أخبار المركز
  • أحمد عليبة يكتب: (هاجس الموصل: لماذا يخشى العراق من التصعيد الحالي في سوريا؟)
  • محمود قاسم يكتب: (الاستدارة السريعة: ملامح المشهد القادم من التحولات السياسية الدرامية في كوريا الجنوبية)
  • السيد صدقي عابدين يكتب: (الصدامات المقبلة: مستقبل العلاقة بين السلطتين التنفيذية والتشريعية في كوريا الجنوبية)
  • د. أمل عبدالله الهدابي تكتب: (اليوم الوطني الـ53 للإمارات.. الانطلاق للمستقبل بقوة الاتحاد)
  • معالي نبيل فهمي يكتب: (التحرك العربي ضد الفوضى في المنطقة.. ما العمل؟)

Ongoing Confusion

How does Hezbollah Cope with Regional and International Pressures?

23 نوفمبر، 2017


The political crisis that erupted in Lebanon after the Prime Minister Saad Hariri announced his resignation, on November 4, 2017, confounded Hezbollah’s calculations, especially as it came suddenly, coinciding with its growing involvement in the Syrian conflict. This confusion was evident in the contradictory messages of the party and was reflected in the speeches of its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in the post-crisis period, most recently on November 20.

That confusion arose from the enormous pressure on the party, whether due to its attempts to dominate the Lebanese political decision in favor of its engagement in the Syrian conflict to serve Iranian objectives, or due to its involvement in supporting terrorist and armed militias that exacerbate existing regional crises, as in the case of the crisis in Yemen, or threaten the security and stability of the States in the region.

Two Main Variables 

Undoubtedly, there are two variables, which have contributed to the escalation of these pressures. Firstly, the heightened international attention to the negative roles played by Hezbollah in the Lebanese and regional arenas. This was evident in the recent sanctions imposed by the US Congress against the party on October 25, 2017, targeting its political role and economic resources. These sanctions followed the announcement of the US strategy, on October 13, to confront the Iranian threats in the region, particularly with regard to the roles of the Iranian-backed militias, namely Hezbollah.

Accordingly, many analysts argue that the US administration is moving towards taking steps against Hezbollah inside and outside Lebanon, which may amount to the use of the military option, as this is an application of the new US strategy through which Washington seeks to curb the Iranian activities in supporting terrorism and chaos in the region.

The US interest coincides with the increasing international condemnation of the roles played by Hezbollah inside and outside Lebanon to serve Iran’s objectives, as reflected in the remarks made by the French Foreign Minister spokeswoman Agnes Romatet-Espagne on November 13, 2017. According to Reuters, France’s foreign ministry said that "it was an important condition for the stability of the region that Iran not interfere in Lebanon’s domestic affairs.” This was followed by assertions from Espagne stating that ““We wish that all those who exert an influence in Lebanon allow all the political actors in this country to exercise fully their responsibilities,” in reference to the pressure exerted by Hezbollah on the government to take political steps in harmony with Iran’s policy, especially in Syria.

The second variable is the new data imposed by the resolution of the Arab Foreign Ministers Council held on November 19, at the invitation of Saudi Arabia, to discuss ways of confronting the Iranian threats. The statement issue by the council not only denounced the practices carried out by Iran and its sectarian militias in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, but it has also revealed a new Arab trend towards the “internationalization” of the Iranian threat dossier, by calling on the Arab group at the UN to prepare for Security Council meeting to discuss these threats.

Conflicting Messages 

These twin pressures denied Hezbollah the opportunity to take the lead, and enforced it to adopt a defensive posture, which contributed to its confusion. This was evident in Hassan Nasrallah’s speech one day after the Arab Ministerial Meeting, in which he sent three political messages: the first was to give the impression that Hezbollah was not responsible for the ongoing political crisis in Lebanon, asserting that the party does not consider the prime minister’s resignation valid, a speech adopted by the political forces aligned with him, making it necessary for Hariri to resign from Lebanon, as confirmed by President Michel Aoun and other Lebanese officials.

Thus, the party seeks to send messages that there are other reasons for the current crisis in Lebanon, associated with the interactions that are taking place between regional forces in the region, as well as their repercussions on various regional crises, particularly the Syrian and Yemeni crises. This runs counter to the facts on the ground which indicate that the party’s violation of the policy pursued by the Lebanese state since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis based on “disassociation”, was the main reason why the political situation in Lebanon has reached such point.

The second message was to imply that the party is moving towards a policy of withdrawal from certain crisis zones with the aim of reducing the international and regional pressures. This was reflected in Nasrallah’s reference, during his last speech, to the possible withdrawal of the party’s leaders and cadres from Iraq, if it were found that the main objective to which they had moved to Iraq had been achieved. 

In this context, it is noteworthy that Nasrallah has concluded his remarks by suggesting that these elements could be moved to other battlefields if required, which means that returning to Lebanon will not be the only option for the party if it decides-at the behest of Iran-to withdraw from Iraq. This indicated that Yemen or any region may be a potential arena for deploying such elements to support the terrorist militias there.

Therefore, these hints contradict Nasrallah’s desire to deny the party’s smuggling of weapons to any Arab country, including Yemen, except the Palestinian territories, in response to the accusations of the party's involvement in the launch of the ballistic missile attack on Saudi Arabia from Yemen.

The third message was to promote the Iranian allegations about its role in the war against ISIS, as Nasrallah was keen to applaud the Revolutionary Guards and the commander of the Jerusalem Force, Qasim Sulemani, for his role in ousting ISIS from the Syrian city of Bukamal.

Remarkably, these statements coincide with Iran’s eagerness to promote the same allegations, as highlighted in the statements made by Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, on November 21, 2017, in which he attacked the Arab League and exaggerated the Iranian efforts in the fight against ISIS. However, Rouhani ignored the fact that the sectarian policy adopted by Tehran was one of the reasons for the spread and expansion of ISIS in Iraq and Syria in recent years. 

In light of the above, it can be argued that Hezbollah seeks to distance itself from the ongoing crisis in Lebanon, for which it is directly responsible. Instead, it seeks to send messages that it is open to efforts made by several regional and international powers to reach out a settlement over the coming period, without having to show any willingness to back such efforts, because the decision is ultimately not taken in the Southern suburb, but in Tehran.