أخبار المركز
  • د. إبراهيم فوزي يكتب: (المعضلة الروسية: المسارات المُحتملة لأزمات الانتخابات في جورجيا ورومانيا)
  • إسلام المنسي يكتب: (جدل الوساطة: هل تخلت سويسرا عن حيادها في قضايا الشرق الأوسط؟)
  • صدور العدد 38 من دورية "اتجاهات الأحداث"
  • د. إيهاب خليفة يكتب: (الروبوتات البشرية.. عندما تتجاوز الآلة حدود البرمجة)
  • د. فاطمة الزهراء عبدالفتاح تكتب: (اختراق الهزلية: كيف يحدّ المحتوى الإبداعي من "تعفن الدماغ" في "السوشيال ميديا"؟)

Vision from Within

Why did the Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict erupt over Kirkuk?

24 أكتوبر، 2017


Iraq’s control over Kiruk came amid rising regional and internal pressures on the government of the Kurdistan region. The Iraqi government managed to impose a regional siege on Kurdistan, after the latter held an independence referendum. It also neutralized the American stance and seized control over the strategically significant Kirkuk. This sparked divisions between main Kurdish powers and increased tensions among the Iraqi government and Kurdistan, thus warning of the possibility of military confrontations between the involved parties.

Demographic Overlap

Kirkuk is distinguished from other Iraqi cities for its mixture of ethnicities, religions and sects as there is no certain ethnic majority. There are Christians, Muslims, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Sunnis, Shi'ites, Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and others. For example, ethnicities and religions are diverse in the city of Nasiriyah, but the majority is Shi'ite Arabs. The same applies to the city of Dohuk in the Kurdish Region as the majority is Sunni Kurds. In Kirkuk, however, the percentages of different ethnicities and sects are pretty close. 

No conflicts or clashes happened among the society’s components but after 2003 and due to the diversity of parties and groups with different interests, conflicts emerged as they sought to dominate the city. These disputes later expanded and reached parties within the same ethnicity.

Tensions in Kirkuk reached their peak in June 2014 after the terrorist ISIS organization occupied four provinces and one third of Kirkuk (the Hawija district and surrounding towns). As a result, forces of the federal government withdrew from areas surrounding Kirkuk and Peshmerga forces seized control over them. After liberating the provinces, which ISIS had controlled, a new challenge emerged pertaining to areas controlled by the Kurdistan Region as the latter did not want to withdraw from these areas and wanted to include them within the region’s administrative borders.

Tensions increased when Kurdistan announced it will hold an independence referendum in September 2017. The referendum was held although the federal government and regional countries warned of this step and the threats it poses. This is when the crisis erupted between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region and it expanded to reach areas controlled by Peshmerga forces.

Kirkuk’s Crisis

Kirkuk is wealthy in crude oil. Some call it “Iraq’s strategic storage.” Iraq’s biggest oil producing company is located in Iraq. Local authorities even prohibit digging more than 6 meters in wells in some of the city’s areas as they fear oil will just come out naturally. This may be the main reason behind the conflict in the city. This is in addition to regional and international ambitions in this strategic city within Iraq’s administrative, economic and strategic map.

The crisis first surfaced when the city’s governor along with a part of the local council decided to participate in the referendum, which the Kurdistan Region decided to hold to separate from Iraq. This angered the central government as the city would be separated from the Iraqi state’s administrative map. The central government, thus, expedited the liberation of the Hawija district of Kirkuk and which lies on the direct contact line with the city. Kirkuk’s government asked to be handed the city’s administration but the governor rejected the central government’s request and said they will resist any attempt by the Iraqi army to enter the city. Many Iraqi army forces, counter-terrorism forces and Popular Mobilization forces thus mobilized on the city’s outskirts.

On Monday October 16, 2017, these forces advanced towards the city and a direct confrontation happened on the city’s outskirts from the southern side, near the industrial neighborhood. The army advanced towards the oil company and other vital zones. Within this context, the Peshmerga forces affiliated with Kurdistan’s Region divided.

This is due to disputes between the two major Kurdish groups in the Kurdistan Region, the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Masoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani. Talabani was succeeded in the party by his children, wife and some aides. His death during this critical phase and his diplomacy and good ties with the region’s countries greatly affected these divisions within the Kurdistan Region and within his party. The dispute between the two Kurdish is due to disagreements over the referendum and separation during this dangerous time.

The Peshmerga forces’ quick withdrawal from the city helped Iraqi forces smoothly enter the city with slight human and material losses. Iraqi federal forces thus stationed inside the city and on the administrative borders.

Foreign Pressures

Iraq’s strategic position and ethnic, racial and sectarian overlaps imposed a series of economic, political and military repercussions, which clearly appeared following the American invasion in 2003. They also appeared as regional powers sought to control the country’s political decisions and during Kirkuk’s crisis. The two parties’ position regarding this crisis can be clarified as such:

1.       The Turkish stance: It is well-known that Turkey has several interests in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. One of Turkey’s fixed positions is its rejection of dividing Iraq especially that Turkey’s Kurds are more than Iraq’s Kurds. The separation of the Kurdistan Region from Iraq threatens Turkey’s national security especially that the Kurdistan’s Workers Party (PKK), which Ankara lists as a terror group is active in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq.

Turkey also assigned itself as a defender of Turkmen in Kirkuk and it requests defending them whenever there is a chance. It also seeks to seriously and systematically get rid of the Popular Mobilization that supports the federal government. Popular Mobilization forces represent an efficient power on the ground and their engagement in a direct confrontation with Peshmerga forces may represent a chance for Turkey to get rid of both of them.

2.       The Iranian stance: Iran looks at Iraq as its vital space and entrance to Arab countries. It interfered in Iraqi affairs a lot and it has good ties with the federal government and strong relations with some Kurdish parties in the Kurdistan Region, particularly with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. This was clearly seen during the recent Kirkuk crisis as Iran tried to divide the Kurds in Iraq out of fear that Iran’s Kurds will also demand separation.

3.       The American stance: Iraq is strongly linked to the US due to the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement. One of the agreement’s items stipulates that “when there is a foreign or internal threat or aggression against Iraq or when its sovereignty or political independence or unity of land, water and air are violated or when its democratic system or elected institutions are threatened, both parties – upon the request of the Iraqi government – will immediately launch strategic deliberations which include diplomatic, economic or military measures and other measures to deal with these threats.”

Within this context, some note that the US has taken a neutral stance towards the parties conflicting over Kirkuk. The federal government would not have taken this action if the US hadn’t approved it. The reason behind this stance could be the fact that the president of the Kurdistan Region did not comply with the American demand to postpone the referendum. The US may think that Barzani thus ignored the American administration. This is why the US began to take several measures to take hold of the game again. 

Possibilities of Escalation

Tension increased in Kirkuk after Iraqi forces controlled the city. There is currently tension between all the city’s components. The diversity of ethnicities and sects worsened tensions and the situation now resembles a time bomb that can go off any second. There are, thus, ethnic and sectarian tensions towards fateful national issues.

Iraq’s Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi said on October 18, i.e. two days after the Iraqi forces entered the city, that Kirkuk’s local police will look after the city’s internal security supported by the federal police in order to maintain the city’s security situation. He added that the Popular Mobilization will withdraw from the city and that the governorate of Sulaymaniyah will participate in managing the city through forces affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. This represents an initiative that may guarantee the city’s internal security, but possibilities that chaos will erupt in the city are still on due to regional and international interferences and ethnic and sectarian tensions.

Divisions between the two major parties and the help of the Sulaymaniyah governorate to the central government in handling administrative affairs weaken Kurdistan’s demands to fully separate. However, chances that confrontation may escalate between the two parties are still on as several forces advance on the main road of Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan, and as Abadi voices the necessity of handing over crossing borders and airports to the central government. Any reckless step by either parties may spark an official war between the federal and central governments unless there is international intervention to resolve this crisis.

What increases this possibility is international and regional interferences supporting both parties and the lack of popular awareness regarding the threats posed by the crisis. The Kirkuk crisis may be resolved as one of the dimensions of the Kurdistan separation case if Kirkuk is placed under special management of the city’s sons.