Over the past years, Iran sought to bolster relations with both Russia and China. As part of its quest, it joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in September last year, and signed agreements with both states. This goal turned into a strategic regional approach for its foreign policy whenever US and European sanctions were ratcheted up over its nuclear program. Within this context, Iran’s president Ebrahim Raisi made a visit to Moscow on January 19, 2022, where he held talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The visit was concluded without announcing any specific and clearly defined results; no agreements or documents were signed by the two states, contrary to what Tehran suggested ahead of Raisi’s visit.
Messages to the West
The meeting between Putin and Raisi came amid sensitive circumstances that both countries have. The talks in Vienna on the future of the Iran nuclear deal are entering a highly critical stage, where Tehran is now required to make clear decisions. This development coincides with a critical stage of escalation by the United States over the crisis in Ukraine. The US says that Moscow is preparing to invade Ukraine. The West rejects Moscow’s moves and threatens to impose the toughest sanctions against Russia if it decides to launch a military attack. Although the two developments are practically separate from each other, Russia and Iran have the same enemy in both cases: The US and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
There is consensus that Raisi’s visit was meant to send a message to the West in particular that both states, Iran and Russia, can threaten to use leverage to counter pressures from the West, and to adapt to sanctions imposed on both Tehran and Moscow.
The fact is that whenever the West ratchets up pressure on Moscow, more Russian leaders backing Moscow’s getting along with Iran’s hardline policies show up.
Remarkably, Raisi’s visit to Moscow coincided with the “2022 Marine Security Belt” joint naval drill held by Russia, China and Iran in the North Indian Ocean. The exercise marks the three states’ common security attitude towards the West and the NATO military alliance.
By moving closer to Russia, Iran seeks to achieve several goals, the most important of which are as follows:
1. Iran’s message that it has alternatives to the 2015 nuclear deal:
The message is meant to show that if the West does not respond to Iran’s conditions at the Vienna talks over its nuclear program, Tehran is willing to go east to Russia and China, a move that the West dislikes. By opting for this behavior, Iran wants to push the West to make concessions or at least to meet its requirements in any new nuclear deal. Russia is perhaps adopting the same behavior to wield regional leverage to confront the West and NATO, especially in light of the intensifying crisis over Ukraine.
2. Iran considers Russia as a guarantor for its nuclear program:
This is not only in the Vienna talks but for all its activity for this issue, especially regarding its quest for keeping its stockpile of uranium if and when a new nuclear deal is reached. Additionally, Iran wants to continue to get help from Russia for its nuclear program. Moscow built Iran’s Busheher nuclear reactor.
3. Iran is looking forward to a strategic partnership with Russia:
It seeks to achieve this through a 20-year agreement, as stated in draft documents prepared by Tehran. This would follow a similar 25-year agreement signed between Iran and China through which China will invest US$400 billion in Iran's economy in exchange for a steady and heavily-discounted supply of oil from Iran. In Russia’s case, Tehran eyes technology transfer from Moscow as well as Russian weapons and military equipment. It is also looking forward to more Russian investments in its infrastructure. But although Russia views it as one significant way to expand its regional influence, further bolster its economic and trade interests, such partnership does not seem to be encouraging enough now. The main reason being Moscow’s concerns over the consequences of any western sanctions if that partnership is seen by the west as a violation of sanctions imposed on Iran.
Controversies
Despite agreement between Russia and Iran over the importance of cooperation in confronting their enemies, the US and the NATO allies, the aforementioned Iranian goals do not seem to have been achieved during Raisi’s visit to Moscow. This shows the sensitivity of relations between the two states, even when they cooperate over important regional issues. The reason is perhaps that Tehran and Moscow have divergent interests, on the one hand, and opposing political views over regional issues, on the other.
Issues factoring in the relations between Moscow and Tehran are as follows:
1. The conflict in Syria:
Statements made by the Iranians and Russians during the talks between Putin and Raisi were clearly focused on the joint experience both countries are having in Syria, including backing the regime of Bashar Assad and fighting terror organizations. But on the ground, there are evident contradictions marring the policies of the two countries on Syria. That is, in addition to the conflict between them over more influence in Syria, a core issue between them is Israel’s policy on Syria, especially Israel’s military attacks on Iran’s military presence on Syrian territory. Israel continues to strike Iranian assets, forces and military sites as well as its militia groups inside Syria. Iran understands that such Israeli attacks are not excluded from understandings between Israel and Russia, especially as Russia seeks to bolster its relations with Tel Aviv, on the one hand, and believes that Iran’s plans in Syria obstruct the peace process and stability between Israel and Arab states, on the other.
2. Iran’s nuclear program:
Although Russia is backing Iran in the talks over its nuclear program, and at the same time puts pressure on Tehran to engage in another round of the Vienna nuclear talks, Moscow, essentially, fears Iran’s nuclear program, especially regarding Iran’s potential ability to make nuclear weapons, its enrichment of large quantities of high-purity uranium. That is, at the end of the day, Russia does not want a nuclear-weapon state on its southern border that can pose a threat to it on the long term, especially given the historical conflict between Russia and Iran over large swathes in the energy-rich Caucasus which is also an important hub for trade and transportation.
3. Shifts in the Caucasus:
Armenia's defeat in the recent war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh has given birth to a new geopolitical map in the South Caucasus. Iran, a historic supporter of Armenia, emerged as the biggest loser in this conflict. What compounded Iran’s loss is the current rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey aimed at normalization of their relations around regional energy, trade and transportation projects. The projects are planned to link Azerbaijan to Turkey via Armenian territory in preparation for a vital overland trade route between Turkey and Central Asian states. Remarkably, Russia gave agreement to these efforts and even hosted the first round of talks between Turkey and Armenia. Amid all this, Iran is a loser. It will lose overland trade routes between Turkey and Azerbaijan. This new geopolitical map of regional interests in the South Caucasus is set to cause relations between Tehran and Moscow to become even colder, especially because Iran considers these lands as part of its historical territory taken over by Czarist Russia more than a century ago. For Iran, being excluded from the new arrangements in the South Caucasus is such a big issue.
Lack of Complete Trust in Iran
Agreement between Russia and Iran over mutual benefit from countering the common Western enemy and its sanctions and pressures doesn't necessarily mean complete convergence of their policies. The current circumstances driving their agreement may not exist forever, especially given Tehran’s pragmatic foreign policy. Moscow is perhaps implicitly posing these questions: What if Iran and the West reached a new nuclear agreement? Will Iran, then, insist on its rhetoric calling for a strategic partnership with Russia? This question must be prompting Russia to recall that Iran collaborated with the United States during the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, as well as during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Based on that, Moscow has a deep conviction that upon reaching a nuclear deal with Washington, Tehran is capable of changing its rhetoric and engaging in interests with the United States and Europe, especially because the West possesses the keys to funds, trade, investment, experience and technology, among other assets, all of which attract Iran in its quest to first remove the sanctions, and then look forward to carry out more projects and expand its influence. That is why it can be said that Iran’s rhetoric of strategic partnership with Russia does not have the complete trust of Moscow. Moscow is well aware that this Iranian rhetoric is more like a political tactic that Iran has to employ under tensions with the West, and that Iran’s ultimate goal is to reinforce its standing in the Vienna nuclear talks and other issues.
In conclusion, Russian-Iranian relations seem to be walking on a tightrope where each side is trying to hold the other’s hands as long as possible to counter hardships and challenges. Raisi’s recent visit to Moscow does not lie outside this context. That is, Iran is exercising maximum pragmatism to strike a balance between its move towards the East to Beijing and Moscow and its adherence to the Vienna talks in its search for a new nuclear deal that would serve as a new political contract with the West. In embracing this pragmatism, Tehran seems to need a great deal of balance in order to achieve its goals. The fact remains that Russia, whose policies are in conflict with Iranian policies over vital regional issues, is well aware of the real nature, implications and background of Tehran’s policy. Based on all that, Russia’s slowing down and refraining from signing a strategic partnership no with Iran is well understandable.
