Since their
emergence in Somalia in October 2015, ISIS- affiliated terrorist groups have
sought to expand their influence, but have not yet been able to do so. They are
still in a vulnerable situation that has not been able to contain Its
repercussions, which limit its ability to rival Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen
(HSM), especially in terms of deployment and operational activity. Accordingly,
many estimates suggest that it may rely on sleeper cells or scattered
formations to carry out small-scale attacks, on the hope that Somalia would
turn, at a later stage, to hotbed of the main organization that sustained heavy
defeats in Iraq and Syria in recent months. The strategic position of Somalia near
global transport lines may lure the organization to exploit it to threaten the
interests of international powers.
Early Conflict
These groups began
to emerge in Somalia in October 2015, when Abdel Qader Momen, a former cadre of
al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, along with 20 of his followers, paid allegiance to Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi. Although the main organization in Iraq and Syria did not
declare Somalia’s branch as one of its external “emirates”, which implies that
branch is still weak, al-Mujahideen movement saw in such presence a threat to
its influence. This because the emergence of these groups coincided with the
expansion of ISIS in the Sahel-Sahara region at the expense other al-Qaeda-affiliated
groups, to such a degree that threaten its survival, before it could regain its
influence.
Over the last
period, the international community has shown increased concern over the
presence of such groups in Somalia. This was evident in the drone strikes
launched by the U.S. on November 4, as well as the UN report on November 8, issuing
warnings that Abdelkader group managed to increase its members from a few dozen
to 200 persons.
Certainly, these
developments indicate that the international powers and organizations have proactively
moved to counter the possible transformation of Somalia into a breeding ground
for the new terrorist organization, after losing most of its strongholds in
Iraq and Syria. These developments prompted the international community to warn
against the dangers of ISIS spread in Somalia and take actions to counter it,
through pre-emptive military strikes against the bastions of its affiliated
groups.
This has compounded the pressure on these groups, especially as they fail to develop their military and organizational capabilities, or to launch high-profile attacks and suicide operations, or recruit a large number of terrorist elements. This is turn has affected their operational activity, as their members are still between 200 and 250 persons, impeding their control over vast swathes of land, such as al-Mujahideen. Their control over Qandala, a coastal village, lasted only a month, after the government forces ousted their elements at the end of December 2016.
Multiple Factors
The diminished capacity of these groups to
expand their activity within Somalia can be ascribed to several factors, as
follows:
1- Poor funding: These groups failed to secure multiple
sources of funding for their activities, as their economic resources are
confine to old traditional sources, such as voluntary contributions and donations.
Moreover, they did not engage in commercial activities similar to other
terrorist organizations, and did not control large swathes of land to enable them
to impose taxes, as was the case with the main organization in Iraq and Syria.
2- Mujahideen’s pressures: al-Mujahideen movement views the emergence of pro-ISIS groups in
Somalia as a threat to its influence, especially given ISIS’s ongoing attempts
to be at the forefront of terrorist organizations wherever it exists. This led
al-Mujahideen to take actions to wipe out those groups, or at least curtail its
activities, threatening to kill all those who split and join ISIS and began to
chase those who moved to mountainous areas to avoid further attacks.
3- Decline of the main organization: This has numerous consequences on
sub-organizations, which lost one of their main sources of funding, in such a way
that may lead many of its elements to defect and join rival terrorist
organizations, chiefly al-Qaeda and its offshoots.
4- Limited footprint: Most of the groups that declared their allegiance to ISIS are concentrated
in Al Medo mountain range north-eastern
Somalia, after the government forces and al-Mujahideen movement drove them out
of the areas they tried to control. This led to a decline in the ability of
these groups to establish ISIS- affiliated “emirate”, prevented them from recruiting
more terrorist elements, especially since there is a positive correlation
between expansion, proliferation and expanded recruitment.
5- Lack of alliances: These groups were unable to establish a
network of alliances with other terrorist organizations due to their
intellectual orientations, which helped al-Mujahideen movement to force their elements
out of some areas. Moreover, their capacity was significantly degraded as a
result of the military strikes by the U.S and government forces.
In light of the above mentioned, it can be
argued that pro-ISIS groups in Somalia are still vulnerable due to several organizational
and economic factors. Yet, this does not negate the fact that they may pose
strong threats to the security and stability of Somalia during the next period.
This would happen if some leaders and cadres of the main organization moved to
Somalia, if they managed to secure alternative sources of funding or recruit
more terrorist elements who adopt ISIS’ ideology.