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What Restricts Shifts in the Political Track of Syria’s Crisis?

21 أغسطس، 2017


Current data on the political and military situation in Syria indicate that the military aspect remains the dominant factor in the crisis due to the faltering political track at Geneva and Astana. Nonetheless, significant political changes that developed recently cannot be underestimated in determining the future of the crisis. 

Rehabilitation of the Regime 

The Syrian regime continues to make efforts to “rehabilitate” itself through steps aimed at sending across direct messages to powers involved in the Syrian crisis that its forces are gradually regaining control over more territory inside Syria. These steps are as follows:

1- The face of Bashar al-Assad appeared on the new 2000-pound banknotes on the basis that the situation became suitable for recirculating them following the recent changes on the ground.

2- Assad recently toured some Syrian cities such as Hama in which he performed the Eid al-Fitr prayer on June 25 appearing in public in the city for the first time since the beginning of the crisis .

International Flexibility

The international position on the crisis in Syria went through a change. This is evidenced by increasing talk on the need for a political solution, and less talk of a military solution. Moreover, some relevant international and regional powers accepted the idea of involving al-Assad regime in a political solution and transition. This was reflected in the following developments: 

1-  Tunisian efforts to resume relations with the Assad regime. The Tunisian parliament, on July 19, rejected a bill on restoring relations with the regime in Syria due to the lack of a qualified majority of votes. However,  on July 30, Tunisian Foreign Minister Khemaies Jhinaoui announced that Tunisia’s diplomatic relations with the Assad regime has never been severed since the start of the crisis and that the country’s diplomatic mission in Damascus has been in direct daily contact with the regime. Moreover, a delegation from the Nobel Prize-winning Tunisian General Labor Union, the country’s largest trade union, recently visited Syria and met Bashar Assad.

2- France’s flexibility with the Syrian regime. French President Emmanuel Macron’s stated that France no longer considered the deposing or departure of Assad a pre-condition to resolving the conflict in Syria, and that the priority was fighting terrorist groups. In addition, McCron confirmed during his meeting with US President Donald Trump in mid-July that he intends to set a road map to solve the Syrian crisis. The first step is to form a contact group that includes permanent members of the UN Security Council, regional countries and representatives of the Syrian regime and the opposition.

3- Turkey backed down on its sharp position on the Syrian regime. Turkey’s approach is closely connected with the Kurdish issue and not its old strategy for deposing the Assad regime. Moreover, its priority now is to contain the growing threat posed by the Kurds and protect Turkey’s territory from the increasing Kurdish influence and preempt any attempt to create a Kurdish entity inside Turkey in the future.

4- Saudi flexibility on the Syrian crisis. The aforementioned positions were further backed by statements attributed to Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir by disputed media reports claiming that he had informed the Syrian opposition's High Negotiations Committee that Assad would stay in power (in a first phase of transition) and that the Committee has to come up with a new vision or else the powers involved in the process would seek a solution for Syria without the opposition. This coincided with al-Jubeir’s invitation to the Committee to hold a meeting in Riyadh in August to discuss restructuring the Syrian opposition through expanding the High Negotiations Committee and unifying the ranks of the Syrian opposition.

5- Recent developments in Lebanon’s stance towards al-Assad regime. Two Lebanese ministers from the Shi'ite Iranian-aligned Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, announced plans to visit Syria on August 16 claiming that the sole aim is to discuss economic issues and Syria reconstruction efforts and not political matters. Some Lebanese media reports claim that the visit is approved by Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri because no minister may visit a foreign country without the approval of the head of the cabinet. 

Plans for “Confederalism”

A litany of political plans to establish a confederal state in Syria came out recently. The following developments stand out in this context:

1- The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), co-led by Saleh Muslim, continues efforts to take  further executive steps towards establishing a federal system that was announced on March 17, 2016 in Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria. One such practical step was taken when the constituent assembly of the so-called Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, on July 29, set the dates for the first municipal and legislative elections in the de facto autonomous region after it approved laws on elections and administrative divisions.

2- The Syrian Interim Government on August 10 announced the formation of a new entity to administer Syria’s southern provinces in agreement with representatives of the local councils of Daraa and Quneitra. The step aims to build institutions for autonomous rule similar to that in Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria, and discharge administrative matters in the southern de-escalation zone in tandem with efforts to restructure the factions of the Southern Front. 

Regime's Gains 

Despite faltering international efforts to reach a Syrian peace agreement, the country’s political scene recently witnessed significant developments that played into the hands of the Syrian regime. 

The changed regional and international positions on the regime and declaring that the departure of Assad is no longer a pre-condition to resolving the conflict, came as an acknowledgement of the current military reality in which the balance of power largely tilts in favor of the forces of the regime and its allies. 

Obviously, Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia is seeking to impose political normalization between the Lebanese government and the regime of Bashar al-Assad through an economic path, seen as a maneuver or trick to overcome the Lebanese government’s sensitivity about dealing with al-Assad and its insistence on pursuing the Lebanese state’s policy of neutrality towards regional conflicts. 

Some powers are seeking to introduce plans for a confederal rule in northern and southern Syria. Their aims is to impose themselves as key parties to whatever plans are developed for the future in Syria while paving the way for imposing this system on other parties as a fait accompli and even making it as the general framework of a future Syrian state.