On April 10, 2023, several military militia commanders operating in western Libya announced the revival of the so-called "Union of Libyan Revolutionaries" and their rejection of the 13th amendment to the constitutional declaration, which was recently adopted by the House of Representatives and the High Council of State The militias also hinted at the possibility of using force to prevent the implementation of this declaration, under the pretext of ending the political and security chaos in the country.
Grand Mufti Making a Comeback
Against the backdrop of growing international involvement in the Libyan crisis, with the aim of holding presidential and parliamentary elections in 2023, Libya's Western-based factions have made some significant moves. The implications of these moves are as follows:
1. Reactivation of the "Union of Libyan Revolutionaries":
Several militias that are loyal to Libya's ousted Grand Mufti Sadiq al-Ghariani have issued a statement rejecting the militarization of the state and the appointment of dual nationals to any sovereign positions in the country. Additionally, they announced the reactivation of the "Union of Libyan Revolutionaries," a coalition of militias that operate in western Libya. The statement also claimed that this union would defend the gains of the Libyan people and put an end to the political and security chaos in the country.
The statement lacks specificity regarding which militias are part of the new coalition, which raises doubts about their ability to carry out their threats. The militias mentioned in the statement also rejected the 13th Amendment to the Constitutional Declaration. This amendment, approved in February 2023, provides a constitutional basis for presidential and parliamentary elections. It resolves the debate over the nature of the political system in Libya in favour of a presidential system and defines the powers of the executive and legislative branches. The amendment also refers to the laws that will be issued later, currently being drafted by the Joint 6+6 Committee made up of members of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State, which set the conditions for candidacy in future elections.
2. Al-Ghariani warning against UNSMIL’s initiative:
Al-Ghariani has warned against the United Nations Support Mission in Libya's (UNSMIL) efforts to prepare for the upcoming elections. He has further accused the international body of planning to establish a failed state and has urged what he described as "loyal leaders" to reject these efforts.
Some assessments suggest that al-Ghariani's call is primarily directed at the outgoing Prime Minister of the National Unity Government, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, who aligned with the deposed Mufti in 2022 as part of his efforts to gain internal support and strengthen his position against the parallel government led by Fayez al-Sarraj. Therefore, al-Ghariani's recent call aims to disrupt the current rapprochement between eastern and western Libya, especially considering the ongoing talks between Dbeibah and the Libyan National Army Commander, General Khalifa Haftar, as part of mediation efforts by Western powers and the United Nations to create the necessary security conditions for holding elections.
Multiple Drivers
The recent movements made by factions loyal to al-Ghariani in western Libya can be attributed to the following factors:
1. Concerns over unifying the military:
Recently, there have been understandings between military commanders of western and eastern Libya to unify the country's military institution, which would play a decisive role in preparing for the upcoming elections. The United Nations mission and Western powers, led by the United States, have intensified their efforts to resolve this issue, resulting in several meetings between military commanders of both camps. The most recent meeting took place in Benghazi, Eastern Libya, on April 7, 2023, resulting in an agreement to establish a joint force in southern Libya to form a core for a unified military institution.
Factions loyal to al-Ghariani are not in favour of the unification of the military institution because it could jeopardize their gains. The integration of several armed groups into the military and security institutions and the disbandment and disarmament of other groups that are not ready for reintegration could threaten groups loyal to al-Ghariani.
2. Concerns over Egypt-Turkey rapprochement:
There has been as well an increase in the rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey regarding the Libyan issue. During the meeting between the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, and his Egyptian counterpart, Sameh Shukry, on April 13, it was announced that the two countries had agreed to work on a roadmap to lead Libya to parliamentary and presidential elections.
The bloc of the deposed Mufti al-Ghariani is concerned about the rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo, as it has always relied on the continuing disagreement between the two countries to ensure its continued presence in the Libyan scene. Although Ankara is unlikely to respond to Egypt's demands to pull out its troops and foreign mercenary groups from Libya, some Western reports suggested that Turkey might agree to withdraw Syrian mercenaries in return for keeping its military advisers in the North African country.
3. International pressures for holding the elections:
Al-Ghariani's camp is extremely concerned about the international and American pressure to hold parliamentary and presidential elections in Libya by the end of 2023. This is to create an executive authority strong enough to undermine the influence of Al-Ghariani's camp within the government. This is mainly because his camp feeds on internal conflicts.
4. Understanding between Dbeibah and Bashagha:
In recent weeks, there has been an understanding between the government led by Dbeibah and the government led by Fathi Bashagha regarding preparations for the upcoming elections. The two governments plan to jointly oversee the election process. Both rival governments have agreed to participate in meetings held by the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in April. Bashagha visited Misrata in late March, where he called for adopting a reconciliatory approach to end polarization and conflict.
In this context, any understanding reached between the Bashagha and Dbeibah governments would threaten Al-Ghariani's interests. The deposed Mufti took advantage of the conflict between the two governments to reinforce his role and influence. This perhaps explains why he indirectly urged Dbeibah to reject the international community's initiative and efforts to unify the military institution.
Moreover, because militias loyal to Al-Ghariani are based in Misrata, the Mufti is concerned about the implications of any understanding between Dbeibah and Bashagha. This is because it may undermine his influence in the city by making armed groups shift their loyalty away from him.
Likely Repercussions
Amid movements by the camp led by Sadiq al-Ghariani, in conjunction with international efforts for preparations for the elections, the following repercussions will likely impact the scene in Libya in the coming period:
1. Concerns over security deterioration:
Al-Ghariani's movements could potentially undermine the current understanding and lead to a security escalation. However, there is a slim chance of this happening due to the significant breakthrough made by the military path, which is considered the most complicated of all the challenges in the Libyan crisis. Additionally, Turkey and Egypt have announced their cooperation in training and strengthening the joint army consisting of troops from both eastern and western Libya.
2. Likely launch of a new roadmap:
Some assessments suggest that a new roadmap will be launched soon, based on or complementary to an initiative led by Abdoulaye Bathily, the United Nations special envoy to Libya. Recent statements by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu have hinted at a roadmap being discussed by Cairo, Ankara, and other regional and international actors involved in the Libyan issue. The roadmap is expected to be unveiled before mid-June 2023. It is likely to include a set timeframe for the parliamentary and presidential elections while settling the debate about the executive authority that will lead the electoral process.
3. Better chances for approving the electoral law:
In the coming period, a breakthrough is expected in finalizing the electoral law developed to regulate the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, with the current moves being made by the Joint 6+6 Committee, the Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement, and the surprise visit by the Chairman of the Higher Council of State Khalid al-Mishri to Istanbul. Speaker of the House of Representatives Aguila Saleh and Libyan National Army of Eastern Commander Khalifa Haftar are also preparing to visit Cairo in the coming days to discuss issues posing challenges to the achievement of the electoral base. The rapprochement between Cairo and Ankara could reflect positively on efforts to reach an agreement about the electoral base.
In conclusion, the internal situation and the regional and international contexts provide an excellent opportunity to settle the highly complicated Libyan crisis. However, this does not mean that no existing challenges can hinder these efforts. The camp led by Libya's deposed Mufti is the most recent challenge. It aims to perpetuate the volatile situation to guarantee and preserve its interests and continued presence in the Libyan scene. However, the ability of this camp to hinder the efforts appears to be limited.
