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Is the Nuclear Agreement Between Iran and the P5+1 Group Still Fragile?

01 نوفمبر، 2016


The nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5 + 1 group, signed on the 14th of July 2015, has led to the lifting of most of the sanctions that were in place on Iran at the start of January 2016. The agreement, however, still faces a number of tough challenges that have pushed some in both Iran and the US to call for the cancelling of the agreement. 

This is a farfetched possibility, due to the negative consequences that would be forced upon the negotiating parties, especially since they are already preoccupied with other issues that are just as important such as the war on terror and the Syrian crisis. However, cancelling the agreement is still on the table if the current differences between the parties persist, or if more aggressive political personalities rise to the post of president in either the US or Iran. Currently the US elections are due in November and are to be followed by the Iranian elections 6 months later. 

Political Crisis:

The possibility that the agreement could fall through has been highlighted in a number of speeches by Iranian and international representatives, the last of them being the head of the IAEA Yukiya Amano, who noted in an interview on the 7th of October 2016 with German press that the agreement is still very weak. He also added that the upcoming elections in the US and Iran will create even more room for doubt over the agreement, in a sign that a change in the US administration and the lack of continuity in President Hassan Rouhani’s term could increase the chances of a setback in the agreement during the coming phase. 

Most notable in Amano’s interview is that it focused on the political side of things and not the technical, meaning the head of the IAEA does not see an issue with the technical aspects of the agreement as per each side’s commitments. For instance, reducing the levels of uranium enrichment from 20% to 3.5% on Iran’s side, reducing the number of centrifuges or lifting the International sanctions in place on Iran, are not too difficult to handle technically, yet the political challenges between the negotiating parties are the main obstacle, specifically between the US and Iran. 

In other words, the issues that could see the agreement collapse is purely based on the lack of trust between Tehran and Washington. The agreement has done nothing to stem and contain this, however, it is not for lack of commitment on both sides, as the IAEA has confirmed in a number of statements, before the interview of Amano, that Iran is committed to the articles of the agreement.

A Number of Reasons:

Without a doubt, there are a number of reasons that increase the lack of trust between both sides, namely, Iran, despite sticking to its commitments as per the IAEA, was very keen on finding loopholes in the agreement with the global powers in order to be able to continue its ballistic missile tests. They see this as being a side issue to the agreement and is not within the scope of the Security Council as they are not qualified to look into nuclear weapons. 

On the other hand, the proposed lifting of sanctions from Iran is not proceeding as planned either as Iran has accused the US of hindering the financial and monetary transactions between Iranian and foreign banks. Even some foreign corporations have shied away from any deals with Iranian companies out of fear that they would get penalized by the US government. This seemed clearer by Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani during his General Assembly speech to the UN in September 2016 where he sought to highlight that the lack of lifting of sanctions by the US is a shameful act.

Alongside the message that was sent to the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by the US in March 2015, where they affirmed the agreement can become null and void with the election of a new president in Iran, the US congress has also adopted a number of new laws that have limited the options that Barack Obama has to lift the sanctions off of Iran. The latest law was agreed upon by the US congress on the 23rd of September 2016 where it refused the sending of money to Iran in the shape of aid, indirect money, or direct money via banknotes unless congress approves the matter. 

As for Iran, the Ayatollah has threatened to burn the agreement as a response to statements by US officials and a number of Iranian officials have suggested the return to reviving the Iranian nuclear program by enriching uranium by 20% again and to increase the number of centrifuges as well as shifting the enrichment process to the “Natanz” facility that was built underground.

A Deepening Crisis:

The problem in the choices made available to both Iran and the US regarding cancelling the agreement do not seem to be a great deal. The situations and the new conditions that the agreement has forced into place seem to be a great deal different than those they had reached prior to it, meaning that both parties cannot go back to the previous path easily as before. 

Both parties also at the current time seem to be unable to consider the fact that there could be a collapse in the deal despite the threats that have been issued by both sides. The US will find it more difficult to create a mobilized international community against Iran in the Security Council in order to be able to raise newer sanctions against Iran, in light of its ongoing disagreements with Russia, especially on the Syrian crisis. The threat to use military force as an option will face even more difficulties as the scope of opposition to such an option within the US has widened significantly. 

Iran on its side does not have too many options to consider in this regard as well, despite the slow lifting of sanctions at the moment, it will not venture to risk having them reinstated once again. Along with its continued threats and show of military force, this does not mean that it is keen to get into a direct military confrontation, as well as the fact that it is involved in a number of other regional crises, which will in all likelihood push it to not change its position on the agreement drastically. 

In light of this, it can be said that the nuclear agreement that was reached between Iran and the P5+1 group will face a number of difficult tests in preventing the deal from collapsing all together. Yet the paths that Washington and Tehran have taken to not carry the responsibility in the case this happens, as well as the preoccupation with other internal and regional matters that are of no less importance, point to the continuation of the nuclear agreement as being the most likely path in the coming period.