In 1848, 19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston said, "We have no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." Politicians have long been acting in accordance with this famous quotation, which now offers a justification for talks held recently in Moscow between the Defence Minister of Russia, Sergei Shoigu, Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar and Syrian Defence Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas on December 28, 2022.
Observers who recognize the complexity of the Syrian issue were not surprised by this meeting. Turkey had set the stage for the talks, and President Recep Tayyib Erdogan, in mid-December, stated that he might sit down with Syrian President Bashar Assad twelve years after the two countries broke ties. Earlier, in August 22, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that he had held a quick meeting with his Syrian counterpart Faisal Mekdad on the fringe of the meeting of the Non-Alignment Movement in Belgrade in October 2021, a statement that paved the way for the talks between the recent meeting of defence chiefs in Moscow.
Common Enemy
The Syrian officials were reluctant to join the talks but eventually went to Moscow at the behest of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Had it been up for them, the Syrians would not have held any meeting with Turkish officials before the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Jarabulus, al-Bab and Azaz, which were seized by Turkey in 2016, as well as from Afrin, which was taken in 2018. Ahead of the Moscow meeting, Syria and Turkey laid out their lists of demands and conditions. Syria demanded a pledge from Turkey to withdraw from all occupied villages and towns that Ankara says it is prepared to give up only if areas in the east of the Euphrates river are freed from Kurdish militant groups and controlled by the Syrian government.
Currently, Ankara and Damascus have a common enemy: The Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, and its organizations operating in Syria, including the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, its political wing, the Syrian Democratic Council, as well as the People's Protection Units, or YPG. That is why Syria does not decline Turkey's condition of eliminating these outlawed Kurdish factions, which usurped Syrian lands and oil fields. These factions would not have made these gains without military support from the United States. President Assad labelled these Kurdish factions as traitors and emphasized that "there is nothing called a 'Kurdish issue' in Syria."
Confidence Building
This is the stage of confidence building between Ankara and Damascus, and it all hinges on which side would make the first move in this direction. Turkey is supposed to dismantle the pillars of "the Kurdish state", while Damascus will sit down with the Turks at the negotiating table. The Syrian army alone cannot eliminate the Kurdish factions protected by US troops. In this case, Turkey will have to either launch attacks independently or neutralize US troops to allow Syrian forces to advance on the ground. During preparations for such an operation, a direct communication channel has to be established between the two countries, embassies have to be re-opened, and security and military officials of both countries exchange visits in preparation for a meeting between Assad and Erdogan, which is expected to be held before the next elections in Turkey in the first half of 2023.
Because of the coordination between Turkey and Syria, the Syrians are unlikely to make any concessions for the Kurds regarding administrative rights and light arms in their areas. Moreover, teaching the Kurdish language will not be allowed in their schools, and their military organizations will be dismantled, which means that all issues that were on the negotiating table are now off the table after the rapprochement between Syria and Turkey.
The Kurdish issue is unlikely to be settled soon, which opens the door for much talk about the possibility of reviving the Adana Agreement signed between Turkey and Syria in 1998 but was put on hold since 2012. The accord allowed Turkey to deploy troops five kilometres into Syrian territory, upon approval from the Syrian government, to crack down on separatist Kurds and withdraw once their military missions are accomplished.
Years ago, Syria and Turkey did not object to a proposal by President Putin to revive the Adana Agreement. Still, today the Turks demand a safe zone no less than 35 kilometres into Syrian territory, a demand that Damascus categorically rejects. Moscow can seek to reach a compromise to reduce the depth of the safe zone to 10 kilometres, which can be approved by Damascus on the condition that Turkey maintains no military presence in this zone. Such a compromise requires fresh negotiations and a new agreement. The solution could be through the deployment of joint Syrian-Russian troops on the border to reassure Erdogan and ensure that no Kurdish factions will not get close to his country's borders in the future.
Available Options
An agreement with Turkey can be painful for Damascus but is still the "easiest option" because Syrians are in dire need of restoring their oilfields to the Kurds to solve the stifling fuel crisis sweeping Syria.
Other options for Damascus include having to make concessions to the West as part of the political process or disengage with Iran and Hezbollah, which Damascus strongly rejects. Syria might be upset by Tehran's reluctance to ship oil derivatives to Syria, and Iranians might be asking for too much from the Syrians, according to reports that Iran is placing pressure on Damascus to extort "sovereign concessions". These include Iran's desire to establish sovereign military bases on the Mediterranean, ensure that Iranian citizens receive equal treatment as Syrians at hospitals and academic institutions and ensure that Iranians who commit crimes in Syria are tried at Iranian and not Syrian courts. But these disagreements do not mean that Iran-Syria relations are declining.
Future Roles
Before the conflict broke out in Syria, most countries believed that Syrians were the most moderate element of the so-called "axis of resistance" and had the most substantial influence on Hezbollah or Iran. For example, Damascus succeeded in convincing its ally to accept the deployment of international observers in Lebanon back in 1996, in the wake of Israel's Operation Grapes of Wrath - later this came to be known as the "April Understanding"- and making Hamas accept the Arab Peace Initiative launched by the late King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia at the Arab Summit in Beirut in 2002. Later in 2006, Syria, once again, convinced Hezbollah to accept, or rather to refrain from, opposing UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the fighting with Israel. One year later, in 2007, Damascus mediated the release of British sailors captured by Iran. That is why continuous relations between Iran and Syria, for some, can, in the future, result in convincing Hezbollah to accept a neutral president as successor to Michel Aoun.
In turn, Iran wants to reap the fruits of its military intervention in Syria. Still, it is well aware that it cannot maintain a permanent military base in Syria as Russia did or even seek to establish a safe zone in the country as the Turks do. This way, Ian's share in future Syria will likely be limited to the political and economic arenas.
It should be noted that because of the language, race and sectarian barriers, Iran was unable to establish a famous incubator in Syria. It is impossible to turn Syria into an Iranian base.
The conclusion is then that the future of Syrian-Turkish relations hinges upon the accommodation of the interests of both countries as long as the Kurdish issue is concerned. Although the two sides have converging views about this issue, other issues are still pending. The most important of these is the fate of armed Syrian factions that rely on Turkish support and the possibility of engaging in reconciliations similar to those achieved in Ghouta in suburban Damascus and southern Syria. Another equally important issue is the fate of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The question is now whether they will be forcibly repatriated or get housing units inside Syria with finance from the Turkish government. President Erdogan addressed this issue in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September last year. Erdogan cannot afford to keep the refugees in Turkish territory because of growing racist campaigns against them and because opposition parties call for their repatriation because they are responsible for Turkey's economic and subsistence crises.
