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Steering Clear

Reasons Behind the Conservatives’ Support for President Rouhani

01 أغسطس، 2018


Although the Fundamentalist Conservatives have recently sought to exploit the problems facing Iran at the internal and external levels to ratchet up pressure on Rouhani's government and the Moderates in general -which has succeeded in strengthening conservatives' presence within state institutions in recent years- they do not want to ramp up the pressures in such way that could eventually lead to a power vacuum or cause a serious split in the regime.

Certainly, they fear that this option may contribute to weakening the regime’s ability to deal with the recent domestic and regional troubles, in particular the continuing protests due to the economic problems and the lack of basic living services such as water and electricity in some areas, as well as the approaching deadline for the re-imposition of sanctions by the US Trump administration on Tehran in August and November.

Backing the president

It was indeed shocking that many of the Fundamentalist Conservatives have begun to call for the need to stand by President Hassan Rouhani to enhance the efforts of the government, which is currently bracing itself for the repercussions of the US sanctions in the coming period. The mainstream media, such as Kayhan newspaper, have also started to promote the idea that weakening or demanding the overthrow of the government will send a “wrong” message to anti-Iran forces, chiefly the US, given that the latter counts on the new sanctions to undermine the regime and force it, at a later stage, to negotiate to reach a new agreement with Washington on terms that correspond to its interests and policies.

Therefore, support for the President Rouhani came also from the Iranian highest echelons, represented by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. During his meeting with Foreign Minister Mohammad Jawad Zarif, Iran’s ambassadors and representatives in international organizations on 21 July 2018, Khamenei highlighted that the remarks of President Rouhani in which he hinted that if Iran could not export its oil, the whole region would not export it, alluding to Iran’s possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz- express the approach and policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

This support is an important indication that Khamenei wants to end the controversy that raged at home and abroad after Rouhani made those remarks during his visit to Switzerland in early July, especially after some Iranian officials were keen to confirm that the statements were “misunderstood” in an attempt to reduce the criticism directed at Iran by several regional and international powers concerned with ensuring the freedom of navigation in the region.  

Lack of Alternatives

But perhaps the ultimate objective of ensuring support for President Rouhani is that the Fundamentalist Conservatives, along with them the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), are keen to avoid being in the forefront of the Iranian political scene at this difficult juncture, which may lead to significant shifts in Iran in the coming period. 

In other words, this backing indicates that the regime is short on options for coping with the pressures and crises it faces, other than maintaining the current policy implemented by the government, at home and abroad.

At the domestic level, the government is trying to solve the problems of fresh water and electricity shortages that have emerged in some towns and villages and has been one of the causes of numerous protests during the recent period, in parallel with its ongoing efforts to control the exchange rate of the national currency (toman), which have taken a nosedive against the dollar, pushing the merchant class (Bazaari) to join protests.

At the external level, the government is striving to keep the nuclear deal alive, which has been hit hard by the US withdrawal, either by pushing the European countries to implement economic measures that would reduce the repercussions of the pullout, or by trying to persuade China and Russia to back Iran’s position in the coming period, which will face further escalation by the US.

Although many institutions in the regime and conservative forces voiced their dissatisfaction with the government’s moves and expressed doubts on relying on the European stance towards the US administration's policies, they were keen not to obstruct those moves. This was primarily based on the coservatives' belief that they are part of the government’s endeavors to ensure that European States meet the requirements set by the Supreme Leader in order to stay in the nuclear agreement in the coming period.

This position means that many forces in the Conservatives and state institutions see that turning up the heat on President Rouhani could lead to considerable consequences at the present stage where the regime, in their view, needs to be stay united in the face of external pressures and internal crises.

In other words, these fundamentalist tendencies believe that the call to overthrow or force the government to resign, which surfaced in the recent period, could have serious repercussions that would spill over to the Fundamentalist Conservatives themselves, because if a vacuum in the executive power to happen, they would have to find an alternative candidate to run the executive affairs of the state.

Certainly, this path could prove destructive to the Conservatives, since they currently lack the strategy or options that would enable them to deal effectively with the current internal crises and external pressures facing Iran.

Thus, the tendency, which has greater consensus within the conservatives, has emerged, which calls for the continued support for President Rouhani and setting limits to the pressures on him during the next phase, until he completes his current presidential term, which will end in 2021. Then, new circumstances may evolve that correspond to the visions and policies of the conservatives and enhance the chances for their return to lead the executive power.

Accordingly, the Conservatives’ pressures have been reduced to demand a change in the economic team in the government, because, in their view, it has failed to address the accumulated economic problems. The government seems to be trying to grasp this and hence working to defuse the tension at home and focus on confronting the repercussions of the US policy. Amidst the limited options and lack of alternatives, the steps taken by the US administration appear to be paying off and having their toll on Iran, which have put the Iranian regime to a difficult test.