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The Illusion of the Empire

Explaining Erdogan’s Ottoman Fanaticism

26 ديسمبر، 2017


The dream of reviving the Ottoman Empire dominates the policies and orientations of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Although he denied, in the early stages of his political ascent, his desire to re-establish the Ottoman state, his recent inflammatory rhetoric and aggressive policies towards the opposition, neighbouring states and international powers reveal his desire to become the “New Sultan”, quoting some Turkish academics. His bid to do so can be clearly seen in dismantling and restructuring of the Turkish identity through invoking the manifestations and symbols of the Ottoman heritage. He further adopted hegemonic and expansionist policies with the aim of reproducing the “Ottoman colonization” era in the Middle East region.

Revival of Ottomanism

Erdogan’s fanaticism about the Ottomanism and his attempts to revive the Ottoman Empire in a new shape is unmistakable, as he tries to transfer Turkey in a religious tint, which can be explained through many indicators, as follows: 

1- Dominance speech: In most of his political speeches, Erdogan uses the term “we are the descendants of the Ottomans” to assert his Ottoman tendencies and attempts to revive the Empire through political and geographical expansion, including the Middle East region. Erdogan perceives this region as a province of Turkey, by virtue of its historical subordination to the Ottoman State. Erdogan also believes that several European countries are an extension of the Ottoman historical presence in Europe in the past.

In the wake of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) winning of the majority of seats in the 2011 parliamentary elections, Erdogan delivered a victory speech to a gathering of his supporters saying “Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul, Beirut won as much as Izmir, Damascus won as much as Ankara, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir, and as much Turkey won, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Europe won”, which reflects the colonialist expansionist orientations of Erdogan.

2- Compulsory religious education: The return of compulsory religious education in Turkish primary schools shows Erdogan’s attempts to revive Ottomanism; a decision implemented immediately by the Ministry of Education. 

3- Political figures: In January 2015, AKP members of parliament put forward a bill calling for the adoption of the Ottoman Empire “tughra” as the official emblem of the Turkish nation, which had been abolished in 1922 after the fall of the Ottoman caliphate. The Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Turkish National Assembly agreed on this proposal notwithstanding the opposition of the MPs.

4- Architectural patrimony: Erdogan seeks to revive the historic and architectural patrimony of the Ottoman Empire. In July 2016, for example, Erdogan announced his intention to reconstruct some military barracks in Istanbul and to demolish the Ataturk Cultural Center, stating: “We will reconstruct the historic Taksim military barracks in Istanbul’s Gezi Park, whether they like it or not,” defying the opposition of many Turkish citizens.

In August 2016, he renamed the largest bridge on the Bosphorus in Istanbul “Selim I”, despite the broad opposition from Shi’ite Alawis in Turkey, due to historical hostility between Sultan Selim I and Shi’ites.

5- Official ceremonies: Erdogan is keen to use Ottoman Empire-inspired symbols in all the details of daily life. For example, he appeared in a photo posted on Twitter in November 2017, with the banner of the 57th Ottoman Army division in front of him.

In addition, he appeared in more than one official occasion – such as during his reception of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in January 2015- accompanied by soldiers dressed in Ottoman warriors’ attires and carrying flags of 16 countries founded by the Ottomans, this component was added to the formal parades on a permanent basis. MP of Balikesir city from the Justice and Development Party posted a photo in which Erdogan was surrounded by soldiers and commented by saying: “The 90-year-long Ottoman caliphate’s advertising break is over”.

6- Presidential powers: The constitutional amendments, which shifted Turkish political system from parliamentary to presidential one, have consolidated the powers in the hands of Erdogan, turning him into a form of a king or sultan. Abdul Rahman Dilliak, a Turkish thinker affiliated with Erdogan’s regime, stated that the transformation of Turkey’s presidential system will allow Turkey to turn into a caliphate state, Erdogan to the caliph of the Muslims, and will open representative offices of the Ottoman Islamic caliphate at his palace.

7- Teaching the Ottoman language: Erdogan authorized the teaching of the Ottoman language in schools, announcing in December 2014 that “Teaching of the Ottoman language will inevitably be implemented…whether they like it or not.” He also slammed those who oppose the move, describing them as the greatest danger, believing that that move will protect the identity of the state till the day of resurrection.

8- Support for historical series: Erdogan encourages Turkish series and movies that show events dating back to the Ottoman era, one manifestation of this support was his visit, in November 2016, to the locations of the scenes of the “Diriliş: Ertuğrul,” a series about the historical founders of the Ottoman state.

9- Documentation of the Ottoman archives: Turkish media are focused on Erdogan’s project to document the Ottoman archive known as “Ottoman Tapu Registers,” which reportedly contains between 63 and 77 thousand transcripts documenting the property of the Turks in Mosul, Kirkuk and Aleppo, according to claims of some Turkish politicians. In October 2016, Erdogan called for amending the Treaty of Lausanne, (1923), upon which Turkey’s current borders have been drawn.

In this context, some MPS and members of the AKP stressed more than once that the Iraqi Mosul and the Syrian Aleppo belong to the Ottoman state. Accordingly, there is a need to protect them as part of the Ottoman Empire, as they claimed.

Reasons for Erdogan’s Fanaticism 

Erdogan’s Ottoman fanaticism is attributed to the interplay of several factors, some of which are due to the nature of his political upbringing, his doctrinal pattern with nationalist extremism and political ambition. Other factors include his bid to exclude and curb opponents, tendencies of vengeance and retaliation from the “enemies,” as he put it, in addition to regional colonization and domination. The factors can be further explained as follows: 

1- Political upbringing: Erdogan was strongly influenced by the social and political upbringing. He graduated from the Imam Khatib Islamic religious schools, and began his political career within the ranks of the religious movement in Turkey, which was then represented by Necmettin Erbakan. He was an active member of the National Salvation Party, then the Welfare Party and Virtue Party formed by Erbakan. He became the mayor of Istanbul, as representative of the Welfare Party.

Erdogan was jailed for religious hatred and banned from holding government positions in 1998 as he quoted a Turkish poet describing mosques as military barracks and minarets as spears. He also described his supporters as a “holy army guarding the religion,” which reveals that Erdogan used to exploit religion since his early beginnings for rallying political support. 

2- National extremism: Extreme views related to the Turkish identity reign over Erdogan’s doctrinal pattern. Tracing his speeches unmasks a view of the world dominated by rigid beliefs about Turkey’s supremacy based on the Ottoman history, which he sees the most tenet of the Turkish identity.

Contrary to the prevalent assessments in some Arab literature on Erdogan’s policies, which considers that he is focused on reviving the Islamic identity, the “Turkish nationalism” in the Ottoman sense is the dominant tenet of Erdogan’s doctrine and view of the world, the driving force of his regional policies.

3- The Vengeance Doctrine: The Turkish President considers the tenacity and revival of Ottomanism a kind of personal vendetta against the “enemies” of the Turkish state. Erdogan’s vengeance policy is directed to three “enemies.” His first group of enemies are secular movements, elites and state institutions that oppose his political orientations and hinder his Ottoman project. The second category is the regional powers that Erdogan considers to be a rival of Turkish domination because they present anti-Ottoman regional project. Lastly is the international powers that Erdogan seeks to avenge because they were historically the reason for the fall of the Ottoman state and drawing its current borders.

These perceptions feature in Erdogan’s bellicose speeches against European countries, his focus on historical conflicts between the Ottoman Empire the European countries, and his claims, in his political discourse, to represent the Islamic world based on the colonial legacy of the Ottoman Empire.

4- Legitimacy of inheritance: By adhering to the Ottoman principles and fanaticism of the Ottoman State, its history and symbols, Erdogan wants to send an implicit message that he is the legitimate heir of the Ottoman caliphate, a matter has been repeatedly highlighted by the AKP’s media. For example, pro-Erdogan newspapers put his portrait next to the image of Sultan Abdulhamid II, one of the strongest Ottoman sultans.

5- Political despotism: Erdogan employs the Ottoman legacy as a repressive tool to eliminate political opponents, seeking to put forward an ideology that is different from Kemal’s secularism (Mustafa Kemal Ataurk). Erdogan attempt to do this through implementing social re-engineering tactics to influence the population to restore the Ottoman values and practices as part of the collective memory. This ensures his political hegemony and the exclusion of opponents, since he is part of the “Ottoman Sultans”, for whom the term “opposition” was not in the vocabulary of their administrations. In this regard, Erdogan’s rhetoric confuses “fair tyrant” notion with and stigmatizing the opposition of treachery and hostility to the interests of the Turkish people.

6- Colonialism: Erdogan thinks that the Ottoman legacy gives the Turkish nation a historic right to regional hegemony and to represent the Muslim world. Thus, Erdogan sees his meddling in the Arab countries, deploying military forces in Syria and Iraq, his support of extremist religious organizations in the Arab states as part of the “imperial policy” that reinforce his colonial vision of the Turkish role in the Middle East.

Ottoman Hegemonic Policies 

Erdogan’s fanaticism about Ottomanism is evident in his domestic, regional and international policies, as following:

1- Repression of the opposition: Erdogan follows the same policies of some Ottoman rulers, especially the ones concerning eliminating his opponents. For example, he arrested a big number of opponents after the failed military coup attempt in July 2016. The political crackdown included dismissal of state employees, police and military officers, restructuring the administrative apparatus of the state, domination over the judiciary authority consolidating his power over the state; making Erdogan the representative of all legislative, executive and judicial powers.

2- Regional expansion: Erdogan has pursued regional expansion through constant interference in the affairs of other countries. His speeches reveal his attempts to interfere in the sovereignty of neighboring countries. He tends to use an aggressive tone towards those whom he deems as “regional adversaries” of Turkey’s hegemony.

Regional expansionism is not limited to fiery rhetoric, as Turkey has backed extremist religious movements in several regional states and has provided them shelter, financial support and media platforms to promote their ideas. This is inseparable from Turkey’s role in supporting terrorist organizations in Syria by allowing combatants, funds and weaponry to cross-border to Syria.

In the same regard, Turkey has engaged in direct military interventions in Syria and Iraq. It maintains a number of military bases in various countries, including: Qatar, Northern Cyprus, Syria, and Azerbaijan, where it built its first military base in the latter in November 2017, and plans to build another eight military bases.

3- The New Janissaries: Erdogan has moved to set up pro-groups, similar to the “Janissaries” of Sultan Orhan I, which were created as “the new army,” due to his lack of confidence in the army then. For example, leaks reported by the Turkish media and published by Fouad Avni, known as the “Snowden of Turkey” in January 2017, said that the SADAT International Defense Consultancy Inc, founded by Adnan Tanriverdi, Erdogan’s advisor, is training young men from the Justice and Development Party on fighting.

Prior to the appointment of Tanriverdi as a presidential advisor, the Turkish parliament had investigated charges against the company including stirring riot and chaos in the Kurdish areas, as well as training ISIS’s members. In addition, the Department of the Turkish Religious Affairs issued a decree to establish youth branches in 1500 Mosque, scheduled to reach up to 20,000 mosques by 2021.

Overall, Erdogan’s belligerent policies towards the Arab countries are likely to escalate due to the prevalence of Ottoman fanaticism over his beliefs and views. Accordingly, he attempts to dominate the Middle East, revive the Ottoman Empire, intervene violently in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries, strengthen his internal political tyranny, and support extremist religious movements throughout the region.