Disclaimer: This assessment was written prior to the conclusion of the Fourth Round of the Geneva Talks on Syria. Nonetheless, this assessment accurately predicted the outcome through its contextual analysis.  (The original Arabic document is dated March 1st 2017). 

In a follow up to negotiations that took place during the Second Astana conference, the Fourth round of Geneva Talks are being in a much more complicated environment, a much larger representation and much wider differences among the warring parties in Syria. In this respect, there is an increased possibility that the negotiations will not deliver a decisive end to the conflict in Syria especially given the disagreement among the opposition towards the delegation representing them. The differences are so extreme, tensions could negatively affect agreements from the Astana II Conference, the most significant being a ceasefire.

With the 4th round of negotiations being convened in Geneva, a number of questions are being asked as to whether it will succeed or not, and what indicators will be used to measure success. This is in light of the conflicting interests and visions that have surfaced since the start of the negotiations. These are not separate from other events that have cast a shadow on the proceedings of these events. These include a lack of clarity of the new American administration’s position on the crisis, the ever-expanding role of the Turkish-backed forces that have taken over more land in Syria, and the increasing debate as to what can be built upon from the previous Astana conference. 

Points of Similarity and Difference:

The differences and similarities between the Astana II and Geneva IV conferences are highlighted below: 

1. Representation: The negotiations in Astana only included certain armed factions from Syria, while the Geneva IV Conference includes both political and military representations of the armed opposition.

2. Unison: In Astana, there was a large degree of cooperation between the participants, as was apparent from the single delegation they formed. In Geneva, however, negotiations are more complex with a bigger number of members of the opposition involved. This was made more apparent with the presence of three delegations that represented three different views in the negotiations. 

3. Type of Negotiations: The opposition and the regime did not meet face-to-face in Astana, as each side was kept separate. In Geneva, the opposition openly requested to have direct negotiations with the regime. This a first, as for over three years there has been no direct negotiations between the various warring factions in Syria. 

Despite this, there is a great deal of similarities between the conferences of Astana and Geneva:

1. Rejection of a military solution to end the crisis in favor of a political solution.

2. Prioritizing a ceasefire between participating factions in order to combat terrorist groups.

3. Kurdish factions have been excluded from both peace talks.

Geneva IV in context

The negotiations in Geneva coincides with many developments, on and off the ground, which will have a direct impact on the potential outcome of the negotiations. The most significant developments are as follows:

1. The continuation of the ceasefire declared on December 30, 2016, is one of the most important outcomes of the Astana II conference, despite its fragile nature. Other ceasefires only lasted for a few days. 

2. The expansion of lands under the control of Turkish-backed forces, as part of Operation Euphrates Shield, after the city of Al-Bab was freed from ISIS control. This is a significant step for Turkey, and coincides with a number of goals which include eliminating any chances for Kurdish forces to expand their territories along the border, as well as preparing Turkish-backed factions to participate in the battle of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. 

3. The Syrian regime is pushing to use the results of the battle of Aleppo to reinforce their negotiating position in Geneva, in spite of suffering losses from some opposition groups. For instance, an attack claimed by Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Al-Nusra Front) on two military installations in the city of Homs on February 25 led to the death of 42 military personnel, including some high-ranking officials. 

4. The obscurity of the new American administration’s position with regard to the conflict in Syria. The opposition is relying heavily on this as they view that the US stance on Iran will now be much harsher and should therefore have a positive effect on the opposition in Syria. 

5. Guterres taking over as UN Secretary-General could help induce change in the negotiations in light of the high priority that the UN Secretary-General places on the issue of refugees.  

6. Signs of a possible fracture between Russia and Iran, as a result of Russia’s move to push for a political resolution as they see that a decisive military victory in Syria is unlikely. Iran, however, sees that a political solution in Syria could pose a threat to its regional interests.

7. Building up on the achievements of the Astana conference, especially given that it laid the groundwork for negotiations in Geneva. This has pushed many to consider Astana as a preliminary stage for the negotiations in Geneva. 

The Likely Scenarios

There are three likely scenarios that could emerge from the Geneva negotiations: 

The first possible scenario involves the failure of negotiations. This is based on a number of factors. The most important of these is the insistence of some of the opposition members to discuss a political transition, at a time where other parties are aiming at prioritizing combatting terrorism. Additionally, the failure to form one united delegation for the opposition has diverted efforts towards attempting to unify the visions of the three delegations rather than reaching a consensus between the opposition and the regime.

The danger in the failure of the negotiations lies in the fact that the situation could deteriorate to what it was prior to the Astana II Conference, specifically when it comes to resorting to a military solution as opposed to a political one. 

The second scenario is striking a partial deal between the regime and the opposition in the form of a political transition. This is a scenario based on the losses suffered by the opposition on the ground as well as their internal divisions. This could jeopardize their image amongst the international community given the fact that they are losing ground to government forces and regime-backed militias, specifically in the battle for Aleppo. 

The possibility that this scenario will pass remains slim because of the necessity to have consensus on settlements that would be put forth for a solution. Additionally, the fact that some of the opposition powers are seeking to reignite battles with the regime that could lead to the outbreak of conflict once more. 

The third scenario is a delay in the final outcome of negotiations and another round of talks. This means, quite literally, that there would be an attempt to keep the situation as-is and maintain the ceasefire. This scenario is considered the closest to reality and would mean that statements need to be issued that do not push for a decisive close on any front. There would most likely be hints at another round of talks, but this would be based on how divided the current round of negotiations are in the visions being brought to the table. Furthermore, the lack of agreement on one agenda will only increase the possibility of a violation to the ceasefire occurring, with the view that gaining ground on the military front would give negotiating parties an upper hand in any new round of negotiations. 

To conclude, these three scenarios all point to the same outcome, which is maintaining the status quo. This will open up the floor, in all likelihood, for terrorist groups to try and escalate the situation once more in order to regain their lost influence on the ground.