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Unveiling the Parallel War

Social media weaponization in Sudan's conflict

16 مايو، 2023


Violent clashes between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have quickly erupted through the streets of Khartoum and beyond. However, alongside the fighting on the streets, cyber war has been waged by both sides on social media. Misinformation and videos have rapidly spread online, seemingly employed as psychological tactics by both sides to manipulate the situation on the ground. These tactics are aimed at both local and international audiences, further exacerbating the issue due to the media's inability to access conflict zones. As a result, social media has become the primary source of information and public discourse, exposing a dark side of the conflict in an environment that is highly polarized and susceptible.

 

"Twitter Wars"

 

Despite many accounts claiming to be official channels of the RSF or the SAF, both sides have verified accounts where they publish content, statements, and other media material related to the ongoing situation in Sudan.

 

The official Facebook page of the SAF has 1.4 million followers and 359 thousand engagements. In comparison, their Twitter account only has 2,000 followers and is much less active. However, the SAF official spokesperson's profile on Twitter has more than 57 thousand followers and 182 tweets. Notably, the spokesperson's account had been inactive since 2021, with the last tweet published before becoming active again with the outbreak of the current conflict in April 2023.

 

On the other hand, the RSF runs multiple and more active accounts across Facebook (965 thousand followers and 214 thousand engagements) and Twitter (93 thousand followers and 4,860 tweets). However, the RSF's higher follower and engagement numbers do not necessarily indicate support or agreement but rather the volume of interaction and ongoing discussions taking place online. The RSF has a less active profile on Instagram, with 17 thousand followers and 2,800 posts.

 

Both sides have extensively published content between April 15 and 24, 2023, claiming victory or casting accusations at each other using text, video, and imagery. As the online war intensifies, we can offer an analysis of the published material and make several observations.

 

During the same period, the SAF published 119 tweets, including 11 video clips, generating 17,081 likes and 3,792 comments. The tweets amounted to 1,883 words. Using content analysis methods, we note emerging patterns. For instance, the SAF uses words that aim to delegitimize the RSF, labelling their opponents as 'rebellious,' 'rebels,' and 'rebellion.' They have used these labels 56 times, 'militias' 19 times, and 'enemy' 5 times. The SAF has addressed the Sudanese people in 38 tweets, asserting its mission to protect the nation against 'the enemy side.' Noticeably, there is no reference to power transition or any other terms that link to democracy, with a single exception on April 17, the day the conflict broke out when the SAF tweeted: "No retreat and no reversal in implementing the political path to which [the SAF] is committed."

 

The RSF has published 179 tweets, receiving 74,037 likes and 10,532 comments, reflecting an intense debate fueled by the RSF's use of over 57 videos and imagery. Using the same method to analyze the 2,277 total words tweeted during the same period, the RSF has described the SAF as "coup" and "coup perpetrators" 23 times and referenced the SAF's connection to the former regime 11 times using "past" and "vanquished." They referenced Sudanese civilians and nationals 21 times, directly addressing them 26 times. In contrast to the SAF's discourse, the RSF referenced the political path, using a dedicated hashtag, and described the conflict as a fight for "honour to reclaim our people's rights for freedom, justice, and democracy," stating that "civil society is fighting against injustice and tyranny."


Disinformation Chaos 


By reviewing seven fact-checking services, we have identified a total of 37 pieces of content that were deemed fake or disinformation. This number is notably lower than the actual figures, especially when considering individual statements that are challenging to verify, although they constitute the majority of content published by both sides. Many of the online content claiming to be related to events in Sudan were actually from past events in other countries like Libya or Iraq. This type of disinformation is distinct from entirely fabricated news, such as claims of the death of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the RSF's leader, or the escape of SAF's Maj. Gen. Yassin Ibrahim Yassin, or reports of fires in Port Sudan pipelines.

 

It is also worth noting that most disinformation is related to on-the-ground fighting and victories. Additionally, there have been disinformation posts targeting Egypt regarding a group of imprisoned Egyptian troops, leading to speculation about their fate or location and whether any agreements were made for their release.

 

Furthermore, the crisis has revealed the problematic decision of Twitter to monetize the 'blue tick' verification. Prior to the recent Twitter takeover, obtaining the blue tick status required verifying the account holder's identity. However, now, any paying member can obtain this status without undergoing identity verification. This was the case when a post circulated on social media about the news of Dagalo's death from his wounds, which was later debunked as fake news but gained significant engagement online.

 

Another aspect of disinformation exacerbating Sudan's conflict is the weaponization of artificial intelligence. The BBC has published a report on the proliferation of 'Twitter bots,' accounts using ChatGBT technology to promote fake information or random words related to Sudan. These accounts aim to diffuse content about Sudan and divert attention from what is happening on the ground.

The widespread dissemination of fake news has had a negative effect on online discussions, reflecting the chaotic nature of Sudan's conflict. This, in turn, has fueled polarization and confusion surrounding the war. The inability of reporters and media to cover the war has allowed social media to replace professional journalism, a concern strongly voiced in a statement by the International Federation of Journalists on April 21.

 

Narrative of War

Upon reviewing the content published by the warring sides, several key characteristics of this 'parallel war' and its objectives can be outlined:

 

1.     Delegitimization:

Both sides have sought to legitimize their actions against each other, utilizing formal language, statements, and slogans while appearing in official attire and displaying official emblems. They have accused each other of responsibility for the conflict, claiming the right to represent the people of Sudan and positioning themselves as trustworthy partners of international actors. To delegitimize the opposing side, both the SAF and the RSF have used terms such as 'rebels,' 'militias,' 'extremists,' 'coup,' 'gang,' and 'horde' to describe their enemy.

 

2.    Propaganda:

Both sides have heavily utilized social media to promote their victories and exert pressure on their enemy, particularly in the early days of the conflict. They quickly discredit any achievements claimed by the opposing side and cast accusations against them. Both sides have circulated videos of captive soldiers calling on their fellow soldiers to join their respective 'righteous' side. This demonstrates how both parties have weaponized social media for military propaganda, including the dissemination of fake news. For instance, the SAF posted a video clip on their Facebook page claiming to be war footage from the northern region, only to be later discovered as footage from a video game. Similarly, the RSF published a video claiming the takeover of the SAF's intelligence headquarters, which was later debunked by Al Jazeera.

 

3.    Image war:

Visual materials, including imagery and videos, have played a crucial role in the Sudanese conflict. These visuals have not only contained misleading content but have also been framed in a way that portrays one side as aggressively 'chasing' or 'hunting down' enemies during clashes. The visuals often depict killed militants as 'martyrs' and showcase the military capabilities of the warring sides while asserting their roles in protecting civilians or evacuating foreigners.

 

4.    Religious cover:

Statements have been saturated with religious references to victory and fighting. Both sides have used the term 'spoils,' which carries religious connotations, to describe seized equipment. These tactics form part of a broader psychological warfare, appealing to the emotional side of Sudanese public opinion and adding a sense of legitimacy that is as important as legal or polarizing discourses.

 

5.    Addressing the international community:

 The RSF appears to heavily rely on addressing the international community, as a significant portion of their online content is communicated in English. Dagalo, in particular, has published only three posts in Arabic, while the rest were in English. The content of his posts primarily relates to his interactions with international actors, including a recent statement in which he reassured the UN of their commitment to protect civilians.

 

In contrast to the aforementioned narrative of the conflict, the civil forces remained neutral, although they extensively utilized social media platforms. The Forces for Freedom and Change utilized their Facebook page to publish official statements on behalf of the civil forces who signed the framework agreement. These statements were neutral in nature and called for a cease-fire. They expressed their commitment to the peaceful political path, accusing the "totalitarian fundamentalism of the Islamic movement" of instigating the war. They also urged the international community to exert pressure on the movement and put an end to the conflict. Other verified accounts, such as a Facebook page attributed to the Democratic Unionist Party, published less formal content but held similar positions, directly accusing the Congress Party of launching attacks and assassinations against diplomatic missions and opponents of the war. Other civilian parties, including the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors and the Red Crescent, used social media to disseminate distress calls and urge for relief efforts. Their stance remained neutral, with a focus on the humanitarian aspects and the protection of civilians in the midst of the conflict.