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Victim Discourse

Moroccan islamists' defeat, between political arrogance and loss of incubators

19 سبتمبر، 2021


Arab regimes vary in the way they deal with Islamists. Some are convinced that it is important to integrate Islamists into political life, whereas others prefer to exclude Islamists lest they should turn the tables and seek to hinder democracy once they assume power. 

Morocco have always relied on a partial integration of some Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood's Justice and Development Party (PJD), which decided to abide by the rules governing political life in Morocco. As a result, PJD managed to play a key role in domestic politics; many of its members found their way to the parliament and held government posts. The party even won majority in 2011 and 2016 legislative elections, and therefore formed the government two consecutive times. However, the party suffered from a severe blow in the general elections, which were held on September 8, 2021. This raises various questions concerning the reasons and significance of this defeat of Moroccan Islamists.

The Context and the Significance

Despite the pressures imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic, Morocco was keen on holding the legislative elections on September 8 as planned. The turnout was considerably high, and the results were surprising. Following are key factors shaping the context of the elections and the implications of its outcomes:

1.    The elections were held with the Covid-19 crisis looming large: 

The elections were held amid hostile circumstances imposed on Morocco, the Arab region and the whole world by the Covid-19 pandemic, which caused international investments to fall dramatically, tourism revenues to decline, and social problems to worsen. This forced political parties to draw up more realistic approaches to address the social, political and economic needs of the citizens. 

In response to social distancing and other measures imposed by the Moroccan authorities to contain the pandemic, parties utilized social media and virtual platforms as far as campaigns are concerned.   

2.    The turnout was high: 

Compared to previous elections, this year's elections witnessed remarkably heavy polling (more than 50% of the registered voters actually voted). Generally speaking, the high turnout can be regarded as a message from the citizens to the political parties and other political players, highlighting the importance of working on performance and communicating effectively with the ordinary citizens. 

Besides, the high turnout of the voters this time may be caused by the fact that people realized that abstaining makes the elections meaningless as it gives candidates an opportunity to follow illegal practices to attract voters, which, in turn, encourages corruption and fanatical discourses that reject democracy and do not recognize its institutions and mechanisms. We must not also forget that the political parties did a good job this time; not only were their platforms more realistic and responsive to the citizens' needs and hopes, but they also managed to establish more effective communication with the voters. This encouraged youth participation.  

3.    The results were by no means expected: 

Before the elections, there were indications that PJD, due to its weak performance and other internal factors, would not be as successful as it was in 2011 and 2016. However, nobody could have ever expected that it would come eighth, with a total of no more than 13 seats in the parliament. Some leaders were confident that the party would have the lion's share of the votes, and would form the cabinet again. What makes the situation all the more surprising is that the National Rally for Independents, which was in the government alliance with PJD, managed to come first and will consequently form the new government. 

4.    Peaceful transfer of power is a must: 

Some political players gloated over PJD’s failure, as they oppose the party’s principles and visions. Others were victims of the party's local and national policies for years. Though PJD secretary-general resigned once the results were announced, the party's leaders insist that they were treated unjustly, as they believe that adopting such discourse can help them avoid taking responsibility for their actions and dealing objectively with their failure. For instance, they pleaded that money and power were used in tipping the balance against them, and that the vote records were not handed over to the party. 

However, the victim discourse may have been convincing had not the PJD won the legislative elections before, and even formed two consecutive cabinets two consecutive times. 

Yet, Morocco showcased that it has been able to maintain a peaceful transfer of power, despite the discourse of victimization and conspiracy claims.  

Reasons for failure

Though PJD leaders are holding fast to conspiracy theory, contending that the elections were rigged, many analysts refer to actual reasons that brought about the fall of the party. Among the most important of these are government performance, internal problems, and the fact that other parties proved to be competitive enough. 

1.    The touchstone of power: 

Since PJD won the 2011 legislative elections, many questions have been raised about the party’s ability to fall back on its principles and frameworks in running the country efficiently, especially as an alliance comprising various left and right parties was formed. It is noteworthy that the party came to power amid many regional and national challenges and dilemmas, manifest in protests and demonstrations demanding change. Initially, PJD tried to project an image of itself as a defender of the marginalized, only to wind up adopting 'unpopular', economically burdensome laws and decisions that particularly had negative effects on the middle class. A case in point is the decision to raise retirement age. In addition, the government adopted a 'let-bygones-be-bygones' approach in dealing with embezzlers of public funds. Besides, the government was not strict enough when handling several issues, let alone the fact that some cabinet members adopted an oppositional discourse. 

Generally, PJD’s two terms fell short of Moroccans' expectations, and did not reflect the freedoms granted the legislative and executive powers by the 2011 constitution. 

2.    Accumulation of internal conundrums: 

The first major internal issue that PJD faced occurred following the 2016 legislative elections, when former secretary-general of the party Abdelilah Ben­kirane, having had a hard time consulting and negotiating with leaders of various parties, failed to form a coalition government. Saaddine Othmani then formed the cabinet, but had to negotiate for five months to do so. The outcome was not very satisfactory. Since then, PJD has suffered many internal conflicts pertaining to evaluating its position as a majority party and supporting Othmani (by way of giving the country's good precedence over the party's good), especially as some party members interpreted the situation as a war waged on the party and its leader Ben­kirane, and therefore believed that the party had to re-assume its former status as an oppositional force, so as to save face and maintain popularity. 

Internal conflicts surfaced when some PJD members left the party for other parties. Besides, the party did not nominate any of its leading figures. Many observed that PJD’s latest campaign was not as strong as previous campaigns; it was so weak that no slogan was chosen for it. The reason, most probably, is that Ben­kirane was no longer there to boost the campaign with his interventions and his populist speeches. 

3.    Strong competition from other parties: 

Many Moroccan parties have managed to bounce back lately. A case in point is Authenticity and Modernity Party. Since this party came into existence in 2008, its leaders have always made it clear that their prime concern is to stand up to PJD’s conservative agenda. They regularly criticized PJD and its two cabinets. There is also Independence (Istiqlal) Party which quit the first coalition government formed by PJD, preferring to play the role of the rational, non-populist critic of the government performance. The same applies to the National Rally for Independents, which used to be part of the former government alliance, but has recently managed to reinstate its influence independently. 

While PJD failed to effectively communicate with the electorate, these parties had more well-organized and intensive campaigns, and drew up platforms that reflected a high degree of awareness of Morocco's problems, promising to find solutions, especially to problems of the underprivileged and the unemployed, as well as problems pertaining to investments and rural communities. 

4.    'Dawa' wing's evasion of responsibility: 

As PJD re-examined its beliefs and principles, it was always keen on stressing that it maintains a clear demarcation line between political activity and religious activity (i.e., dawa, with which the Unification and Reform Movement is entrusted). This has always been said by leaders from both the political wing and the religious wing of PJD. Some believe that PJD’s recent failure can be understood in part in the light of the fact that the Unification and Reform Movement did not encourage people to vote for PJD as it did in the 2016 elections. The Movement's website did not publish any campaigns for PJD. Some observers attribute this silence on the Movement's part to the fact that Othmani signed a joint declaration with USA and Israel, whereby Morocco resumes relations with the latter. It is known that the Movement has always rejected such relations. This is perhaps why the Movement decided to detach itself from PJD during the elections, which, in turn, led to such a crushing defeat of the partyeven in cities and areas known for its allegiance to Islamists.