The mounting regional and international pressures on Qatar due to its support for extremist groups, led their leadership and cadres, especially those belonging to Muslim Brotherhood, to assess countries and capitals that can serve as “alternative havens” for Doha in case Qatar decides to expel them. Such development is expected to change Qatar’s policies from hosting and funding to “proxy sponsorship” of terrorist organizations through covert support for them in the regional incubators.
Characteristics of Alternative Destinations
Qatar was considered an “ideal stronghold” for the leaders and members of extremist groups, not only because they enjoy the support of Doha government, but also because they manage to provide their organizations with media platforms and financial support from the Qatari territory without any hindrance or fear of prosecution. Therefore, countries that could be sought by these groups, in case their leaders leave Qatar, must meet a set of criteria, most prominently “security” guarantees, a high degree of confidence that these countries will not change their stances and decide to prosecute and extradite them to their countries of origin, or limit their support for their cells and branches in the Middle East countries.
Foremost among such security assurances is the presence of close links between extremist groups and governments of some states, such as Turkey, which has close relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Leaders of the extremist groups can recourse to countries that have influential ruling religious movements, such as Pakistan or Malaysia. They may also resort to other countries, in which there are active members of these organizations under the cover of Islamic associations, such as South Africa, where there are active members of the Muslim Brotherhood within the civil society organizations, charity and advocacy associations.
These options will depend on the willingness of these states to receive such leaders given that they are on the regional and international terrorism lists, and wanted by international security institutions across the region. In addition, many of the candidate countries to receive them have good relations with states that designate these leaders as terrorists, which will make such countries hesitant before taking such step.
On the other hand, these destinations or alternatives do not suit all extremist leaders living in Qatar, given their intellectual and organizational diversity. The list of leaders and cadres living in Qatar includes leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist leaders, religious authorities of extremist organizations, and members of Al-Qaeda including its regional branches and allied groups. Thus, the alternative havens will vary according to the web relations of various organizations and the assessment of these leaders of the states that can serve as alternative bases for their movements.
Map of “Safe Havens”
There is no single criterion to determine the suitability of alternative havens for terrorist organizations, based in Qatar. In this context, the new concentration areas of such groups vary according to the specificity of each group. They can be classified as follows:
1- Muslim Brotherhood: Muslim Brotherhood’s pragmatic intellectual system enabled it to forge strong relationships with governments and elites in some countries, despite ideological differences, such as Iran, which has a strong relationship with the group since the era of Khomeini, whom it described when he died, as a “leader who triggered the revolution against the tyrants”. Their relationship is still strong, which may explain the silence of the group over the Iranian subversive and terrorist acts, such as the attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran in January 2016, and its interference in Iraq, Yemen and Syria.
Muslim Brotherhood relationship with Turkey is the strongest, compared to other countries, since Erdogan assumed power. The close alliance between the Brotherhood and Erdogan has grown more strongly post 2011, where Turkey backed them during the Arab Spring, as part of regional policies to support political Islam movements. In the wake of June 30, 2013 in Egypt, Turkey became the prominent safe-haven for the Brotherhood fugitives, headquarters of their channels and media platforms, and a key management center, from where their leaders and cadres oversee their activities in Arab countries.
This close alliance explains why the leaders of the group support Turkey’s policies and stances in the region, and grant it religious legitimacy. Rashid Ghannouchi’s support for the Qatari policies in July 2017 is a model of pragmatic and intellectual harmony between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood, which makes it the safest haven for their leaders and the most likely destination for hosting members departing Qatar.
Iran is a strong candidate for hosting the Muslim Brotherhood leaders in the coming period, especially that each one finds in the other one’s much sought-after treasure. The group needs a country to recognize them and not designate it as a terrorist group, like most Arab countries, and in return Iran needs the group to help it dismiss the accusations of being sectarian and improve its tarnished image due to sectarian intervention in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.
Tunisia is also a potential haven for Muslim Brotherhood members in particular, given the central role of Nahda movement in the Tunisian political scene, its explicit support for Qatar since the outset of the crisis, and the hostile stances of its leaders against the Arab Quartet. All these issues make it a possible candidate for hosting the group members, based now in Qatar, especially that Tounes Al-Irada Party, led by former President Moncef Marzouki, declared explicitly that he stands by Qatar, because of its role in backing Marzouki to assume power.
The list of candidate countries to host members of the Muslim Brotherhood, includes Pakistan, Malaysia and South Africa. However, these countries can host the group leaders as individuals, in their personal capacities without being an alternative headquarters for the group, through which they manage their operations and activities and launch media platforms. These countries are keen to safeguard internal security and maintain relations with the anti-terror Arab Quartet.
2- Al-Qaeda leaders: It seems that the options available to Al-Qaeda members and their allies based in Qatar, are limited compared to those available to the Muslim Brotherhood members, because unlike the Brotherhood, they do not have good relations with Turkey. Therefore, Turkey will not allow the organization members to move to its land, especially after the deterioration of its relationship with the Al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Syria. Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as Al-Nusra Front) refused to allow the Turkish troops to enter "Idlib" in Jun 2017, which led to severe tensions in relations between the two sides.
Tunisia will not be among the safe havens for Al-Qaeda leaders, due to the worsening security conditions in the country and growing threats as a result of the increased activity of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which threatens Tunisia directly. Other countries like Malaysia or Pakistan, are also unlikely to host Al-Qaeda members under the current circumstances.
Thus, the available options for Al-Qaeda members are limited to Iran, given its alliance with Qatar in this crisis; especially that Iran is an old haven for members of Al Qaeda, despite ideological differences between both parties. Iran has become one of the most favourite countries for some its leaders, such as Saif al-Adl, Yasin al-Suri and Mohamed Al-Masri, who resorted to it in late 2001, after the collapse of Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Iran was using them as leverage in the face of some countries in the region.
This relationship explains why Al-Qaeda do not target Iran, which led later to the dissent of the former leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from Al-Qaeda, as he objected to exclude the interests of Iran from their targets. This revelation was made by Abu Mohamed Al-Adnani, in May 2014, that before the establishment of ISIS they deferred from targeting Iran, in compliance with the orders of Al-Qaeda, to safeguard the interests of the organization and its supply lines in Iran.
Regional flash points in Syria and Yemen and the areas where Al-Qaeda groups are active, such as the coast and desert countries in Africa, are possible destinations for Al-Qaeda leaders and Salafi organizations based in Qatar, but these destinations are unsafe compared to Doha or Tehran.
Repercussions of leaving Doha
The departure of extremist leaders from Qatar will have several repercussions on the activities and operations of these groups. In addition to the loss of safe haven, they will be denied access to media platforms, provided by Doha. Al-Jazeera channel was considered the major media platform for their leaders, not only to present their ideas, but also to incite to violence.
Clear examples of that support are Al-Jazeera’s interview with Abu Mohamed El-Joulani, leader of Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda wing in Syria, in September 2016, as well as hosting figures of these organizations, such as Abdullah Almahasni, legislation in Nusra, in November 2016. The latter appeared in a video blessing someone before carrying out suicide attack. Such media presence of Al-Qaeda leaders on Al-Jazeera channel has contributed to promoting its propaganda and recruiting new members to its ranks.
The departure of these leaders will likely affect funding their respective organizations, because funding was coming directly from Doha and channeled to the affiliated organizations. This is evident through the continuous accusations by Khalifa Hafter, Libyan National Army Commander, to Qatar of supporting and funding mercenary fighters from Chad and Sudan, to fight in the ranks of Al-Qaeda branches on the Libyan territory, due to the presence of several leaders such as Abdul-hakim Belhaj and Ali al-Sallabi in Qatar.
Finally, the extremist groups will suffer heavy blow if Qatar terminates hosting their leadership and cadres and cut financial and information support, which will significantly limit their activities. Yet, Doha may replace its policies of direct sponsorship for extremist organizations, with invisible and covert support for them to establish alternative bases and havens. This might help them overcome the potential fallout of leaving Qatar and continue to threaten the security and stability of the Middle East countries, which reinforce the importance of developing precise criteria to review Qatar’s commitment to stop supporting terrorism
