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PESCO

Opportunities and challenges for Transatlantic Community

27 ديسمبر، 2017


On November 13, 2017, 23-member States of the European Union (EU) agreed to launch the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The decision, which is the latest move to enhance EU’s defence cooperation since the publication of the Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy in June 2016, was hailed as a milestone in the integration process, establishing a legal framework for cooperation in a sensitive field, where national prerogatives were considered dominant up until now.

The Awakening of the ‘Sleeping Beauty’

PESCO, which was included in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty as a mechanism of differentiated integration, represents an answer to the multiple challenges posed to Europe. The initiative addresses European people’s request of security, which has increased after phenomena, such as terrorism and migration flows, had a major impact on the European continent compared to the previous decades. At the same time, PESCO seems to represent a bold answer to the centrifugal forces and diverting tendencies, which are jeopardizing the European project and reached their peak with the Brexit referendum in 2015.  

On December 11, PESCO was officially launched at the EU Foreign Affairs Council, eight years after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Commenting on the long time passed since, the European President Jean-Claude Juncker defined PESCO as a ‘Sleeping Beauty’. The details of the agreement have been ironed out in the past months, when two different visions of PESCO emerged. On one hand, the French government considered PESCO an ambitious initiative and demanded that higher criteria should be met by those countries interested in taking part in the project; on the other hand, Germany proposed a different approach, promoting the inclusive character of PESCO and the strategic interest of having onboard Central and Eastern European member countries. The final result was the launch of an ‘ambitious, binding and inclusive’ framework, reflecting a compromise between the two visions in which able and willing States could take part.

PESCO: Institutional Framework

The institutional character of the initiative becomes evident when considering the number of EU’s bodies involved in PESCO’s activities. Part of the broader Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), PESCO will benefit from the support of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), under the supervision of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.[1] A regular assessment of its implementation will be carried out by EDA, the EU Military Staff and the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMDP). PESCO will also be linked with the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), established by the European Commission to finance research and joint projects between member states.[2] Binding obligations, a regular review and the possibility of suspending member states that violate the higher criteria mirror the institutional framework of PESCO.

Given its inclusion in the broad institutional network of the EU and the number of activities assigned, PESCO’s governance model represents an institutional anchor that can prevent its dissolution if political circumstances that favoured its establishment are about to change.[3] Moreover, it will also promote a further integration among EU Member States, adopting the same functionalist approach that has promoted the European integration in the last 60 years.

On the other hand, several observers emphasized the initiative’s shortcomings. The fact that almost all EU members agreed to be included[4] should not be overestimated. Indeed, the adhesion of some Eurosceptic governments who have recently opposed a deeper integration of the EU (such as Hungary and Poland) might have been driven by fears of being marginalized rather than by a strong commitment to the project. Moreover, given the fact that decisions in PESCO will be taken unanimously, the high number of members could be detrimental to the integration process and could water down the adoption of ambitious projects, confirming the assumption that the advance-guard group envisaged by the Treaty of Lisbon has been replaced with a convoy[5]; and validating concerns that without a proper buy-in from EU member states, it will remain a marginal paper.[6]

Strengthening the European pillar within NATO

The establishment of PESCO significantly affects the cooperation between the EU and NATO. Considering Russia’s increasing assertiveness since 2014, the cooperation between these two organisations is crucial for the defence of the Western world. However, several issues prevented the establishment of a full and comprehensive partnership: among them several observers identified the Turkish issue (including its controversial relation with the EU and its recent decision to purchase the Russian S-400 missile system) and the reluctance of some countries (e.g. France) to depend on NATO for military interventions.[7]

The EU-NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016 represented a turning point, resulting in the adoption of a Joint Declaration, stressing the need to work together more closely and agreeing to set up 42 actions across different policy areas. The launch of PESCO represented a step forward for the European Defence and was closely followed by NATO officials in Brussels. The Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg welcomed PESCO, saying that it “can strengthen European defence, which is good for Europe but also good for NATO.” Stoltenberg added that a stronger European defence could help increase defence spending and improve burden-sharing within the Alliance, strengthening the European pillar within NATO.[8]

At the same time, Stoltenberg stressed the fact that many European leaders reaffirmed the importance of developing the European defence in a way that it would not be competing with NATO, but complementary to it. Those reassurances were crucial for Stoltenberg, who remarked that NATO and the EU do not need duplications or competition. The need to tune-in the relation between the North Atlantic Organisation and the European defence integration has been also highlighted also by Central and Eastern member states of the EU. Most of them fear that PESCO could undermine NATO and weak the security cooperation with the United States.[9] More in general, defence-spending decisions could represent a challenge for a deep cooperation between the two organisations. As it has been noticed, PESCO potentially puts the EU and NATO on a collision course for member states’ defence money, forcing them to choose between competing expectations.[10]

More in general, Stoltenberg identified three challenges to the Euro-Atlantic partnership after the launch of PESCO: coherence in terms of military capabilities; the need to make sure that forces and capabilities developed under PESCO are also available for NATO; and the need to have the full involvement of non-EU NATO allies in the consultations and process of PESCO. The last point is particularly relevant, considering that after Brexit 80 percent of NATO Defence spending will come from non-EU NATO allies.

The points raised by Jens Stoltenberg reveal the need to clearly address the relationship between the EU and NATO after the launch of PESCO. NATO is and will remain the cornerstone of Europe’s security and the transatlantic relation continues to represent the most formidable deterrent against any threat posed to the Old Continent. At the same time, unprecedented challenges have emerged on Europe’s eastern and southern flanks, forcing both the EU and NATO to step up their efforts to address issues such as terrorism and Russia’s resurgence. As stated in the joint declaration at the Warsaw summit in July 2016, a stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing and PESCO can contribute to strengthen the European pillar of the Euro-Atlantic community, enhancing Europe’s security in particular and that of the Western world more in general.


[1] Daniel Fiott, Antionio Missiroli, Thierry Tardy, Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a name?, p.32, Chaillot Paper n.142, November 2017, European Union Institute for Security Studies.

[2] In this context, PESCO will help address inefficiencies in defence spending in Europe. According to some estimates, in 2016 Europe spent 1.4% of its Gross Domestic Product on defence, far more than China or Russia, but it is considered still militarily irrelevant. Enrique Mora Benavente, Time for the Sleeping Beauty to wake, European Council of Foreign Relations, 15/11/2017.

[3] Alessandro Marrone, Permanent Structured Cooperation: an Institutional Pathway for European Defence, Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Commentaries, 20/11/2017.

[4] Apart from the United Kingdom engaged in the Brexit negotiations, Denmark opted out of EU defence initiatives. Portugal and Ireland recently voted to take part in PESCO, while Malta has still to make a decision.

[5] Nick Witney, EU defence efforts miss the open goal again, European Council of Foreign Relations, 15/11/2017.

[6] Bastian Giegerich, European Defence and the Emperor’s New Uniform, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 22/12/2016

[7] Vincenzo Camporini, NATO/UE: se la difesa europea aiuta la cooperazione, Affari Internazionali, 02/12/2017.

[9] These concerns were made public by the Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydlo who said that the EU’s strategic autonomy should not weak the European contribution to NATO’s defence and deterrence potential. Michael Baranowski, Martin Quencez, An Inclusive PESCO moves forward despite remaining concerns, The German Marshall Fund, 14/11/2017.

[10] Tomáš Valášek, The EU’s New Defense Pact: Marginal Gains, Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Europe, 16/11/2017.