أخبار المركز
  • أحمد عليبة يكتب: (هاجس الموصل: لماذا يخشى العراق من التصعيد الحالي في سوريا؟)
  • محمود قاسم يكتب: (الاستدارة السريعة: ملامح المشهد القادم من التحولات السياسية الدرامية في كوريا الجنوبية)
  • السيد صدقي عابدين يكتب: (الصدامات المقبلة: مستقبل العلاقة بين السلطتين التنفيذية والتشريعية في كوريا الجنوبية)
  • د. أمل عبدالله الهدابي تكتب: (اليوم الوطني الـ53 للإمارات.. الانطلاق للمستقبل بقوة الاتحاد)
  • معالي نبيل فهمي يكتب: (التحرك العربي ضد الفوضى في المنطقة.. ما العمل؟)

New Volatility:

Lebanon after Hariri’s return

30 نوفمبر، 2017


After his return to Lebanon on November 22, about three weeks after his resignation on November 4 from Riyadh, and his meeting with the President of the Republic, Michel Aoun, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nabih Berri, Prime Minister Saad Hariri responded to President Aoun’s request. Hariri put his resignation on hold to give space for dialogue and consultations provided that the three conditions he put forward to rescind his resignation, are implemented. The three conditions are as follows:

1- Preserving Taif Agreement (some sources revealed that this item is intended to disarm Hezbollah, as stipulated in the agreement, which states in article 2 the disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the handing over of their weapons to the Lebanese State within six months of the ratification of the agreement). 

2- Actual implementation of disassociation principle, Hariri considers disassociation form all what happens around Lebanon is the crucial policy that protects Lebanon from any problems in the region.

3- Not to damage relations with the Arab States, stressing that Lebanese politics should not be pursued at the expense of Arab brethren, otherwise he would have a different position.

The Resistance Axis 

The most important reactions to Hariri’s conditions were as follows: 

Hariri’s announcement about putting his resignation on hold, linking it to certain conditions, met with various reactions from the Iranian axis and March 8 alliance, as follows: 

1- The Iranian position: Iran’s state television quoted Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (on November 23), as saying that Hezbollah’s armament is necessary to fight the enemy of the Lebanese nation, Israel, adding that Hezbollah must have the best weapons to protect Lebanon’s security, hence disarming the party is non-negotiable”.  

2- Hezbollah: In a recent statement, the “Loyalty to the Resistance” bloc considered the return of Saad Hariri to the country and the various statements and positions that followed herald the possibility of things returning to normal.

3- The Lebanese President Michel Aoun stressed that Lebanon managed to overcome the government crisis by fortifying its internal unity, with a major diplomatic effort, and that Lebanon deals with other states from the perspective of parity not subordination.

4- Free National Movement: The Lebanese Foreign Minister and leader of the movement, Gebran Bassil asserted at the inaugural session of the Lebanese Diaspora Energy conference in Mexico that Lebanon pursues a foreign policy based on principles and the interest of Lebanon only, noting that the President of the Republic acted vigorously, and the prime minister returned freely.

5- Hezbollah- affiliated media: Al-Akhbar, the pro-party newspaper published several articles underlining that the attempt to exert pressures on the resistance axis fell flat and the Future Movement welcomes Hariri’s decision to suspend his resignation, suggesting that would open up a rift within the March 14 alliance.

International pressures

International pressures were placed on Hariri to dissuade him from his resignation, in order to maintain state stability, to push him to practice his official role as head of the government and as the first line of defence to stand against the dominance of the Iranian axis in Lebanon, with guarantee to back him in the coming period, as follows:

1- The French role: The French move emerged after Hariri submitted his resignation on November 4, through visits and meetings with the parties of the crisis (Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iran). The French President assured the Lebanese President of the collective commitment of the international community to Lebanon’s unity, sovereignty and stability, stressing that Lebanon’s stability is a French priority, a sublime goal of France’s efforts in the Near and Middle East.

2. The U.S. role: Prime Minister Saad Hariri received a telephone call from the U.S. National Security Advisor Gen. Herbert McMaster on November 24, assuring him of the U.S. administration’s commitment to the stability of Lebanon, its support for the state and its legitimate institutions. In addition, the U.S. President assured Hariri on November 23, that his country would continue to back Lebanon’s efforts to maintain its stability, independence and sovereignty.

The Arab position

Prior to Hariri’s decision to rescind his resignation, the Arab position was presented in the final communiqué of the emergency meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers, held in Cairo on November 19, which condemned the Iranian role and armed militias in the region. However, Lebanon and Iraq voiced reservations about some of its provisions (4, 6, 7 and 8) concerning the role of Iran in sowing the seeds of sectarianism and support for armed groups, labelling Hezbollah as a terrorist organization while it is a partner in the Lebanese government.

After the meeting, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, visited Lebanon and hold meetings with the Lebanese President and the Speaker of the Parliament. Aboul Gheit stressed that everyone recognizes the particularity of Lebanon, that Lebanon cannot be a battleground for any Arab-Iranian confrontation, making clear that no one accuses the Lebanese government of terrorism, but the reference to terrorism concerns one partner only in the government.

Lebanon’s exposure

Internal and external developments following Hariri’s resignation reveal that Lebanon is exposed to regional and international influence, making the country prone to fluctuation between escalation and de-escalation, for the following reasons:

1- At the international level, the crisis has provided the Iranian axis, backed by Russia, with a freedom of movement. Against that backdrop comes the affirmation of the Russian Ambassador in Lebanon, speaking to Radio Lebanon on November 19, that the current Lebanese formula is suitable for this stage, in reference to the formation of the current government with Aoun being the president of the Republic, and that the topic of Lebanon’s disassociation from the Syrian crisis should have occurred from the beginning before the involvement of Moscow, Tehran and Hezbollah in the war against terrorism. Thus, the withdrawal of Hezbollah from Syria is unlikely. These statements emphasize the connection between the developments in Syria and the internal situation in Lebanon. 

2- At the regional level, the recent developments have caused a rift in the official Arab-Lebanese relations, especially following the decision of the Arab Foreign Ministers to condemn Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. The current crisis demonstrates that a regional settlement will unlikely undermine the activity of Hezbollah and Iran in the Middle East. The Lebanese crisis is not solely linked to the end of the Syrian crisis because the actors involved in the crisis continue to play their roles, particularly Hezbollah. Hence, Lebanon will likely continue to be an arena for regional tension, until one party falls, and the other takes all the gains.

3- At the domestic level, a question arises as to the seriousness of the Hariri’s demand for disarming Hezbollah, whether he wanted to up the ante to obtain further gains related to the other two demands (disassociation and maintaining good relations with the Arab countries), because it is impossible for Hezbollah to take this step. In this regard, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) precluded the possibility of raising any questions about Iran’s acceptance of the negotiation on the fate of the Hezbollah’s armament, because the party’s armament is not only for Lebanon but all the countries in the region.

In addition, the internal consultations in Lebanon to resolve the current deadlock are not time-bound, suggesting that Lebanon is descending into an open-ended crisis until a consensus formula on how to deal externally with countries in the region is reached, albeit such one would be confined only to official positions.