The controversy around Iran’s ballistic missile program -the main contention between Iran and the Western powers- was revived after the Pentagon, on June 23, reportedly announced that Iran had conducted a failed launch of a satellite-carrying rocket early June 12. Although Iran denied the reports, escalation about the ballistic missile program in particular is not an unlikely scenario that can be ruled out, especially at the present moment. The reason is the ongoing talks in Vienna between Iran and the P4+1 group of Western powers, in which the US is indirectly involved, held to reach a new deal that would enhance the possibility of keeping the landmark 2015 nuclear agreement in the coming period.
It should be noted here that the controversy coincided with reports in the US media about Russia’s preparations to supply Iran with a military satellite system, which Tehran publicly denied. Although they might not be directly linked, the heightened controversy around the two incidents at this time suggests that the disagreement between Iran and the Western powers is over this debacle in particular. It also suggests that it might be one of the reasons why the talks dragged on pushing the US and other Western powers, such as France, to warn that time is running out, indicating that negotiations with Iran cannot go on indefinitely. It was clearly implied that unless there is a clear outline for a potential deal in the coming period, halting the talks seems unlikely to be ruled out.
Distinctive possibility
Iran’s unwillingness to conduct missile tests during the Vienna talks was perhaps the result of pressures put by President Hassan Rouhani’s government to enhance prospects for a new deal. Consequently, such a decision was not rejected by the supreme leader Ali Khamenei, who is also after a nuclear deal that guarantees Iran’s national interests, gives it strategic gains and large economic returns.
However, this course of events may not hold in the coming period, since the current reports affirm that Iran has started the test-launching of satellite-carrying rockets using long-range ballistic technology.
Intersecting goals
The mounting controversy about Iran’s missile program particular at this time can be explained in the light of several considerations, the most important of which are the following:
1. The Iranian goal: Iran did not conduct any ballistic missile test-fires as leverage to enhance the prospects for reaching a compromise or agreement with the Western powers, but this may not be poised to continue in the coming period. That is because Iran may take new measures in this context to emphasize its advance rejection of conducting new negotiations about this specific program as well as its role in the region and support of its proxies. This call was adopted by the Western powers on several occasions. A number of reports indicated that one of the main sources of disagreement during the Vienna talks have to do with pressures being put by Washington to force Tehran to engage in additional negotiations about this program, Tehran’s response to which is rejection.
2. Reality: Making any escalatory steps in this particular context may be related to Iran’s insistence on rejecting any changes to a provision specific to ballistic missile, that is referred to by the current nuclear deal and the UN Security Council Resolution 2231, issued two weeks after the deal was announced on July 14, 2015. The clause includes vague phrasing, which Iran took advantage of, in order to expand its leverage and justify its conduction of multiple ballistic missile test-fires. This is based on its claims that the specifications of the missiles stated in this clause do not match the specifications of the missiles it already has in its stockpile. Additionally, the phrasing of the clause is non-binding and has no legal mandate on Iran upon non-compliance or violation. That’s why Iran, although it carried out ballistic missile fire-tests over the past six year, it was no formally held accountable from the concerned powers, where a majority of them only issued statements to express their condemnation without taking any effective steps to put sanctions in place.
3. The elections implications: It cannot be ruled out that the outcome of the presidential elections held on June 18 had direct influence on this matter. Hence, the issue is not limited to the fact that incumbent Hassan Rounani’s term is coming to an end in August. It is also related to the orientations of President-elect Ebrahim Raisi who, on June 21, at his first news conference since his victory in the elections, insisted that Iran's ballistic missile program and regional role were non- negotiable, an indication that Iran is unlikely to introduce any changes to its foreign policy, and, in particular, the main points of disagreement with the Western powers. Rather, it might take further steps aimed at emphasizing its insistence on continuing its current approach, especially with regards to its missile program and support to its regional allies.
4. IRGC’s Influence: Perhaps Iran’s de-escalation about the missile program over the past period was not only the result of pressure from the Rouhani government, endorsed by the supreme leader, or Iran’s keen interest in giving its negotiators a chance to reach a new deal at Vienna talks. Rather, this may be linked to the aspirations of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to enhance their role once again, especially after Raisi’s victory in the presidential elections. The Corps have received a serious blow when Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a leader of Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF, or Hashd al-Shaabi), were killed on January 3, 2020 in a US drone attack at the Baghdad Airport.
Although the main mission of the Quds Force is to carry out Iran’s extra-territorial operations, Soleimani’s influence went beyond his powers as a commander of the Quds Force, to the extent that he was able to influence the decision-making process in other matters, mainly the nuclear and missile programs.
Because Soleimani's death caused the decline of the Quds Force’s influence, the IRGC might try to compensate for the loss over the coming period, especially after the arrival of a new president, who embraces orientations that make him closer to the IRGC than Rouhani’s policy. This may push Iran to take new steps with regards to the missile program and its regional role, during or after the Vienna talks.
To conclude, it is perhaps safe to say that regardless of the outcome of the ongoing talks in Vienna, disagreement between Iran and the Western powers are poised to persist. The reason is that the issue is not limited to disagreement about the nuclear program. Rather more importantly, its extent goes as far to include the general direction of the Iranian regime, which is incompatible with the interests and calculations of these powers.
