Since the advent of the Democrat Joe Biden to the US presidency, some have been convinced that the ongoing negotiations between Iran on the one hand, and the US and its allies on the other, will result in a new nuclear agreement, regardless of whether this agreement is a copy of the 2015 agreement or a different one from it. Based on this conviction as well as the ongoing negotiations in Vienna between Iran and the international powers regarding this nuclear agreement, the question that arises is what if Iran and the West reach a new nuclear agreement in 2022, specifically should this agreement not include clauses pertaining to Iran's ballistic missile program and Tehran's interventions in the countries of the region? And what are the possible repercussions of this scenario, if it materializes?
A possible agreement
With the primacy of the US conflict with China, President Biden made the issue of reaching a new nuclear agreement with Iran a fundamental one in his policy towards the latter as well as the Middle East in general. Perhaps Biden's early appointment of Robert Malley as the US chief negotiator for the Iranian file came as an expression of his desire as well as that of the Democrats in general to reach a desired agreement. Accordingly, considering all the recent sanctions imposed by the current US administration against Tehran, the rounds of negotiations conducted with it, as well as the endeavors with European allies in this respect, these all reflected the desire of the US in this regard.
On the other hand, Iran, whose economy is mainly dependent on oil, has been badly impacted by US and European sanctions on the grounds of its nuclear program. It is also aware that these sanctions have greatly restricted its role, capabilities, diplomacy and influence in the region and the geographic vicinity in general. Hence, Tehran seems to be in dire need of a new agreement that would relieve it of these sanctions and would grant it opportunities for political and economic investment. Despite the divergent positions of Tehran and Washington, as well as the contradictory conditions of both sides, the Gulf reservations, and the Israeli refusal, reaching such an agreement is a conceivable scenario in 2022.
Content of the new agreement
Some believe that the new agreement may allow Iran to maintain its nuclear program with its basic components as well as its stock of uranium, particularly after it has attained advanced levels in uranium enrichment. Perhaps the Iranian perception is based on the fact that most of what Tehran can offer in order to reach a nuclear agreement is relevant to agreeing to set controls and arrangements to stop any development that could lead to its production of a nuclear weapon. In return, it seeks two main goals: The first one pertains to getting guarantees that any future US administration will not back down from the agreement, as was the case with the Trump administration in 2018. The second goal pertains to lifting sanctions on Tehran, and the release of billions of dollars frozen to Iran in US and European banks.
As for the US, which is not fully responsive to these two Iranian conditions, it is attempting to follow a step-wise policy with Tehran, perhaps with the aim of obtaining the widest measure of concessions from Iran, particularly with respect to its level of enriched uranium, as well as setting a ceiling for enrichment rates and opening Iran's nuclear facilities to IAEA inspectors under the framework of a complex negotiating strategy, out of which the US seeks to bring Chinese and Russian pressure on Iran, should it persist in its hardline rhetoric and its old negotiating approach. The US administration says that it is no longer possible to continue negotiations indefinitely. Perhaps this was reflected in the speech of the US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin in Manama a while ago, where he confirmed his country’s ability to deploy an overwhelming force at the time and place of their choosing, particularly in the Middle East. The military intervention remains an option, if necessary.
A threat to Israel
The political, security, and media circles in Tel Aviv agree that the Iranian nuclear program represents an existential threat to Israel’s future. In this respect, the Israeli view that opposes the Iranian nuclear program should be considered, including Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s assertion that Israel is not opposed to a “good” nuclear deal between Iran and world powers. Based on this perspective, Israel's strategy towards the Iranian nuclear file is basically about eliminating it, through negotiations, or otherwise through a military intervention. Thus, the frequency of Tel Aviv talking about this option to strike Iranian nuclear reactors has increased, particularly in light of the recent steps taken by the Israeli government in this regard, including acquiring more advanced weapons, and allocating a huge budget for a possible military strike.
However, Israel is well aware of the extent of the difficulties around that military option, including reasons pertaining to the nature of Iran's many nuclear reactors, as well as Tehran's deterrent power and the role of its regional arms, particularly the Lebanese Hezbollah with its ability to launch thousands of missiles against Israel. Moreover, Israel believes that the US bet on negotiations with Iran to reach a new nuclear agreement is quite futile. Accordingly, it mobilizes its endeavors to convince the US administration of the necessity of moving towards the military option. Prolonged time is to the advantage of Iran, which has enriched large quantities of uranium with a high degree of purity, which may prompt it to move towards producing a nuclear weapon within a short period.
Arguably, the discussion in Tel Aviv is not about whether or not to adopt the military option, but is rather about how to implement it, and about how to involve the US in order to secure the necessary protection for the success of the military strike. In general, there is an Israeli conviction that the US and the West in general will not leave Israel alone, should a war break out between it on the one hand, and Iran and its affiliates on the other. Consequently, there is a strong belief that even if the nuclear negotiations in Vienna succeed during the next round, what follows this agreement may be laden with major security developments that would change the face of the region. Israel believes that it is not possible to coexist with a nuclear Iran, and that the cost of the military option would be less than this intimidating coexistence for Israel and the rest of the region.
The Gulf
Since the beginning, the Arab Gulf states linked reaching any nuclear agreement with Iran to a number of conditions. These conditions reflect their concerns regarding Tehran’s regional policy. Accordingly they have repeatedly demanded their participation in the nuclear negotiations, and the inclusion of other terms in this agreement, which pertain to the Iranian ballistic missile program, as well as changing Iran’s attitude regarding the hot issues in the region, particularly in Yemen, Iraq and Syria and Lebanon. The Gulf states realize that the Iranian policy towards these issues has become a major threat to their national and internal security. Perhaps what intensifies the Gulf states’ concerns in this regard is Washington’s position that focuses mainly on US interests which go beyond the issue of the Iranian nuclear file to the conflict with China without taking the Gulf concerns into account. Furthermore, such an agreement grants Iran new cards in moving on with its regional policy which threatens the security of neighboring countries.
Perhaps Tehran’s refusal to link any regional file to the nuclear agreement is a reflection of its hidden desire to tamper with the region’s files, intensify its interventions in the internal affairs of these countries and work to change their political and social contexts, as well as escalating against the political actors in them, particularly in the Gulf Arab countries which represent an obstacle for the Iranian project in the region. Iran's regional ambitions may become even more wild, should the new nuclear agreement allow the flow of billions of its frozen dollars in US and European banks, as well as the influx of Western and Asian companies into Iran to invest in energy, services, transportation, and other projects that have been halted by Western sanctions.
Accordingly, the repercussions of the Iranian nuclear agreement in its previous version may intensify militarism in the region, since the Gulf states will find themselves in need of getting ready for this stage, particularly if Tehran continues its old policy of raising tension about hot issues in the region, specifically in Yemen. On the political level, such events may push the Gulf states to reconsider their alliances and international relations, and perhaps turn towards Russia, China and some European countries, particularly France, to achieve some kind of balance in their international relations.
In conclusion, it is clear that in the event of a new nuclear agreement between Iran and the West in 2022, similar to the 2015 agreement, Tehran will no longer be the same, which may impact the entire Middle East region. The new reality in the post-agreement phase will force everyone to re-examine their arrangements regarding Iran, its policies, behavior, and practices. Here, matters appear to have one of two results: Either adapting to a nuclear Iran with a political agenda that aspires to attain more regional hegemony, or rejecting this policy and preparing for confrontation. Israel is also convinced that any new nuclear agreement will render Iran more threatening to its national security as well as that of the region, and that it cannot coexist with this danger indefinitely. This implies a lot of ambiguity regarding the future of the region.
