The scope of tension between Iran and Turkey have dramatically intensified across the region due to the Syrian crisis. Al-Jazeera quoted Turkish state media saying that Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, sharply criticized Iran during the Munich Security Conference on February 19, telling the delegates that, “Iran wants to make Syria and Iraq Shi’ite.”
According to the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), Iran had summoned the Turkish Ambassador in Iran, Rıza Hakan Tekin, to protest these accusations and send a strong warning to Turkey that Tehran’s patience has limits. Iranian media outlets also launched a fierce critical campaign against Turkey’s foreign policies in the region, specifically in Syria.
Despite this recent spate of arguments, there are a number of considerations that may push both parties attempt to contain the conflict in the near future. Both parties will have to negotiate a necessary compromise that serves the interests of both Iran and Turkey. This wasmore evident when Hassan Rouhani and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a meeting on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization session that took place in Pakistan in early March.
Numerous Accusations
What is notable in this regard is that the Turkish escalated accusations against Iran are not new, but rather they have simply reemerged. Previously, President Erdoğan had leveled similar accusations on December 15, 2015 when he claimed that Iran was pursuing sectarian-driven policies in Syria through its support for the Al-Assad’s regime. Despite such statements, this level of tension is unprecedented and has been made all the more evident in light of the following two considerations:
First, the statements of Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu came at the conclusion of President Erdogan’s February 2017 regional tour in the Gulf, which included Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. A number of inside assessments within Iran perceive this as a move to raise the level of cooperation between Turkey and these states on a variety of regional issues, such as the Syrian and Yemeni crises. It is likely that the goals of these visits do not fit with the Iranian vision.
Secondly, these accusations come at a time of increased tension between Iran and Russia, after the latter increased their cooperation with Turkey concerning political and security developments inside of Syria. Specifically, the cease-fire that followed the battle of Aleppo, and the commencement of Astana and Geneva peace talks.
Iran’s concern has increased even more with the ongoing assaults and advancement of the Turkish-backed forces of Operation Euphrates Shield on Syrian territory and their success in liberating the city of Al Bab. This, along with the insistence of Turkey to establish a safe zone in the north of Syria, especially after American policy towards the Syrian crisis become clearer, has added even more reason for concern.
Clear Boundaries
Yet despite all of this, both Iran and Turkey remain cautious and are hesitant to escalate tensions any further. Each country realizes that an escalation of tensions would create more difficulty to maintain common understandings regarding regional conflicts. It will as well affect their special status of their bilateral relations, specifically on the economic level. Here, there are a number of considerations that are linked to each party’s vision, which could affect their interests in case of a potential rise in tension. This could lead to limit the boundaries of this escalation.
Iran is not willing to abandon its strong relations with Turkey, despite ongoing differences. Turkey could, help Iran, in the future, in transporting gas to European states amid Iranian efforts to grasp the outcomes of its nuclear deal. Additionally, Turkey could help rebuild Iran’s battered energy infrastructure in order to increase the production of oil and gas during the coming phase.
Maintaining strong relations with Turkey falls in line with Iranian interests for the time being, especially since there is a possibility that tensions between Iran and US will increase. Accordingly, any additional tensions will limit Iran’s ability to act and maneuver freely on the regional and international stage. Particularly if the terms of the nuclear deal are altered.
In this instance, Turkey will have the upper hand in improving relations with Iran. Turkey may try to contain any tensions to lift the pressures of any potential upcoming sanctions on Iran. Under the previous president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Turkey was one of the few states that openly supported Iran having a nuclear program for peaceful purposes. Turkey also sought, in cooperation with Brazil and Iran, to reach a settlement on the matter by striking a deal in May 2010. Turkey openly disagreed with the US administration under Barack Obama because of this crisis.
Additionally, in a scenario where Iran moves to deescalate and open up indirect channels of communication with President Donald Trump, Ankara may play a pivotal role in mediating between the two parties.
Moreover, Turkey is not willing to gamble with its relationship with Iran, as it could negatively affect its economic interests. As per some Iranian and Turkish sources, Turkey is trying to benefit from the lifting of international sanctions on Iran in order to increase their trade with Tehran from USD 8.4 billion to an estimated USD 30 billion.
Aside from this, any possible escalation in tensions could lead Iran to try to pressure Turkey by establishing strong relations with opposing parties, such as the Kurdistan Working’s Party (PKK).
This escalation of tensions might also lead to a discontinuation of the understanding with Russia concerning the success of the Turkish military operation inside of Syria, particularly concerning the ability of the Kurds to make any gains in their war against ISIS. This could also push Iran and its allies, in the form of militias, to try to threaten Turkey’s interests in Syria and hinder the progress of forces loyal to them.
In light of this, a necessity to compromise will push both Iran and Turkey to work on limiting tensions concerning the Syrian crisis on both the political and military level. Any escalation in tensions would be postponed until foreseeing the anticipated strategic outcomes of the previously mentioned common interests, and its impact on the balance of power inside of Syria and in the region.
