Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hezb-i-Islami leader and former Prime Minister of Afghanistan, returned to Kabul on May 4, 2017 for the first time in more than two decades, and eight months after signing a peace deal in September with the Afghan government, with support from international powers involved in the Afghan crisis.
The controversial leader’s return has raised many questions about the significance of the timing of his move and its potential consequences on Afghanistan's security situation and political landscape, in particular because his arrival coincided with “Mujahideen Victory Day”, marking the April 28, 1992 events. This indicates that Hizb-e-Islami party led by the former warlord is perhaps seeking to make a comeback that coincides with notable changes in its public approaches, in response to current political and security developments in Afghanistan.
Multiple motives
According to the September 2016 peace deal between Hizb-i-Islami and President Ashraf Ghani'S government, the party agreed to give up militant activities in exchange for involvement in political life, while in exchange the government agreed to release the Hezb-i-Islami prisoners and remove Hekmatyar’s name from terrorist blacklists of the United Nations and the United States.
The motives behind the peace deal between the government and the party are as follows:
1- Benefiting from the pardon. The agreement led to the lifting of United Nations Security Council’s sanctions against Hekmatyar in February 2017, paving the way for his return to Kabul and the removal of the assets freeze imposed on him. The move drew sharp criticism from Afghan political powers and rights groups who accused him of human rights violations and killing thousands of civilians by giving orders to shell Kabul in the 1990s.
2- Restoring political influence. Through his return to the Afghan capital, Hekmatyar appears to be seeking to become a prominent political actor in Afghanistan. He noted that he is not willing to play a secondary role in political life. The announcement raised significant concerns among political forces especially after he raised doubts about the power-sharing US-brokered agreement between President Ashraf Ghani and the government’s Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah. Hematyar even showed signs he may be attempting to take advantage of the current dispute between the Afghan government and Taliban to present himself as a pro-government party in the context of this confrontation.
Several views indicate that Hekmatyar, on his way to Kabul, stopped over in Jalalabad city where his supporters organized a big rally at the city’s biggest stadium. The purpose of the rally was to send a message that his party continues to enjoy a large popular base, which will increase his political leverage in the coming period. He further aimed to show that he is becoming a main actor in the future of the Afghani political landscape.
3- Mobilizing partisan support to confront the Taliban. The Afghan government is making diligent efforts to bolster its capability to confront Taliban and ISIS, which seeks to entrench their influence in Afghanistan after they receded in Syria and Iraq. Hence, the government believes that the new peace deal with Hekmatyar and the return of his party as a main political force in Afghanistan can help it in confronting both organizations. Moreover, commanders and elements of Hekmatyar’s party gained extensive military experience from taking part in battles during the Afghan civil war. Their experience can support the government’s efforts in this regard.
4- Bolstering the President's powers. Several views indicate that President Ghani, who signed the peace deal with Hekmatyar’s party, and who are both ethnic Pashtuns, aims to consolidate his powers in the state, as well as his influence, despite the silent dispute with Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, his partner in power.
Potential consequences
Several world powers and parties involved in the Afghan crisis showed their support to the peace deal that led to Hekmatyar’s return to Kabul. This support picked up after his speech on April 29, 2017, in which he called for opening a new chapter, turning the page on the past and working on all-inclusive state-building. He also urged the Taliban to lay down arms and join the peace process. Of course, the reason behind his calls is that involved powers believe his move may produce several positive consequences for Afghanistan. However, this does not negate the fact that the return of Hekmatyar and his party to mainstream politics can impose other notable consequences that cannot be ignored.
Contrary to expectations by some approaches, his call might actually lead to an escalation of Hekmatyar’s dispute with Taliban. As Taliban was quick to reject the call based on their view that the government’s agreement with Hekmatyar aims to bring about change to the political balance of power in favor of the government. Undoubtedly, this will increase the possibility of armed confrontations between the Taliban and the Hizb-e-Islami party and even force the insurgent movement to escalate its attacks on government forces to send across the message that Hekmatyar’s return would exacerbate security turmoil instead of contributing towards reducing the conflict intensity.
Moreover, Hekmatyar’s return to Kabul and his signing of a peace deal with the government raised concerns of the Afghan Northern Alliance, whose relations with Hizb-e-Islami party are strained and even dominated by enduring enmity. Hence, Hekmatyar’s involvement in politics and his bid to become a prominent and major new force on the political scene will perhaps cause tensions with the Northern Alliance. An escalation will possibly occur because the Northern Alliance too may seek to establish other alliances with forces that are enemies to Hekmatyar to prevent him from tilting the balance of power in his favor.
Nonetheless, what should not be ignored is the fact that Hekmatyar poses extensive experience in dealing with his former adversaries and allies at the same time. This is because he has always been keen on widening the margins of available options, and, sometimes, pursued what can be called a “non-closed-doors policy” in anticipation of changes in political circumstances inside and outside Afghanistan. This produces notable impact on his ability to reshape the patterns of his alliances and interactions with the main political forces and armed terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan.
