scenario is to continue with the caretaker government which fully fits with Aoun's agenda and Hezbollah's desire. However, the October 17 Revolution movement rejects this option as well as the rest of the political components previously included with the March 14 Alliance.
However, this refusal can’t change the equation, since these forces lack the means to compel President Aoun to sign a decree to form a government that he can’t control. Thus, it is not unlikely that Mikati would be pushed to apologize, as was the case with Mustapha Adib and al-Hariri. This direction is beginning to loom as President Aoun's advisor and former Minister, Pierre Raffoul, in an interview on OTV on August 1, considered that Mikati remaining on his own terms (i.e., not giving the blocking third to Aoun in addition to the Ministry of the Interior), may guarantee his disposal, similar to al-Hariri. However, it seems that pushing the designated prime ministers to apologize may this time lead to a major clash with the President, as calls for a boycott of Aoun began to emerge.
3- Intensifying external pressures: On July 30, 2021, the EU approved a legal framework for a penal system targeting those responsible for undermining the rule of law in Lebanon. This was preceded by restrictions on the entry of Lebanese figures to France, whom France considers responsible for hampering the formation of the government and engaging in corruption. Some views consider that the new European approach of imposing sanctions, based on waving and threatening, may be more successful than the direct US approach, which impacted the former ministers Ali Hassan Khalil and Youssef Fenianos, and which led to the disruption of the formation of Mustapha Adib and al-Hariri's governments.
Questions have begun to surface regarding the seriousness of the international community about supporting Lebanon, amidst the current political class’s control over any possible government that may be formed, as they have been accused before of corruption and mismanagement. This political class will not hesitate to exploit any external economic support to influence the electorates and strengthem its own domestic presence. Accordingly, the aim of Western pressures on the Lebanese decision-makers may be to either push them to concede, or to call for parliamentary elections amidst the culminating public resentment against them. This may push the voters to radically change their choices and overthrow this class through ballot boxes.
In conclusion, Najib Mikati's failure to form a new Lebanese government will not only be a personal test for him, but will also represent the squandering of perhaps the last opportunity for the current political class in Lebanon to mend its position before opening the doors wide to other options. These options include imposing a wide range of US and European sanctions amidst the outburst of the Lebanese public anger, which may find the upcoming elections to be an opportunity for venting its frustration.
