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Prioritizing Economy: China’s Balanced Messages in Riyadh Summit

27 ديسمبر، 2022


The Saudi city of Riyadh hosted this month a three-day summit where Chinese leader Xi Jinping attended. The trip included a bilateral Saudi meeting, a GCC summit, and an Arab summit. The spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry described the summits as the biggest since China’s independence, marking a significant turn in Sino-Arab relations.

US reports have said the summits highlight China’s strategy to position itself as an influential global power as the US role in the region recedes. President Xi brought the China-US power competition to the Middle East, which was clearly reflected in remarkably clear and balanced statements, offering the region strategic cooperation in food security and energy.

 

This article shall look at the three summits held in Riyadh, their outcomes, and their expected impact on the Sino-Arab relations within a broader China-US power competition.

 

China’s Influence in the Region

The summits could not be analysed without understanding China’s wider influence on the region. Since President Xi ascended to power, China’s ties with the region strengthened with high-profile visits made by Chinese officials to Egypt, Iran, and Saudi. In his address at the headquarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo in 2016, President Xi presented China’s Middle East policy which encapsulates China’s vision towards the region’s economic and political issues. The policy forms a roadmap to developing Sino-Arab relations and principles of governance and cooperation.

 

In December this year, China’s foreign ministry has issued a report titled ‘The Sino-Arab Cooperation in a New Era’. The report covers the history of the developing relations between the two sides, including the establishment of the Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum in 2004 and the 2020 Ninth Senior Officials’ Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, which now includes 17 mechanisms for cooperation. Other significant forums for political and strategic are held bi-annually with solid representation from the entire region.

 

In March 2022, the Arab League passed resolution 8757, which aims to promote Arab-China relations in strategic areas, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative, currently involving more than 20 Arab states. The resolution also asserts the League’s support of Beijing’s ‘One China’ policy. For the Arab League, China’s diplomatic efforts to strengthen multilateral relations have played a key role in stabilising the region and finding peaceful resolutions to long-standing conflicts.

 

Thus, mutual political will and respect have become the overarching theme of Arab-China relations. Refraining from ‘exporting’ its political or economic model onto the Arab world and its positive stance on key Arab issues has earned China the region’s trust and is only expected to flourish. Beijing understands the region’s dynamics and economic needs and has positioned itself as a reliable trade partner. From its early days, China has invested in strategic projects in infrastructure, telecommunications, retail, finance, education, digital tech, Artificial Intelligence, and defence; China has become the region’s single most strategic trade partner.

 

More than five strategic trade deals have been signed between China and Arab states to date, with Saudi, UAE, Algeria, Iran, and Egypt. More than 200 major cooperation agreements were signed, and more Arab states are keen to grow their relations with China to fill the gap left by America’s weakening presence. And so far, Arab states’ relations with China have been nothing less than rewarding.

 

Considering the above, the summit could hardly be read as a tactical move or an adverse reaction to ailing Saudi-US relations since the Barak Administration and, more recently, during the OPEC-US feud over global fuel prices. The warm reception of President Xi in contrast to President Biden’s somewhat awkward ‘fist-bump’ is quite telling of Saudi’s turn towards China. The Arab strengthening of its relations with China essentially aims to mitigate the risk of global power politics through interaction with all actors.

 

Three Summits, Three Messages

Several key messages were evident throughout the summits, which may be summarised as follows: 

 

1. Forging new and balanced alliances: 

The summits reflect Saudi’s strategy of ‘options diversification’ in what may be considered a post-pax-Americana era. New global dynamics and challenges are dictating fresh strategies for dealing with an ever-changing geopolitical landscape. The summit, therefore, isn’t about polarisation or choosing sides. As Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan puts it: “Saudi Arabia does not believe in choosing between one partner and another”.

 

2. The growing influence of the GCC bloc: 

The three-day meetings reflect Saudi’s political and economic heavyweight in the region. The oil-rich bloc is able to influence global markets and play a significant role that supersedes America’s historical influence in the region. Analysts in European think tanks and academic circles are coming to terms with the impending end of America’s regime and the shift in the balance of power across the entire region of the Middle East and North Africa, not just the Mediterranean. Unlike in 1995, when Europe alienated the GCC when the EUROMED was formed. Now the GCC has gained influence and weight in the region. Analysis emerging from Europe concludes the continent needs to revise its policy and its relations with the GCC.

 

3. Staying neutral: 

The Arab world, and the GCC in particular, are not necessarily to be considered a sphere of influence for either China or the US. China’s interest in the region is purely based on investment and energy interests, considering its heavy presence in Djibouti or its defence relations with Iran.

 

China is America’s biggest trade partner and its third-largest export market. In addition, the global power race between China and the US is manifesting through alliances and cooperation. Unlike the Cold War period, during which two blocs were in direct conflict, the China-US competition exists in a highly complex and globalised entanglement of interests, relations, and debt. This view was well reflected in Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Address to the Asia Society, where he said: “President Xi Jinping pointed out that the most important event in international relations in the coming 50 years will be for China and the United States to find the right way to get along. It is our hope that China and the United States will draw on past experiences to find inspiration for the present, and gain strength for going forward. Together, let us explore a way to a China-U.S. relationship for the new era and create a better future for both of our countries.”

 

4. Arab-China alignment on common issues: 

The Riyadh meetings saw the Arab and Chinese sides align on a number of issues that concern the region. In line with Beijing’s policy in recent years, President Xi asserted his nation’s commitment to global stability and security, and he announced several initiatives including Building a China-Arab Community with a Shared Future, as well as a strategic partnership of comprehensive cooperation, common development and future-oriented between China and Arab countries.

 

Arab leaders reciprocated China's diplomacy: in a joint statement, Arab states reinstated their recognition of the 'One China' policy, "rejecting Taiwan's 'independence' in all its forms, and supporting the Chinese position towards Hong Kong and supporting the People's Republic of China's efforts to maintain national security and develop and perfect democracy in Hong Kong within the framework of one country, two systems." The statement also asserted the right to self-determination and the rejection of any form of intervention under the auspices of democracy.

 

President Xi's summit in Riyadh has unnerved the US. Decision makers in Washington to see China's growing strategic relations with the Arab world as a direct threat to US interests in the region, accusing Beijing of attempting to restructure the international order. A narrative dominating US decision-making has been centred on a supposed 'structural struggle' between China's 'digital tyranny' and the West's 'liberal democracy', mobilising political support for a long-term (and costly) political competition with China.

 

5. Iran missing on the agenda: 

The joint statement of the Riyadh summit did not touch on the ongoing relations with Iran and its regional policy, nor did it comment on the Iran nuclear deal framework. Participating Arab states may have opted to avoid raising points that may tarnish the conference's success, considering China's strong bilateral ties with Tehran. Moreover, China has maintained a non-intervention policy regarding the region's issues and believes a resolution to regional differences has to come from the region itself.

 

6. China asserting its non-intervention policy: 

 Two key points made in this regard in the joint statement were 'appreciating efforts by both sides to protect Arab and Chinese minorities' and rejecting the politicisation of human rights as a tool to pressure and intervene in the internal affairs of states. Such messages reflect China's political approach towards the region, being, like Russia, mindful of the religious sympathy between the region's dominant religion of Islam and the Muslim minorities in Xinjiang province. Therefore, China-Arab diplomacy based on mutual respect and non-intervention, driven by major investments and trade, has contributed to the region's balanced stance on the issue of the Uyghur minority, which the West has politicised recent years.

 

We may conclude that the China-Arab summit in Riyadh has produced three remarkable outcomes that would shape bilateral relations for the future. Economic ties and trade remain the top priority for China's presence in the region, recognising critical mutual interests and a desire for economic stability in a chaotic global energy sector. Mutual respect and non-intervention remain the top headlines for China in the region, although a subtle invitation from some of the Arab leaders for a more active role for Beijing in the Middle East. As the US role recedes, China can be the only viable power to bridge the gap left behind, especially in security and military matters. The Riyadh forum has undoubtedly strengthened a partnership of which Washington is growing weary. The US may have yet to accept a new reality in which China plays an influential role in the Middle East.