European countries are considered a strategic partner of Gulf Cooperation Council countries as their relation incorporates several sectors, such as the economic and military fields. Therefore, the current Gulf crisis, which is a result of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt cutting diplomatic ties with Doha because the latter harmed Arab countries’ security and interests, will have repercussions that may affect the European side and the path of its future relations with Arab Gulf countries.

The European Union chose to deal with the Gulf crisis through maintaining what can be called “positive neutrality,” and by not announcing support to any party. However, it seemed there are few relatively different reactions among major European superpowers, namely Britain, Germany and France, towards the crisis. These reactions are based on each country’s calculations and interests with the parties involved in the crisis and on their domestic circumstances.

British Neutrality 

Britain is a country that is influenced by the situation in the Gulf considering the massive Gulf investments there. Britain’s reaction to the three Gulf countries’ and Egypt’s decision to boycott Qatar was represented in the statements of Foreign Minister Boris Johnson after his meeting with his Qatari counterpart Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani in London on June 12. Johnson voiced his country’s neutral stance towards the crisis as he called on Qatar to make more efforts to limit funding terrorist groups. He also called on Gulf countries to ease the boycotting measures against Qatar. He further called upon all parties to calm down and sit for dialogue.

Before that, Edwin Samuel, Britain’s spokesman for the Middle East and North Africa, said on June 5 that it’s in “Britain’s interest to reach a solution to the disputes, which erupted among Gulf Cooperation Council countries and to restore the unity of the GCC to be able to confront the future’s challenges together.”

Britain’s “neutral” stance towards the Gulf crisis can be understood through two major considerations which are:

1. Economic considerations and British commercial partnership with the parties involved in the crisis particularly with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. For example, Saudi Arabia has, since 2012 and until 2016, been one of the major countries importing arms from Britain.

Meanwhile, London has a major economic partnership with Doha and this can be seen in the size of Qatari investments in Britain as they have reached around £35 billion. It is planned for Qatar to invest additional £5 billion. Qatar is Britain’s third largest export market in the Middle East as its exports to Qatar increased from £1.31 billion in 2013 to £2.13 in 2016.

This is in addition to importing natural gas from Qatar to Britain as Qatar imports around 20 percent of Britain’s need of gas. This worries London in case escalation continues between Gulf countries and Doha.

2. Political considerations amid Britain’s occupation with it internal crises due to Prime Minister Theresa May’s loss of the majority in the recent parliamentary elections and the repercussions of this loss on her political status, specifically regarding Brexit negotiations. This is in addition to what Britain has been through in the past phase, due to the increase of terrorist attacks against it.

German Bias

The parties involved in the Gulf crisis were keen on gaining the support of Germany especially considering the strong partnership between them, as Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir rushed to Berlin on June 7 to explain the circumstances of the crisis and the reasons behind cutting relations with Qatar. His Qatari counterpart Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani went to Berlin on June 9 seeking support from the European partner.

Since the beginning of the Gulf crisis, Berlin seemed to be biased towards Qatar to some extent as German officials called for ending the boycott confirming that Doha is a strategic partner in the field of combating terrorism and they called on all parties to sit for dialogue. They also blamed the American administration of Donald Trump for the eruption of such crises. The situation crystallized via the statements of German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel on June 6 when he said: “It seems Qatar is to be isolated more or less. Such a ‘Trumpification’ of relations in the region which is already living through difficult crises is particularly dangerous.” Gabriel also voiced his deep concern of “the severe escalation of the situation and its repercussions on the entire region.”

Therefore, the German stance, which indirectly supports Qatar, can be attributed to these two factors:

1. Economic relations and mutual investments between Qatar and Germany as Qatari investments in Germany are around 25 million Euros. This is in addition to Qatar’s 10 percent share in Deutsche Bank. The size of German exports to Qatar is 2.5 million Euros, and Qatar also owns 17 percent stake in the German Volkswagen automotive manufacturing company

Considering that Qatar is one of the world’s biggest exporters of liquefied natural gas which Europe increasingly depends on, any disturbances in Qatar due to the current Gulf crisis will influence the European and German economy.

2. Taking a stance that opposes the American administration. After the American President Donald Trump rejected the Paris Climate Agreement and after he failed to reach an agreement with the EU regarding free trade negotiations, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called on Europeans not to rely on the US in an attempt to lead the EU away from American dependency.

Therefore, Germany’s stance from the Gulf crisis is in part a reaction to Trump’s stance and accusations that Qatar supports terrorism and to his general policies towards the Middle East and the EU. Merkel favors this approach by Trump because it creates a new role for the EU led by Germany, after Britain exits the EU and it eventually increases the latter’s role in Middle Eastern affairs.

French Mediation

The current Gulf crisis represented an “embarrassment” to France considering it has strategic relations with all parties involved in the crisis. France’s ties especially with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar include security and defense cooperation, bilateral trade agreements and mutual investments in the fields of energy, finance, real estate and others.

Therefore, Paris’ bias to a party at the expense of another may threaten its interests with Gulf countries. The French stance has, thus, called for not escalating the crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt and it supported mediation initiatives, including Kuwait’s.

On the next day after these four countries cut ties with Qatar, French President Emmanuel Macron said he supports any initiative that leads to settling the crisis and confirmed his country’s stance in support of unity among GCC countries. During his visit to Morocco in mid June, he reaffirmed that he will resume his diplomatic efforts that aim “to decrease tensions” pertaining to the Gulf crisis.

Finally, it can be said that European mediation chances in the Gulf crisis seem inefficient if there is no coordination with other parties like the US. Britain apparently does not desire to seriously intervene to calm down the crisis, and it is also preoccupied with its domestic problems. Meanwhile, Germany seems incapable of presenting itself as a mediator that is accepted by all parties especially considering its disputes with the US and its limited influence in Middle Eastern affairs particularly when compared with other superpowers. In this case, France’s chances to be a European mediator that all parties involved in the crisis accept are high, and this supports the French president’s efforts to communicate with all different parties to bring points of view closer.