The rapid advance by Iraqi forces in Kirkuk on October 16, 2017, and assuming control once again over most of the disputed areas of the city with Kurdistan, raised multiple questions about the significance of the recent military operation and its military and political ramifications. Kirkuk, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious city, is among the constitutionally disputed areas between Kurdistan and the Iraqi government since Iraq became a republic in 1958, due to the city’s oil resources and the Kurds’ clinginess to control it, as the late Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani called it “Kurdistan’s holy city.”
Post-ISIS Conflicts
After 2003, the Kurds formed local forces called “Kurdish Peshmerga”, taking advantage of Western support, particularly the US, which coincided with mounting security challenges to Iraq, especially the threats of terrorist groups. The number of these forces reached more than 230 thousand fighters, according to the Ministry of Peshmerga’s estimates in 2017. They succeeded in filling the security gap left by the withdrawal of Iraqi forces after the advance of ISIS and the fall of Mosul in 2014.
In October 2017, the Iraqi government demanded Peshmerga to return to their pre-June 6, 2014 positions. This move came in response to the determination of Kurdistan to proceed with its plans to secede from Iraq, following the referendum on September 25, 2017. However, the Kurdish leadership wanted to forge a new type of relationship with Iraq, which prompted the former to reject withdrawal and stick to the annexation of Kirkuk to Kurdistan.
This triggered another crisis, in addition to the crises, which have already erupted in the wake of Kurdish referendum. The mounting popular pressure on the Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar Abbadi led him to deploy federal troops to Kirkuk, on 16 October, to impose security and reclaim the province, especially oil fields.
Political Maneuvers
The Kurdish leadership, represented by Massoud Barzani, counted on several points of strength. The most prominent of which are the majority of Kurds' endorsement of the secession according to the results of the referendum, international support, particularly during the war against ISIS, the region’s robust economy, and the good armament and military readiness of Kurdish forces.
For its part, the Iraqi government capitalized on the overwhelming public support for the unity of Iraq and keeping it intact, as the majority of the Iraqi political forces in the parliament rally behind Baghdad’s actions in the face of secession. The Iraqi government further seized the rising morale amid harbingers of victory over ISIS, and the readiness of Iraqi forces to fight.
In addition, the Iraqi government enjoys unprecedented regional support for any policy it takes to reverse the Kurdish moves towards separation, particularly from Iran and Turkey, which view the Kurdish secession as a threat to their national security. This emboldened the Iraqi government to quickly opt for direct military intervention, ending the Kurdish control over Kirkuk.
Significance of the Swift Advance
The Iraqi forces surprised the domestic and international public opinion with its swift control over the positions of Kurdish forces, which retreated with minimal resistance except in some positions. This move came shortly after the Iraqi forces massed on the edges of Kirkuk, and following the failure of local, regional, and international mediations to reconcile the points of view of the government of Baghdad and Erbil to resolve the crisis peacefully. After the deadline set for the withdrawal of Kurdish forces expired, the Iraqi forces pushed into Kirkuk governorate and appointed a new governor, to substitute the Kurdish governor, who was previously removed by the federal parliament in Baghdad. All these developments occurred with no more than 35 hours.
By the evening of October 16, the Iraqi forces took back many vital areas, such as Tuz Khurmatu and most of the oil fields, leading to a large exodus of Kurdish families from these areas towards Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates, which are still under the authority of Kurdistan.
The rapid advance of the Iraqi forces is due to deep political differences between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK), as the PUK was against holding the referendum at that time and had concerns that Barzani would assume control over the state in the future. In addition, there is a regional pressure, particularly from Iran on the PUK, whose leaders have historical relations with Tehran. Generally, the PUK sees there is no point in antagonizing the regional powers by going forward with the separation, as long as it will result in a land-locked state, unwelcomed by its neighbors. This is what prompted some PUK-affiliated Kurdish peshmerga forces to withdraw from the South of Kirkuk. The PDK blamed the PUK for losing control over Kirkuk, exposing deep differences that may threaten the future unity of Kurdistan as a political, legal, and administrative entity.
The US neutrality over the stand-off between the two sides has compromised the Kurdish position, especially that the US has repeatedly acted as mediator between Erbil and Baghdad to settle disagreements between the two parties.
Repercussions of Recapturing Kirkuk
Recapturing Kirkuk by the Iraqi forces is expected to have several ramifications, which can be explained as follows:
1- Tightening the economic embargo: Kirkuk oil fields are among the main economic resources on which Kurdistan relies upon to build its future state. Kirkuk has several important oil fields in the North, such as Baker and Bai Hassan, among others, with estimated reserve of around 13 billion barrels, equal to 12 percent of the total Iraqi oil reserves, constituting a major resource of the state budget. The loss of these oil fields will likely delay or annul Kurdistan’s secession from Iraq.
This is closely linked to the Iraqi government’s control over border crossings and closure of the airspace, controlling exports and imports after seizing Kirkuk oil fields, which allows the government to place economic embargo on the region in cooperation with neighboring countries.
2- Fuel Kurdish conflicts: Seizing control of Kirkuk by the Iraqi forces exposed the weakness of Kurdistan’s internal front, namely the existence of differences, which appeared only in the critical showdown. These differences may lead to conflicts and maybe infighting between the two main wings: the PUK and the PDK, a reminiscent of the civil war scenario in Iraqi Kurdistan in the mid-1990s, which claimed the lives of 3,000 to 5,000 people, and displaced nearly 100, 000 others.
3- Enforce the constitution: The central government may move quickly to enforce article 140 of the Iraqi constitution concerning the status of the disputed areas, a preferred option for the government at this stage. This will allow the government to extend its grip over these areas, allowing it to conduct referendums on self- determination free from the Kurdish pressures. This action may win considerable parliamentary support with the participation of some Kurdish forces, who oppose Barzani.
4- Re-demarcate the borders: The Iraqi government is expected to try to weaken the Kurdish parties, which championed the referendum, particularly the PDK and its leaders, and perhaps seek to replace Barzani with a more loyal one to Baghdad. The federal government may impose new borders on Kurdistan, similar to pre- 2003 borders, to ensure that the region will not expand again or think of secession in the future, stripping the region of vast territories.
5- Hold the Kurdish maneuvering in check: Taking back Kirkuk and tightening the embargo on Kurdistan will assert the power of the Iraqi State. Regional and international powers will need to deal with the central government in Baghdad with regards to economic and trade ties of Kurdistan, and not to put Kurdish interests before those of the central government, reducing its capacity to maneuver with Baghdad.
6- Trigger military confrontations: Kurdistan might not give up in the face of the significant retreat in Kirkuk. The military forces of the PDK and Barzani may launch a counterattack against Iraqi military forces to lift the morale of his supporters. It may at the same time seek to rally the US support, against the backdrop of the alleged role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in leading the Iraqi forces in general and the Popular Mobilization Forces in particular, in the operation to retake Kirkuk, capitalizing on the growing tensions between the US and Iran.
To conclude, the swift military advance in the battle for Kirkuk cannot be considered the end to the conflict between the Iraqi government and Kurdistan concerning the secession. The parties involved in the conflict, internally, regionally and internationally, will reshuffle their cards in preparation for a new phase of military and political escalation, as part of a protracted and intractable conflict with no end in sight.
