A recent report published by Washington Post on June 11, revealed the ongoing negotiations between Iran and Russia regarding a new arrangement to purchase a Russian satellite, Kanopus-V. This has sparked the attention of regional and international powers involved in the Middle East. The report revealed that leaders from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) made several visits to Moscow for that purpose. It was further claimed that Moscow has in deed  dispatched experts to train Iranian ground crews on the operating system, which would enhance Iran’s spying capabilities, allowing continuous monitoring of US troops and Israeli military bases. However, many analysts’ reaction to  the accuracy of the report varied, as some predict sealing of the deal, while others said that such a scenario is not likely.

A negative indication

Noteworthy is that this step, if proven true, was taken nearly a year after Iran had announced the launch of its first military satellite, Noor-1 into space. The IRGC had issued a statement on April 22, 2020 revealing the launching of Noor-1 Satellite via the Qased rocket.

Iran’s keenness on obtaining Russian satellite technology implies its realization of the fact that its abilities in this field are questionable.  It is incapable of keeping up with the developments in this realm, despite its eagerness to promote its ‘assumed advancement. That was made obvious when the launch of Iranian satellite Zafar failed to reach orbit on February 9, 2020. This was further criticized by General Jay Raymond, the chief of space operations of the US Space Force (USSF), who stated on April 26 that:  “Iran states it has imaging capabilities — actually, it’s a tumbling webcam in space,” [1] that is unlikely providing anything resembling valuable intelligence.

Multiple Objectives

Those who expect the closing of the deal say that both Iran and Russia strive through disclosing the agreement in this particular timing to fulfill various purposes, among which the most prominent are:

1.   Hurdling the nuclear deal negotiations: According to this view, it seems that Iran is seeking through this step to reassure its firm position regarding the current ongoing negotiations in Vienna with the current “4 + 1”, and indirect American participation. Iran aims to reaffirm that such negotiations are limited solely to the nuclear deal, and does not extent to other issues, especially the Iranian regional role and the ballistic missiles program. In other words, Iran is attempting to confirm that it will resume monitoring American and Israeli bases and infrastructure in the region, even if an agreement is reached in Vienna. This  correlates to its constant support to its agents across the region, who could benefit from the intelligence information that would be obtained through the new satellite.

Iraqi militias, for instance, could consequently be able to obtain information, which would boost the militias’ ability to accurately target more American troops, and perhaps causing bigger losses to pressure the US to withdraw its troops from Iraq. In addition, Tehran can provide Hezbollah with information about Israeli sites in preparation for any upcoming military confrontation.

2.   Enhancing their leverage in negotiations: This explains Russia’s particular anticipation of the summit held in Geneva on June 16, with the US. The summit focused on both parties’ stances towards  pressing issues, especially the to the Turkish acquisition of the S-400 missile system, the Alexei Navalny crisis and the Syrian crisis among others. Prior to the summit, Russian President, Vladimir Putin pointed out on June 12  that the US-Russian relations are at their worst.

3.  Preparations for post-Vienna talks: Iran is expecting tensions to escalate regionally in the wake of the Vienna talks, especially if a deal has been reached. Iran expects that Israel will not easily tolerate a new nuclear deal that guarantees lifting some of the American sanctions and enabling Iran to resume its nuclear activities - to a limited point. This will be a motivation, according to Iran, to move towards minimizing any potential dangers that would threaten its national security. This cannot be dealt with separately from the statements made by Yossi Cohen, former director of the Mossad, on the June 11,. He signaled to Israel’s culpability for Iran’s recent security attacks, especially in regard to obtaining the nuclear archive, nuclear sabotage at Natanz, twice, and the assassination of Mohsen Fakhri Zadeh, a prominent nuclear scientist.

A counter-view:

It is also important to note that other opinions perceive that it is not likely that Russia would push for reaching the deal with Iran, especially after President Putin’s firm denial of the news saying on June 12: "It is all fake news. At the very least, I'm not familiar with this type of thing... It is all gibberish and garbage."

This argument justifies the unlikeliness of closing the deal based on three major considerations, which are:

1.   Neighborly considerations: Iran is a neighbor of Russia, a fact that would make the latter attempt to limit the former’s military capabilities, and to avoid Iran’s possession of anything that would threaten its security. Simultaneously, Russia will not jeopardize its diligent efforts to reach a new deal in Vienna, which prevents Iran from advancing  its nuclear program, and possibly developing a nuclear weapon.

2.    Accumulated disagreements: This step does not coincide with the gradually escalating disagreements between Russia and Iran in Syria, especially after the balance of powers has changed in favor of the Syrian regime. The two nations are seeking to consolidate their military roles and influences in Syria. Iran’s possession of such technology would boost its presence in Syria, which does not align with Russian interests seeking to limit the Iranian presence on ground, as it had already achieved its purpose; guaranteeing that the Syrian regime would stay in power. 

3.    Moscow’s interests: That deal could have negative implications on Russian interests and relations with Iran’s regional adversaries, such as Israel, which is a matter Russia is trying to avoid in all cases. This is especially that sealing such a deal would grant Iran further capabilities to threaten Israel’s security and interests in a later stage, particularly through its loyal militias.

Finally, one can note that no matter how true the report is, Russia and Iran will maintain their close ties in the upcoming stage, while it might, however, be governed by rules and limits forced by Moscow’s interests and the wide scope of its disagreements with Tehran in Syria.