Indications of growing tensions in the social fabric of Algeria during the first days of 2017 have emerged as a number of cities in the provinces of Bagya, Boureya, Boumardis, Teezy and Zo have witnessed widespread protests. The protests were accompanied by acts of sabotage and burning of public facilities. The phenomenon of masked vandals roaming the streets is considered to be a challenge to the authorities coincided with the anniversary of the Arab Spring movements, which led to the ouster of several regimes in the Arab world. The ongoing economic problems and social gaps exasperating among the people of Algeria serve as the existential backdrop to the growing unrest.
Despite this, the movements have not transformed into a popular revolt, despite the ripe environment for a revolution. There are several reasons that have hindered this scenario from taking place, including: a weak youth movement, memories of the Black Decade (the Algerian Civil War in the 90’s), a lack of credible Islamist parties, the role of the military in facing up to the internal chaos, a lack of transition amongst Arab Spring Movements, and a fear of instigating the violence that occurred in Arab Spring states.
In other words, it can be stated that the revolutionary developments that have taken hold of the Arab region over the last 6 years have not reached Algeria in a revolutionary form, but have manifested instead in the form of limited protests. Despite an internal atmosphere of intense struggle, party conflict, countless casualties and long-lasting community damage, the issue of revolution has yet to fully manifest. This has led some researchers to deem this phase a second Algerian war, despite Algeria being known as the exception to the rule in the context of the Arab Spring.
Advancing from the Rear:
Despite the similarities between Algeria and some of the Arab spring states, the results have differed. In other words, there is ample ground for a revolution, yet it has not contextualized in a revolution in Algeria. Despite almost 3 decades passing since its initial protests, Algeria has not reached the point in the conflict that would lead to the toppling of a regime. This is as opposed to what Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen have witnessed, and described as “leading the country from the rear.”Once a crisis appears in these states, it is followed by other ongoing crises until the country comes full circle. This matter has raised a number of questions regarding the nature of the political regime in Algeria that, so far, has been able to retain power, despite repeated protests.
On the eve of honoring actors in the cultural palace in Algiers on January 6th 2017,, the Algerian Prime Minister, Abdelmalek Sellal, stated that Algeria is not affected by the Arab Spring in any way. The power of Algeria stems from its stability and ability to hold off any external attempts for change.
The Minister for Interior, Noureddine Bedoui, also threatened in some press statements to strike with an iron fist all those that seek to destabilize the country. He accused a number of parties, without identifying them, of trying to destabilize Algeria after calls for a strike circulated on social media sites. The sites also called for a halt of all activities in the provinces known to be main holdouts against the regime. They also sought to destroy government property, post centers, companies and administration buildings, police stations, education buildings and trade centers. The groups were also known to block local roads.
The main reasons for protests in the eastern provinces of Algeria are related to drastic economic and social reforms that Algeria has undertaken in order to cope with the drop in oil prices. This was reflected in the 2017 budget, which included taxes on trade buildings and increases in the prices of gas, electricity, and staple foods. They also moved to freeze all the hires in the public sector and have halted any salary increases until 2019. During the protests, slogans such as “We Are All Against the New State Budget of 2017” and “No to Government Austerity” were most common, due, in large, to the fact that Algeria has been in an economic crisis for two years.
Oil prices declined from USD110 per barrel in 2013, to between USD45 and USD50 per barrel in 2017. Some assessments note that the Algerian government was able to receive over 800 billion dollars from oil exports during the high point of the price per barrel, yet it was not able to improve upon the living standards of the average Algerian. Despite this, the General Union for Trade and Craftsmanship in Algeria condemned the threats traders were subjected to, and how they were forced to close their shops or face them being burnt down. Some Algerian pages on a number of social media platforms launched a campaign under the slogan, “Algeria is Above All” and “No to Violence.”
On January 7th, the Algerian flag was raised on all residential buildings, state institutions and companies with the aim of sending a message to the world that Algerians are keen to protect their country and that they refuse to invite strife and civil war into their lives. There are a number of factors that explain Algeria’s success in evading Arab revolutionary movements, despite there being fertile ground for internal strife. These factors are summarized as follows:
The Amazigh Spring:
1. Growing accustomed to repetitive confrontations with no popular revolts: it can be said that Algeria has already outdone most of the Arab states with the Tribal Cultural Uprising in 1980 led by university youth under the Berber Culture movement. The country also witnessed an uprising of the inhabitants of Constantine in 1986, the uprising of the youth in October 1988, an uprising in 2001 which left more than 70 people dead, and the January 5th movement that coincided with the Arab Spring in 2011.
The January 2017 protests were not the first widespread protests witnessed by some regions in the country. Algeria has a history of sudden eruptions in protest. In this respect, Algerian society was well ahead of many of the revolutions that were witnessed in Eastern Europe in the 80’s, only for them to end with no revolutionary fervor.
2. No clear identity for the protesters: some assessments have noted that the main problem with the protests in Algeria over the last few years is the fact that there are no clear identities with regards to the protesters themselves. They are unknown individuals who utilize social media, where their demands cannot be clearly identified. Furthermore, their focus tends to be on social issues, with no clear focus on the political aspect of things.
Facing Poverty:
3. Quick responses from the Algerian government: on the heels of the social protests, the government took a number of steps to face them, similar to what happened on January 5th 2011, when the government declared a reduction in the price of foodstuffs, specifically oil and sugar, in order to preserve the purchasing power of its citizens. This helped to manage and absorb popular anger during a time where robberies via organized crime syndicates were common.
With the recent rise in the prices of food and services (such as oil, sugar, coffee, milk, gas and electricity) by more than 40 percent, which has affected the least capable sectors of society, the government is expected to take measures in order to support its citizenry. This was affirmed by the Minister of Interior during his visit to the Qalama region by stating that the government will be committed to supporting society, and that the state is the only guarantor capable of supporting citizens, despite the harsh economic circumstances. The government has already allocated more than 10 billion dollars of the 2017 budget to fixing financial support to all its citizens.
A Scattered Opposition:
4. The weak will of the youth movements: the youth groups that have participated in protests and have become an organizing power out of the scope of political parties and civilian institutions, after the latter lost their powers to accommodate youth seeking political and social justice. Even the Islamist parties, which have historically had the ability to recruit large numbers of Algerians, have fallen into the background. As a result of their weak appeal and unrealistic ideals, some have transformed into smaller parties while others have dissolved completely.
The emerging youth powers are also very unorganized and have many demands, as their makeup includes various segments of society such as the unemployed, university students, and the residents of the poor quarters. These youth movements do not have the capability to sustain protests while unifying their demands (unemployment, housing and wages). Yet these movements have not yet reached a critical stage that could possibly lead a change in the ruling system of Algeria.
The Red Tribe:
5. The dark legacy and bitter experience of Algeria during the Black Decade: this took place during the 90’s and the following Algerian Civil war, which cost the lives of over 200,000 Algerians between 1992 and 2002. This number excludes those missing and those who were internally displaced. From this history comes the fear among citizens of a return to the period of violence that plagued the Algerian scene for more than a decade . The effects of this war still linger on in the spirit of the Algerian people and have financially destroyed the capabilities of the country. According to some assessments, one of the main reasons for the immunity of Algeria from the Arab Spring was the potential bloodiness of the democratic path.
A number of calls were sent against the revolution on September 17th 2011 and asked people to stand with Bouteflika to assure the stability of Algeria. This came after the Islamic Salvation Front intervened to ensure the escalation of the protests, which pushed many in Algeria to take a stance against the protests and refuse to partake in them.
Troubled Alternatives:
6. Lack of credibility among Islamist parties: it was envisioned that an Islamist party was the only alternative to the ruling party, however they have been found to be far too ambitious for their weight. This includes the Hams group which represents the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood does not have the political weight to win any election as it was a part of the ruling coalition for years and shared the burden with the government it was partnered with.
There is another explanation for the weakness of the Hams movement in catching up to the Islamist movements post-Arab Spring, and that is due to the fragmentation of the Islamist movement within Algeria. This seems to be an issue being faced by the Algerian opposition in an attempt to win over the Algerian public, as opposed to the other Arab Spring movements that enjoyed a far greater public appeal. This will make the confrontation with the security forces in Algeria much easier for them due to their continued lack of appeal.
7. The primary role of military institutions: this transformation has already been seen in both Egypt and Tunisia where the military has moved from being protectors of the regime, to protectors of the revolution. This has not yet happened in Algeria, despite the repeated popular protests that have taken place. This is due in large part to the heavy interventions by both the military and the presidential institutions in such a way that they have been able to face any threat, both externally and internally. These threats became more apparent when the previous President Liamine Zéroual resigned and Bouteflika took over.
The Transitional Trap:
8. The transitional maze that took over the internal scene post-Arab Spring: the phase of building the new regime has been a complex process in some states to the point that the end result has become more of a maze. This thought was solidified in prevailing tendency in the literature referring to the notion of multiple transitional phases instead of a single one. In academic circles, the Arab Spring has been called a “repeated wave of transitional phases in the aftermath of the popular revolutions.”
There has been a lack of coordination among the political powers and the ideological movements of the revolutions in the states of the Arab Spring during the transitional phases. This has come to bear on the security and economic issues plaguing the aforementioned states, leading to the construction of political institutions attempting to create viable constitutions, implementing transitional justice and achieving the interest of the nation in order to create a better republic for all.
A Fragile Sense of Stability:
The security dilemma is one of the principle fears of Algerians, as they fear that further protests would take the turn of a popular revolution in light of official statements by the Interior Minister where he stated that the number one threat to Algeria is terrorism in the light of the ongoing strife in Libya and Tunisia. This was meant to encourage it was supposed to enable the protesters to take a more peaceful turn during the gatherings January 2nd and 7th. Against public opinion, the strikes became violent. This undisciplined reactionary move ultimately led to the complete collapse of the protest movement after public opinion gave way to further nationalist fervor, giving priority to national security over economic and social reform.
In conclusion, despite the outbreak of continued protests and strikes in Algeria over the last couple of years, it seems that there will be no protests such as those witnessed during the Arab Spring. This reflects the uniqueness of the Algerian case. The lack of credible opposition (particularly among the youth and Islamist groups), tied in with the lessons of the Black Decade, the bias of the military institution towards the ruling regime, and an ultimate lack of revolutionary success on the regional stage dictates that Algeria is set to remain in its pre-revolutionary state for the foreseeable future.
