Recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has made several significant statements, including an invitation to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He emphasized the need for bilateral relations to return to their previous state and highlighted the importance of the Syrian government reasserting control over its territory and confronting terrorism. The Syrian response to this invitation has been largely reserved, leading many sources to suggest that normalizing relations between Ankara and Damascus will encounter numerous obstacles, with Syria currently unprepared to engage with the Turkish approach.
However, recent days have seen notable developments involving Syria, Turkey, and Russia, the primary mediator aiming to facilitate the restoration of relations between the two countries. One key indication of this progress is the series of three meetings held between Turkish and Syrian intelligence delegations in border areas. During these discussions, they addressed critical issues and the obstacles that Damascus believes must be overcome for normalization to occur, as well as Turkey's responses to these concerns.
This diplomatic activity coincided with the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin's Special Envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, who met with President al-Assad in Damascus on July 23, 2024. Additionally, the head of Russian intelligence visited Turkey for discussions with President Erdogan. These contacts culminated in Assad's visit to Russia on July 24, where he held a meeting with Putin focused primarily on Syrian-Turkish relations. Following this, Lavrentiev traveled to Ankara on August 3 to consult with Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Nuh Yilmaz regarding the Syrian situation.
Turkish and Syrian circles believe that these recent interactions and the outcomes of the meetings among the involved parties have revitalized the prospect of restoring relations between the two countries, potentially paving the way for progress in the near future. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that significant obstacles still remain on this path.
Turkish Motives
The Turkish stance on normalizing relations with Syria is fundamentally tied to several key considerations, the most significant of which are as follows:
1. President Erdogan's ambition to establish control over Turkey's borders with both Syria and Iraq is paramount. He aims to significantly counter the influence of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Erdogan believes that normalizing relations with Damascus and allowing the Syrian army to regain control of the borders with Turkey could facilitate greater border security and ultimately safeguard Turkey's territorial integrity.
2. Ankara assesses that successful restoration of relations with Syria could pave the way for enhanced strategic cooperation on various regional issues. This would not only bolster Turkey's political influence but also restrict the maneuverability of competing regional powers.
3. Achieving normalization of bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria would enable Turkey to effectively encircle the Kurdistan Workers' Party in eastern and northeastern Syria, which is the primary entity of the autonomous authority in that region.
Damascus's Position
Syria clearly recognizes that President Erdogan's initiatives and repeated calls for restoring relations have not addressed the core issues of disagreement. It believes that summit meetings between the two presidents alone are insufficient to resolve the outstanding problems between the two countries. The Syrian position on this matter is outlined as follows:
1. Damascus contends that Turkey has taken, and continues to take, numerous actions that significantly threaten Syrian national security and the integrity of the Syrian state. This includes the occupation of northern Syria and support for the Al-Nusra Front (Fateh al-Sham) in its control of Idlib Governorate. Additionally, the so-called "National Army" has established a government in other areas of the northern region and controls the crossings between Syria and Turkey, attempting to create an alternative entity that governs the area.
2. Syria asserts that Turkey's efforts to normalize bilateral relations must be contingent upon resolving the primary issues of disagreement, rather than relying solely on promises. This includes addressing the withdrawal from northern Syria, establishing a timeline for this withdrawal, and agreeing on measures to contain the influence and spread of military factions. Furthermore, Turkey must withdraw its support for these factions and allow the Syrian armed forces to regain control over the areas occupied by them. A resolution is also needed regarding the ongoing support for the Al-Nusra Front in Idlib Governorate.
3. Damascus sees potential for cooperation with Ankara concerning the self-rule authority in eastern Syria, which seeks to establish an independent entity, provided an understanding is reached on various issues. While Syria may partially align with Turkey's stance against the formation of this independent force, it does not intend to carve out or invade the territory it controls. Syria has made significant efforts, with Russian mediation, to reach an agreement with the self-rule authority to remain within the Syrian state. However, American pressure has enabled that authority to undertake actions that could lead to its independence. The issue of Turkish withdrawal from northern Syria may find some resolution through a return to the "Adana" agreement, which permitted Turkish forces to pursue the Kurdistan Workers' Party and affiliated elements within Syrian territory up to five kilometers deep. In contrast, the current Turkish proposal seeks a penetration of 40 kilometers, which would encroach upon the main area controlled by the autonomous authority. A proposed compromise would allow Ankara, in collaboration with Syrian forces, to penetrate 15 to 20 kilometers without infringing on Syrian sovereignty, provided that the Syrian army is granted full access to the Turkish border.
Moscow and Washington
The positions of Russia and the United States regarding the restoration of Syrian-Turkish relations are as follows:
Russia:
Russia's stance is a crucial factor in the normalization of Syrian-Turkish relations. Moscow wields significant influence over the Syrian government and President Assad, enabling it to encourage a response to Turkey's overtures while also addressing Damascus's demands, particularly the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northern Syria and the containment of various military factions.
Recent visits by senior Russian officials to both Damascus and Ankara indicate Moscow's commitment to resolving the underlying disagreements between the two nations. These visits suggest that compromise solutions are being explored, raising the possibility of a summit meeting between the Syrian and Turkish presidents in the near future, which would indicate a potential for mutual understanding.
It is important to note that Russia is keen to exclude Iran from these discussions. This suggests that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is unlikely to attend the anticipated summit between the Turkish and Syrian presidents, alongside the Russian president. Moscow aims to reassert its influence over Syria and diminish Iranian dominance, which has grown amid Russia's preoccupation with the conflict in Ukraine.
The United States:
Washington recognizes that the normalization of relations between Turkey and Syria could adversely affect the Kurdish autonomous authority, which serves American interests along the Iraqi-Syrian border. Consequently, more American forces have been deployed from Iraq into the Kurdish autonomous region. American troops continue to occupy key Syrian oil wells near the border with Iraq. Recently, U.S. forces have supported Kurdish factions in seizing control of the wheat crop, which is vital for Syria, thereby preventing local tribes from engaging with the Syrian government and exerting additional pressure on it.
Undoubtedly, the anticipated rapprochement between Turkey and Syria is beginning to impact the Kurdish autonomous authority. Recently, this authority released 1,500 individuals previously affiliated with ISIS, who had been imprisoned. Some sources interpret this move as an attempt by the self-governing authority to appease the Arab tribes connected to these individuals, aiming to bolster its popularity, reduce tensions, and mitigate the existing ties between these tribes and the Syrian government.
Potential Path
It is likely that ongoing contacts and measures will lead to progress in normalizing relations between Syria and Turkey. President Putin is expected to pay significant attention to the upcoming summit between Presidents Erdogan and Assad in Moscow, where existing differences are likely to be addressed in his presence. This would mark a notable achievement for Russia on both international and regional fronts, especially given the challenges it faces due to the ongoing Ukrainian war and Western sanctions.
While it is unlikely that a comprehensive agreement will be reached on all contentious issues between Syria and Turkey, there is potential for establishing a general framework for their bilateral relations and specific approaches to areas of disagreement. An initial step could involve containing military factions in northern Syria, withdrawing their weapons, and allowing Syrian army forces to enter these northern regions. This would entail replacing Turkish forces in the area, with support from Russian troops.
Such a move would exert pressure on the Kurdish self-rule authority, compelling it to reassess its antagonistic stance toward the Syrian regime. The Kurds would need to seek a formula that ensures their survival within the state while maintaining a degree of self-rule, distinct from full independence. This shift could significantly diminish their ties to American strategies. Kurdish sources emphasize the urgency of taking these steps, particularly with the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the White House in the upcoming November elections, which could lead to a withdrawal of American forces from Syria—a decision he previously enacted during his earlier presidency.
Moreover, Italy's announcement on July 26 regarding the resumption of diplomatic relations with Syria, along with reports that other European countries may follow suit, signifies a notable international shift in how the Syrian regime is perceived. This development could prompt the regime to reconsider its approach to the Syrian opposition amid the evolving dynamics in the Middle East.
Overall, it is essential to recognize Turkey's efforts to enhance relations with Syria, which have been preceded by strengthened ties with Iraq and other regional nations. This aligns with Turkey's recent expansion strategy aimed at establishing itself as a regional power capable of engaging with the European Union, potentially serving as leverage to fulfill Ankara's demands from the EU.
