Although Iran has refused more than once to hold bilateral negotiation with the US, even before the recent and surprising initiative of the U.S. President, Donald Trump, on July 30, 2018, this does not seem to be the game. It may be argued that the problem of the negotiations between Iran and the U.S. does not lie in the issues per se, but in the timing, i.e., the internal, regional and international circumstances under which they will be held and upon which they will be based.

Thus, the negotiating terms remain a priority and even more important than the very idea of negotiation, as each party will endeavor, before this option is implemented, to improve its negotiating position, in order to maximize gains or offer the least concessions.

Deferred Option

Having said that, the question of negotiation with the US is more likely to be deferred but not excluded for Iran, which always resorts to it when it does not have other options through which Tehran utilizes the available freedom of movement to respond to the other party's pressures. The past four decades have seen secret and open negotiations and security understandings between Tehran and Washington, even in periods of unprecedented tension. 

Therefore, the current controversy raging in Iran about the recent initiative of President Trump, who has shown a willingness to “meet with the Iranian leaders anytime they want”, remains an indication that negotiation is an option and Iran may eventually resort to it. This is the case if Tehran cannot bear the consequences of the renewed US sanctions, or if Tehran considers the possibility of military confrontation with the US has increased.

In other words, if there is a categorical rejection by the Iranian regime and its supreme leadership represented by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei of the negotiation notion, this controversy would not have emerged in the first place.  This is given that those who call for negotiation would, in this case, come under such a strong criticism campaign that may eventually weaken them politically and undercut their influence within decision-making circles.

Strikingly, the idea of negotiating with Washington is no longer the preserve of the 'Moderates' led by Rouhani. It is indeed gaining special importance and momentum, even by prominent figures within the Conservatives, such as Ali Akbar Nouri, who is close to Khamenei and a member of the Expediency Council, who in response to Trump’s initiative, said that “We cannot stand idly by refusing to negotiate, and say that he is wrong”.

This may be a sign of the regime that the refusal of some prominent officials to negotiate bilaterally with the US is not a determinant of Iran’s policy, which always sees significant changes if Tehran deems its interests requires so.

Early Preparations

Hence, the Iranian regime may make early preparations to negotiate with the US, and will most likely take steps that, in its view, would bolster its position ahead of the negotiations, the most prominent of which are the following:

1- De-escalating domestically: At present, the regime is trying to contain the mounting protests in several major provinces and cities, which flared up due to the collapse of the national currency (the dollar has reached about 130,000 riyals), high inflation and unemployment rates, as well as the decline of investments and export earnings.

This may help explain the motives behind the support provided by some of the regime’s institutions for the recent economic measures taken by the government, in parallel with exerting pressures on the government to make changes in the economic group, after the appointment of a new governor of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), Abdolnaser Hemmati, to replace Valiollah Seif.  

Surely, one of the regime’s objectives to put pressure on the government is to send a message to the Iranians at home that the root causes of the chronic economic crisis lie in government policies rather than in the attitudes of the regime. This is evident in the mainstream media's campaign  promoting that the failure of the government to handle this crisis is due to its lack of commitment to the supreme leader’s call to adopt the so-called “resistance economy” instead of counting on improving the relations with international powers and attracting foreign investment.

2- Escalating regionally: The Iranian regime may make use of its influence in some crisis-ridden states in the region as part of its attempts to reduce the US pressure, to send direct messages ahead of the possible negotiations, in which the Iranian role in the region will be one of its main bargaining cards.

That is why Iran is keen on enhancing the chances of continuing protests in Iraq in which Tehran's policies have contributed to aggravating the electricity problem in the southern governorates, as well as hindering the formation of a new Iraqi government after the parliamentary elections on May 12, 2018.

In addition, Iran was present at the recent escalation by the Houthis in Bab al-Mandeb after its attack on two Saudi oil tankers on July 25, 2018, particularly that Tehran, according to numerous reports, is training the Houthis on the development of small explosive boats and marine mines.  These same mechanisms are what Tehran relies on in its recent threats to close the Strait of Hormuz if it is unable to export its oil after the renewed US oil sanctions in November 2018.

This escalation coincided with the publication of a report by the United Nations Panel of Experts, confirming that “weapons used by the Houthi militias have recently been inspected, including missiles and drones, show characteristics similar to weapon systems known to be produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran”.

According to other reports, the US believes that over the coming period, Iran will conduct large-scale exercises in the Gulf having advanced their date, which has a direct connection with the current tension between the two sides.

3- Broadening the range for international options: Iran may head to increase the level of coordination and cooperation with both Russia and China during the next period, to expand the freedom of movement and maneuver before it can accept negotiating with Washington. This also explains why it seeks to establish continuous channels of communication with Beijing and Moscow to discuss developments concerning the nuclear dossier and bilateral relations. At the same time, Iran may try to exploit the current tension between the US and China specifically, after the outbreak of the so-called “trade war” between the two sides to strengthen its position against Washington.

In conclusion, it can be argued that confusion and hesitation will remain the hallmark of Tehran’s policy in responding to the US pressure, until it agrees to negotiate with Washington. The negotiation will undoubtedly be a tough one, as it will not only focus on the nuclear program but on other non-nuclear issues.