Iran has reacted swiftly after the kidnapping of 14 of its soldiers from the Basij and border guards in Mirjaveh, along the border with Pakistan, on October 16. Tehran summoned the Pakistani ambassador to inform him that Islamabad should take the necessary actions to secure the release of soldiers after being transferred to Pakistan.
Remarkably, Iran has been keen- this time - not to escalate with Islamabad, unlike previous incidents, the latest of which was the killing of 10 Iranian soldiers, on April 26, 2017, which prompted Iran to threaten military intervention if the Pakistani government did not launch strikes against the armed groups that carry out such operations. Iran went further, firing mortar shells on the border on May 27, 2017. This cannot be separated from Iranian efforts to handle the fallout of the new US sanctions, as well as the implications of Imran Khan’s rise to power in Islamabad.
Numerous Factors
The positions taken by the Iranian officials after the Mirjaveh operation have so far been limited to demanding the Pakistani authorities to honor their obligations in the security agreements signed between the two parties to release the kidnapped soldiers and to round up the cells carrying out the kidnappings, which can be outlined in light of several factors, as follows:
1- Confronting US sanctions: Iran is making unremitting efforts to reduce the fallout of the US sanctions, the first batch of which has begun on August 7 and the second will start on November 4. Tehran hopes that some neighboring countries, like Turkey and Pakistan and Afghanistan, can reinforce its endeavors in this context.
In addition to exploiting its border with some of these countries, especially Afghanistan, to engage in oil and dollar smuggling activities, with the aim of disrupting the attempts of US President Donald Trump’s administration to bring its oil exports to zero and drain its financial resources, which are used - according to the US - to support terrorist organizations and develop the nuclear and missile programs, Iran is betting on the positions of some other countries, particularly Turkey and Pakistan, which refuse, or at least express reservations about the new US sanctions.
2- Betting on Imran Khan: Tehran believes that Imran Khan’s ascendancy to power in Islamabad could help cement the bilateral relations, prompting the former to send Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to the latter on August 30, 2018, to meet with Pakistani officials and explore ways to develop relations between the two parties during the coming period.
Of course, this is due, in part, to the tendencies revealed by Imran Khan shortly after assuming power, including his willingness to take new steps to raise the level of bilateral cooperation with Tehran through the establishment of bilateral economic projects. Besides, numerous reports indicated that he did not respond to pressure exerted by the US to abide by the sanctions on Iran, calling for the resolution of differences between the two parties through direct dialogue. Furthermore, some of these reports reveal that a number of officials close to Imran Khan are defending Iranian policies towards regional developments.
According to many Iranian estimates, Imran Khan’s keenness to pursue a more independent policy on relations with countries that wield strong political and economic influence on Pakistan could be in the interest of Iran, amid the continued escalation between Iran and those countries, especially the US and Saudi Arabia.
3- Counting on the Chinese role: The strong relations that Iran has been able to forge with China may have a role in identifying patterns of interactions between Iran and Pakistan, for two considerations: first, the particular importance that Beijing attaches to its relations with Pakistan, its regional ally, which it has always pushed to intervene to reduce the pressures, particularly amid its concern not to disturb the existing strategic balance with India at the present stage.
Second, the significant impact of the Chinese policy, which rejects the US sanctions on Iran. Beijing insists on continuing oil imports from Iran even after the second batch of sanctions on oil export, on November 4. Thus, it can be argued that China’s stance on the ongoing escalation between Iran and the US will be an important variable in determining Iran’s ability to deal with US sanctions and reduce its economic ramifications.
In this context, Iran seems to be trying to exploit the ongoing tension between the US and China from one hand, and the US and Pakistan on the other hand, due to the intensifying trade war with Beijing and cutting aid to Islamabad, in the belief that this could help it enhance the bilateral cooperation and contain the repercussions of US sanctions.
Iran is also keen not to interfere in the traditional dispute between India and Pakistan, to avoid tension in its relations with either party, and hence it has taken many steps to develop its bilateral cooperation with Islamabad, at the economic and security levels. This came in parallel with signing an agreement to develop the Chabahar port with India and Afghanistan, which will allow New Delhi to reach the Central Asian countries without going through Pakistani territory.
4- Rallying regional support: Many political circles in Iran view Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan to be aligned with Iranian interests, which now require the support of the Afghan Taliban, a support which Tehran is trying to exploit to achieve two goals: first, to turn it into a tool to exert pressure on the US amid continued escalation between the two sides after Washington withdrew from the nuclear deal and re-imposed new sanctions on Tehran.
Second, to ensure that Taliban will not harm its interests in Afghanistan, amid Tehran’s ongoing attempts not only to strengthen its influence within the latter, but also to garner the support of the largest number of Afghans “sympathizers” for its regional policies. Iran has previously been able to form the Fatimid Brigade militia to engage in the Syrian conflict alongside the Assad regime, Hezbollah and other militias, which have contributed to tilting the balance of power inside Syria in favor of the regime.
5- Avoiding fragmentation of efforts: Any possible escalation with Pakistan could lead to a fragmentation of the Iranian efforts, which are currently suffering bombings and kidnappings targeting the military and security institutions. So far, Iran has failed to contain the repercussions of these operations despite the missile strikes they have directed to al-Boukamal in Syria at the beginning of October, announcing the liquidation of what it called the “mastermind” of the Ahvaz operation on the same day that the recent kidnapping took place.
Despite all this, the lingering differences between Tehran and Islamabad may not be secondary, as their interests are intertwined in more than one regional issue, in a way that continuously limit bilateral cooperation between the two parties. Therefore, bilateral interactions alternate between cooperation and tension according to the variables produced by the emerging developments on the regional and international arenas.
