With the second batch of US sanctions on Iran, coming into effect today, the government of President Hassan Rouhani is taking preemptive measures to strengthen its ability to confront sanctions. It seeks to exploit the sanctions to endorse its candidates for the four ministerial portfolios whose ministers were dismissed in the past months, following a no-confidence vote in the Consultative Assembly.

But this move does not mark the beginning of a lull between the government, backed by the moderates, and its opponents from the fundamentalist conservatives and some religious leaders, as well as the powerful institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This period seems temporary, in anticipation of the outcome of the new sanctions in the coming period. 

Numerous Justifications

President Hassan Rouhani quickly issued a decree on October 28, 2018, appointing the four ministers to their posts after they gained the confidence of the Consultative Assembly. The timing of the decree has, of course, a significance. The government exploited the approaching sanctions to promote the need for filling the void ensuing from the dismissal of four ministers by the Consultative Assembly, which severely criticized them for failing to handle the various crises, in a way that led - in the view of fundamentalist conservatives who led the motion of no confidence - to the increase of unemployment and inflation rates, and a decline in the value of the national currency against the dollar.

In this context, the government provided numerous justifications to strengthen its position in the face of its opponents, and to lend special importance to the appointment of the new ministers at this time, the most important of them are:

1- Advance preparations: The government claims that filling the vacant portfolios will reinforce its ability to cope with the strong repercussions of the second batch of sanctions, which primarily focuses on oil exports, especially as these portfolios are directly related to dealing with sanctions, such as the economy, industry and labor ministries. 

Remarkably, the government’s efforts in this dossier were combined with a campaign to send messages to the Iranians that it would adopt a package of non-traditional mechanisms to contain the ramifications of US sanctions, including opening the way for the private sector to export oil and use the barter system with the international powers concerned with the continuation of economic relations, amid the expected continuation of oil smuggling operations in cooperation with local and external networks. 

2- Counter-messages: The government has asserted that appointing the four ministers will send signals to the outside world that the strong pressure on Iran has contributed to narrowing the internal differences between the political forces and the powerful institutions. This could diminish the importance of some international powers’ bet on widening internal divisions to exert further pressure on the Iranian regime and push it to make a change in its policy towards accepting new negotiations to reach a broader agreement instead of the current nuclear deal.

3- Khamenei’s instructions: The circles  close to President Rouhani have promoted that the continued vote of no confidence for ministers or at least the disapproval of the president’s nominations for vacant ministerial portfolios does not correspond to the instructions of the Supreme Leader of the Republic Ali Khamenei, who gave the green light, on September 2, 2018, to undo the vote of no confidence from the Education Minister Mohammad Bathaei, in the belief that the political conflict between the parliament and the government -at this time- would undercut the state’s ability to confront US sanctions.

Escalation lying in wait

Strikingly, these justifications led some leaders of the fundamentalist conservatives to support three ministers. The Consultative Assembly endorsed the Industry Minister Mohammad Reza Rahmani, with 203 votes, the Economy Minister Farhad Dejpasand, with 200 votes, and the Minister of Labour and Welfare Mohammad Shariatmadari, with 196 votes, while the Minister of Roads and Urban Development Mohammad Eslami, with only 151 votes.

Nevertheless, this move does not mean that the next stage will see a political lull between the Consultative Assembly and the government, or between the fundamentalist conservatives and moderates. The timing of endorsing the four ministers was the variable that tilted the balance in favour of the government. The voting session, which was held a week before the imposition of the new sanctions, did not offer multiple options for the parliament or the fundamentalist conservatives, whose MPs preferred not to obstruct the approval of the four ministers at this critical juncture, especially that they are among the economic group involved in taking measures to deal with the sanctions.

It could be argued that the first stage that will follow the imposition of the new batch of sanctions will test the balance of power between conservatives and moderates, as all parties concerned with sanctions are keen to assess their repercussions on the Iranian economy during the coming period.

Consequently, the conflict between the two parties may intensify again during the post-sanctions stage, as the fundamentalist conservatives continue to look for the opportunity to exert further pressure on the moderates, exploiting the economic consequences of sanctions. They will probably try to put pressure on the government in another dossier, the recent attacks which targeted the IRGC and security forces, as the parliament will discuss in the coming period a request to question the Interior Minister Abdol-Reza Rahmani-Fazli. 

A Campaign against the Reformists 

Signs of this escalation have appeared early, as reflected in the widespread controversy sparked by the message of Guardian Council member Mohamed Yazdi to prominent cleric Mousa Shobairi Zanjani, in which he criticized the latter for meeting former President Mohammad Khatami and key reformist leaders such as Abdullah Nuri, Mousavi Khoeiniha and Hussein Kerbasji, a movement that is labeled  “sedition stream” in Iran, because it is accused of organizing and escalating protests in Iran in 2009 over the reelection of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for a second term.

Such criticism suggests that the regime is still intent on pursuing a hard-line policy toward reformists in general, although many of their forces have declared their loyalty to the regime and joined the pro-Rouhani moderate stream. Furthermore, the influential institutions could exploit the next stage - in which Iran will be under strong external and internal pressures - to impose severe restrictions on the reformists. This is perhaps a prelude to gradually removing them from power at the first election, namely that of the Consultative Assembly to be held in 2020. 

Lashing out at a senior cleric, such as Shobairi Zanjani, is an important indication that the regime no longer cares about any red lines in its confrontation with what it considers to be adversaries at home, even if it affects the prestige of the religious authority, a matter emphasized by the key moderates leaders, who responded strongly to Yazdi’s criticisms, dismissing it as an unacceptable assault by conservatives. 

In short, the political lull that Iran is currently witnessing may be short-lived, in anticipation of the storm of the impact of the new sanctions on the Iranian economy.