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Strategic Triad

The New Strategic Triangle and its Impact on Regional Security

30 مايو، 2024


Over the past thirty years, the collaboration between China, Russia, and Tehran on a bilateral level has made significant strides. The partnership between Russia and China has evolved into a "no limits", all-encompassing alliance. President Putin chose China as his first destination after his re-election this year, underscoring the strength of their relationship. The Beijing summit not only showcased the depth of strategic cooperation between the two nations but also highlighted its promising future progress. Simultaneously, the trilateral partnership involving Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran has also made substantial advancements. Despite the passing of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, the tripartite partnership appears to be stable, underpinned by shared interests and solid foundations.

Tehran and Beijing have inked a strategic partnership agreement in Tehran on March 27, 2021, spanning 25 years and encompassing political, economic, and military domains. Similarly, Iran has entered into the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with Moscow in January 2022, set to last for 20 years, replacing the expiring basic treaty of 2001, which had been renewed thrice. The new agreement aims to bolster cooperation, particularly in energy, transportation, trade, and infrastructure. Consequently, the tripartite partnership is advancing on two fundamental economic and strategic fronts. At an economic level, its foundations comprise:

Strategic Cooperation in the Energy Field

Iran holds the second position, following Saudi Arabia, as the major oil supplier to China. A significant agreement was reached in March 2004, wherein Iran committed to providing China with $20 billion worth of liquefied gas over 25 years. Moreover, China has acquired a 51% stake in the "Yadavaran" oil field, located near the Iraqi border, boasting reserves of approximately 3 billion barrels. Notably, numerous projects focusing on Iranian infrastructure and the energy sector are underway, with the gas condensation refinery in Bandar Abbas standing out as one of the most prominent initiatives.

In the wake of sanctions imposed on both countries, Russia and Iran are showing significant interest in energy cooperation. Russia has planned to invest $7 billion in the Azadegan field situated on the Iranian-Iraqi border. Additionally, Gazprom has inked a memorandum of understanding worth $40 billion with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). This agreement entails investments in the North and South Pars of Kish conventional gas fields. To circumvent Western sanctions on the supply of gas-related technology and equipment, Iran has supplied turbines to Russia. This move was facilitated by Iran's development of its local industry, enabling near self-sufficiency in the field.

Conversely, Iran imports gas from Russia through Turkmenistan via two transmission lines with a capacity of 20 billion cubic meters. Notably, both nations played a pivotal role in establishing the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, which comprises 12 major gas exporters contributing to approximately 85% of the international gas trade and collectively owning 40% of gas transportation pipelines.

Iran as an Economic Corridor

Iran holds significant strategic importance as a key corridor for the Belt and Road Initiative, which serves as a compass for Chinese policy. It stands as the primary intersection of the Central Asian trade route, playing a pivotal role in continental connectivity and the overland Silk Road. Additionally, the recent closure of European ports and markets to Russia has prompted the activation of the "North-South" corridor, establishing a direct link between Russia and India via Iran. Despite initial hesitations from Russia, this route offers a 30% cost reduction and is 40% shorter than some traditional alternatives. The inaugural shipments through this corridor commenced on June 11, 2022.

Iran's BRICS Membership

Iran became a member of BRICS on January 1st, opening up new opportunities for trade and economic cooperation between Tehran, China, and Russia. China, already a significant trading partner for Iran, saw trade exchange between the two countries reach $14.6 billion in 2023, accounting for a third of Iran's total exports.

Furthermore, Iran has a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, led by Russia, which is expected to significantly boost trade exchange between the two countries in the coming years. To facilitate transactions, both countries are looking to deal in national currencies and link their banking and financial systems. Additionally, Iran's integration of the Russian “Mir” card with its Iranian counterpart “Shatab” will further enhance economic cooperation between the two nations.

Moreover, the strategic pillar of the tripartite cooperation among Iran, China, and Russia has significant implications for regional and international security. Some of the most notable dimensions of this cooperation include:

Joint Military Exercises in the Indian Ocean

The "Joint Maritime Security Belt" maneuvers, held annually since 2019, cover an area of 17,000 square kilometers with immense strategic significance. Situated at the convergence of the vital Golden Straits - Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab, and Malacca - and in close proximity to the Fifth American Fleet, this area oversees the transit of about 30% of the world's seaborne crude oil and a fifth of China's oil imports through the Hormuz Strait. In March 2024, the exercises were expanded to include Oman, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and South Africa as observers. The stated objectives of these maneuvers encompass enhancing the security of international maritime trade, combating piracy and maritime terrorism, humanitarian efforts, as well as the exchange of operational and tactical expertise and information on maritime rescue. This expansion signifies the deepening strategic cooperation among the participating countries.

Arms Exports and Localization of Defense Technology

Military cooperation between Iran and the two countries began after the Islamic Revolution, when Iran's access to American and Western arms was cut off. Currently, Iran ranks as the third largest importer of Chinese arms. Beijing has assisted Tehran in developing long-range ballistic and anti-ship missiles, and has provided defensive missile systems, including long-range Scud and cruise missiles. Additionally, Beijing supplied Tehran with CSS missiles, the essential equipment to establish Iranian weapons and ammunition factories, and supported Iran's naval capabilities by providing speedboats and gunboats.

Moscow also plays a crucial role as a primary supplier of arms to Iran. In 2016, Russia delivered S-300 missile defense systems to Tehran and is currently in negotiations for the supply of S-400 systems. A significant $10 billion deal was finalized in January 2022, encompassing the purchase of military equipment, including a minimum of 24 Su-35 super-maneuverable fighter jets. Additionally, Russia will provide training for 32 Iranian pilots in its facilities.

Furthermore, technical cooperation between the two countries enables Tehran to undertake the repair and modernization of its existing fleet of MiG-29, MiG-25, and Sukhoi 24MK fighters, thereby bolstering the capabilities of the Iranian Air Force. Notably, during the Syrian crisis, Iran granted unprecedented access to Russian bombers to launch from the Iranian "Hamedan" base.

The Ukrainian crisis marked a pivotal moment in strengthening the strategic partnership between Moscow and Tehran, propelling it towards a "full-fledged defense partnership." A significant indicator of this partnership is the supply of Iranian drones to Russia. Moscow has increasingly relied on Iranian "Shahed 136" drones due to their cost-effectiveness and ability to accomplish specific objectives. As a testament to the depth of their collaboration, the two countries have agreed to localize the production of Iranian drones in Russia, focusing on a new advanced model characterized by increased speed, extended range, and reduced noise levels.

Understanding and Coordination around Afghanistan

Following the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, a series of meetings involving the three countries, as well as Pakistan, have been convened at the foreign minister level to address the situation in Afghanistan. The fourth meeting, held on April 13, 2023 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, saw the participation of three Central Asian countries. The high-level coordination among the involved nations and their engagement with the Taliban government have effectively mitigated the Afghan threat and managed the repercussions of the sudden US withdrawal from Afghanistan to a significant degree.

China and Russia are actively engaging with Afghanistan, leveraging their embassies in Kabul to foster communication with the Taliban. In a significant move, China appointed a new ambassador to Afghanistan in September 2023, signaling its commitment to the region. Additionally, China recognized the credentials of the Taliban ambassador to Beijing, indicating a willingness to engage with the new Afghan leadership.

The Taliban has shown interest in participating in China's Belt and Road Initiative and has urged China to increase its investments in Afghanistan, citing the country's abundant mineral resources, including lithium, copper, and iron. Notably, several Chinese companies are already operating in Afghanistan, with plans underway to develop a large copper mine, reflecting China's growing economic footprint in the region.

Meanwhile, Moscow has also expressed interest in the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline and the trans-Afghanistan railway, which would connect Uzbekistan with Pakistan.

The rejection of the UN Secretary-General's plan by the three countries - Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran - on March 2, demonstrated their coordination. The plan involved appointing a special representative for Afghan affairs, which the three countries, along with the Taliban, viewed as a potential gateway for American and Western intervention in Afghan affairs. Doubts were cast on the intentions of Western countries and the United Nations.

Cyber Cooperation

Cyber security is a critical aspect of the partnership between the three countries. Russia has been providing Tehran with advanced espionage software, digital surveillance tools, communication, and diagnostic capabilities, as well as eavesdropping and advanced imaging devices, including lie detectors. Specifically, the Russian company "Protel" supplied restriction software to the Iranian mobile phone operator "Aren Tel," granting it the ability to monitor, intercept, or disrupt all mobile phone communications.

Moreover, Iran and Russia have had a cooperation agreement in place for combating cyber threats and enhancing information security since 2020. As part of a strategic cooperation agreement, China is set to aid Iran in establishing a national Internet network. Notably, the Iranian government has long been striving to create a separate domestic Internet network distinct from the global network.

Iran’s Membership of the SCO

In addition to bilateral engagements, several collective frameworks foster and bolster security and strategic cooperation among Iran, Russia, and China. The most significant of these is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Iran attained full membership in the SCO in September 2021 after two decades as an observer. This development enables a heightened level of sustainable security cooperation and intelligence coordination not only with Russia and China, but also with other SCO members.

Chinese-Russian Support for Iran’s nuclear deal

In view of the extensive mutual interests between Russia, China, and Iran, both Russia and China have actively pursued the lifting of sanctions on Iran. Their goal is to end Iran's international and regional isolation and reintegrate it into the global community. Notably, these two countries are recognized as the key architects of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Furthermore, they have vehemently criticized the United States' decision to withdraw from the agreement.

The nuclear cooperation between Tehran and Beijing dates back to the 1980s, marked by the signing of a significant agreement in 1985. Over the years, China has provided Iran with essential support in constructing nuclear facilities and related research centers, particularly in Isfahan. Moreover, China has played a pivotal role in training numerous Iranian scientists and technicians within its borders and has facilitated the sale of raw uranium to Iran.

Russia holds a significant stake in this thorny issue. It is a key partner in Iran's nuclear program, including the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Additionally, Russia played a crucial role in the negotiations that led to the nuclear deal.

After the United States withdrew from the agreement on May 8, 2018, Russia, in conjunction with China and European stakeholders, actively worked to salvage and uphold the deal. Their efforts aimed to manage Iranian responses and prevent further escalation. As a result, Moscow and Beijing have successfully kept the possibility of Tehran and Washington rejoining the deal open for the future.

Limits of the Tripartite Partnership

Despite the tripartite partnership between Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing, it is evident that both Beijing and Moscow are highly interested in fostering strategic cooperation with the Arab Gulf states. They perceive such collaboration as pivotal in shaping the new world order. There exists a consensus between China and Russia on the imperative nature of an Arab-Iranian rapprochement. Both nations are of the view that their strategic interests are best served by promoting stability and peace in the Gulf region. They regard the Arab countries and Iran as strategic partners, understanding that fostering stable relations between these two parties is essential for safeguarding their vital interests in the region. Their engagement with these nations is based on equality, aligning with the demands of their respective interests. In line with this, Moscow introduced the "Russia's Collective Security Concept for the Gulf" initiative on July 23, 2019. Additionally, Chinese mediation successfully led to the Saudi-Iranian agreement in March 2023.

The tripartite partnership is unlikely to provoke Russia or Beijing to engage in a military confrontation on behalf of or alongside Iran against Washington and Israel. However, there is potential for them to offer support akin to what Iran and China provided to Moscow during the Ukraine crisis. Nevertheless, if the West were to instigate a conflict with all three countries, it could push them to form an alliance. In such a scenario, each country would likely engage in conflict on its own front - with Russia in Eastern Europe, China in Taiwan, and Iran in the Gulf. This worst-case scenario would entail a third world war, a prospect that all of humanity fervently hopes to avert.