In September 2024, the United States and Iraq began consultations regarding an agreement on a plan for the withdrawal of the U.S.-led coalition forces from Iraqi territory. Sources indicated that the plan includes the withdrawal of hundreds of coalition forces by September 2025, with the remainder to leave by the end of the following year. The agreement is awaiting approval from the leadership of both countries, along with the scheduling of an official announcement.
Key Observations
Several observations can be made regarding the disclosed plan for the US withdrawal from Iraq, which can be outlined as follows:
1. Absence of a Formal Agreement:
Iraqi Defense Minister Thabit al-Abbasi announced that Baghdad had reached an agreement with Washington concerning the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq over a two-year period. He confirmed that the agreement outlines the conclusion of the coalition's mission in two phases. The first phase, from September 2024 to September 2025, involves the withdrawal of US forces from Baghdad and the military bases where American advisors are stationed. The second phase, spanning from September 2025 to September 2026, will cover the withdrawal of US forces from their bases in the Kurdistan Region.
Nevertheless, these plans remain mere understandings, as the two countries have yet to sign a formal agreement. The Iraqi side has indicated the possibility of such an agreement being signed sometime in September 2024.
2. Retention of Some Forces:
According to statements from both Iraqi and American officials, the purpose of these understandings and the anticipated agreement is not the complete withdrawal of US and international coalition forces, nor the termination of Operation Inherent Resolve—a military campaign initiated by Washington in 2014 against the terrorist group ISIS. Instead, it aims to establish a new defensive cooperation between Baghdad and Washington. This relationship is expected to meet Baghdad's aspirations to reduce the number of international coalition and US forces in Iraq. However, it is anticipated that a certain number of US troops will remain in Iraq under the mandate of training and advisory roles. Nevertheless, no specific figures for the US or coalition forces expected to stay in Iraq in an advisory and training capacity after the completion of the US withdrawal phases by 2026 have been mentioned.
3. Retention of Intervention Authority:
The understandings reached between the Iraqi and US sides do not include any commitment from Washington to refrain from military intervention, including airstrikes against hostile targets in Iraq, without prior coordination with the official Iraqi authorities.
Potential Implications
The understandings reached between the Iraqi and US sides are likely to produce a range of implications for Iraq's domestic landscape, with effects that may extend to Iraq's regional surroundings, as well as impact the United States itself. These implications can be outlined as follows:
1. For the Iraqi Side:
The potential US withdrawal from Iraq will have an impact on three key actors in the Iraqi political scene: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al-Sudani, the Coordination Framework and Iran-aligned armed factions, and the Kurds.
Regarding Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al-Sudani, a US withdrawal, if it occurs, would represent a political victory for his government. The withdrawal agreement would secure several political gains for the Prime Minister. The first gain is fulfilling his promise to remove US forces from Iraq, a commitment he made when he assumed office in 2022. The second gain is meeting a key demand of the Coordination Framework, which has consistently called for the removal of US forces from the country. This could, in turn, ease the growing tensions between the government and the Coordination Framework.
In recent months, disagreements have emerged between some factions within the Coordination Framework, certain Iran-aligned armed groups, and Prime Minister al-Sudani, particularly regarding the delay in concluding Iraq-US negotiations to end the international coalition's mission and withdraw US forces. Moreover, tensions between al-Sudani's government and the Coordination Framework have been intensifying, especially following the arrest of senior officials in al-Sudani's office, accused of managing a surveillance network targeting political forces in Iraq. This incident led to calls within the Coordination Framework to withdraw confidence from al-Sudani's government. Therefore, fulfilling the Framework's demand for a US withdrawal could help de-escalate the strained relationship between al-Sudani and the Framework.
The third gain is that the current framework of understanding regarding the US withdrawal, if implemented, would preserve the strong relations between Washington and Iraq. These understandings would not lead to a complete withdrawal of US forces but would allow for the retention of some troops in Iraq.
The fourth gain is that Prime Minister al-Sudani could leverage this agreement to promote himself as a leader capable of maintaining excellent relations with Washington and Tehran while keeping Iraq out of the dangers of becoming entangled in a costly regional war. This is a narrative Prime Minister al-Sudani is likely to use to bolster his image ahead of the 2025 parliamentary elections.
2. For the Coordination Framework and Armed Factions:
The potential US withdrawal represents a significant gain for the Coordination Framework and the armed factions aligned with it. Politically, this withdrawal serves the interests of the Coordination Framework, as it allows them to declare success in removing US forces from the country—an essential element of their political agenda since their formation. The Framework will also benefit from the withdrawal by mobilizing its electoral base and supporters, as well as attempting to attract new voters. This withdrawal can be strategically exploited in election campaigns as a key component of the Framework's candidates' electoral agendas.
For the armed factions, the US withdrawal would also be well. It would allow these factions to increase their influence in Iraq with little opposition. Additionally, the US withdrawal would enable the expansion of operations by Iran-aligned armed factions, particularly in the transportation of weapons and missiles through Iraq, without US oversight.
3. For the Kurds:
The Kurds are likely to be the biggest losers from the US withdrawal from Iraq. This withdrawal is expected to weaken the Kurdistan Region, which benefits from the US military presence on its territory, as well as from American military support for the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, both in terms of training and armament. Beyond the potential harm to the military capabilities of the Peshmerga, the increased influence of Iran-aligned armed factions that would follow the withdrawal could have negative repercussions for the Kurdistan Region. There are numerous unresolved issues between Baghdad and Erbil, notably the distribution of oil revenues and the disputed city of Kirkuk between the region and the federal government. Thus, the growing role of armed factions in Iraq after the US withdrawal is likely to undermine the Kurdish position on these issues.
4. For Regional Actors:
If the US withdrawal occurs, it is likely to have implications primarily for Iran and Turkey.
For Iran, the US withdrawal would represent a victory for Tehran in its struggle against Washington in Iraq. Consequently, Iranian influence in Iraq would become unchallenged, allowing Iran to capitalize on the absence of US forces to extend its influence within the country, encompassing both political and economic dimensions. The visit of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Iraq on September 11, 2024, may have been aimed at discussing arrangements for Iran in the post-US withdrawal phase. Additionally, it is likely that Iran will increasingly rely on Iraq to transport weapons and military equipment to Lebanon following the US withdrawal.
Turkey is likely to benefit from the US withdrawal by expanding its military operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Ankara will reach bilateral agreements with the Kurdistan Regional Government, particularly with the Kurdistan Democratic Party, regarding the nature of Turkish presence in northern Iraq. Such agreements would aim to ensure stability in areas controlled by the party and facilitate cooperation in combating the PKK.
5. For the United States:
If the US withdrawal is implemented, it could have potential ramifications extending to both the domestic landscape and Washington's regional policy. Domestically, the recent understandings regarding the US withdrawal come at a sensitive time, with the upcoming US presidential elections approaching. While a significant number of Americans, especially among the youth, believe that US forces should be withdrawn from Iraq, there are concerns among elite circles about the possibility of a chaotic withdrawal resembling the US exit from Afghanistan in 2021. Such an outcome could harm the image of the United States and negatively impact its allies in the region.
The timing of the US withdrawal could also pose challenges for the Democratic candidate and current Vice President Kamala Harris's campaign. Republicans, along with the campaign of Republican candidate Donald Trump, are expected to use the topic of withdrawal as an electoral issue, highlighting what they perceive as the failure of the current Democratic administration, led by President Joe Biden, in foreign policy—of which Harris is a part. It is likely that Trump will frame the US withdrawal from Iraq as a way to reinforce his previous accusations against the Biden-Harris Administration of capitulating to Iran.
6. On the Regional Side:
Any unorganized large-scale withdrawal of US forces from Iraq would damage American influence in the region. This withdrawal would allow Iran to expand its reach in Iraq and contribute to strengthening its positions in Syria. Additionally, the US withdrawal highlights a renewed perception of American disengagement from regional security and confronting Iran, suggesting that the Middle East is not regarded as a strategically important area compared to the Pacific and Southeast Asia theaters of operations.
Moreover, the US withdrawal from Iraq could reveal contradictions in American policy, as the US continues to supply substantial amounts of equipment, munitions, and military aid to support Israel while distancing itself from confronting the Iranian threat. This approach could pose significant risks to regional countries if the Iranian threat is not neutralized.
Future of the US Withdrawal
It is clear that the future of the US withdrawal from Iraq and the implementation of the aforementioned understandings will depend on several factors, as outlined below:
1. Outcome of the US Elections:
If Kamala Harris wins, her administration will likely seek to reduce the number of US troops in Iraq, continuing the Biden administration's approach and the 2022 US National Security Strategy, which prioritizes theaters of operations other than the Middle East. This strategic shift focuses on regions such as Southeast Asia to compete with China and prevent its expansion.
Conversely, if Donald Trump wins the elections, he will likely adopt a hardline stance toward Tehran. Trump is expected to reimplement the Maximum Pressure policy against Iran, which would inherently position Iraq as a battleground for competition with Iran.
2. The Threat of ISIS:
The primary purpose of the US military presence in Iraq is to combat and prevent the resurgence of ISIS. Therefore, a crucial factor in determining whether or not to implement the US withdrawal from Iraq is the state of the organization on the ground and the capability of Iraqi security forces to contain its threat. If the threat posed by ISIS remains limited and the Iraqi security forces continue to effectively counter the organization through security operations, there will be little justification for the continued presence of US troops in Iraq. However, if the threat from ISIS escalates in the coming months, this may provide justification for the United States or local allied forces (such as the Kurds) to request an extension of US troop presence in Iraq.
In conclusion, it can be said that the US withdrawal from Iraq could create a security gap resulting from the technological capabilities utilized by US forces in the country. The United States possesses advanced intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities that enable it to monitor the threat posed by ISIS and carry out preemptive strikes against it. However, this gap is likely to be temporary until Iraqi security forces (the army, Popular Mobilization Forces, and federal police) can develop their own capabilities to counter ISIS. This development will primarily depend on the focus of these forces, particularly the Popular Mobilization Forces, on combating ISIS rather than being drawn into participation in a regional war.
