Although the first round of Sweden talks led to soaring expectations that a change will take place in the course of the Yemeni crisis from the path of war to that of negotiation, its outcome is limited to the settlement of the humanitarian crisis, which the UN envoy underlined in his statement to the Security Council following the negotiations.
The issues pertaining to the crux of the conflict will likely be addressed in the second round, scheduled at the end of next January, which should include the comprehensive framework for the settlement, as a road-map for shaping Yemen’s post-war future, and solving political and security issues. The outcome of the first round sought to neutralize the manifestations of the Houthi “militiation”, not to end it. It can also be argued that the outcome equates between the parties to the crisis in terms of tasks, implementation mechanisms and the formed committees under the auspices of the UN, a key indicator that risks transforming the Houthi movement into a major party in the Yemeni scene under the aegis of the UN.
Five Points
The outcome of the Yemeni talks in the Swedish capital gives rise to several points, as follows:
1- The Port agreement: The agreement according to the statement issued by the Office of the UN envoy Martin Griffiths included three elements, the first concerns the ports of Hodeidah, Saleef and Ras Issa, the second is the exchange of prisoners and the third is the mutual understandings on Taiz. The first element accounted for the main points of the outcome, which comprised 15 points, including security redeployment mechanisms, management mechanisms, the distribution of roles among the parties to be involved in the next phase, and limiting the immediate cease-fire to those places, which means that the agreement is primarily aimed at supporting humanitarian relief through the organization of port management, in accordance with the UN plan.
2- Central role for the UN: The agreement expands the role of the UN, where it will play a key role in port inspections, chair the Joint Security Redeployment Coordination Committee, as well as strengthen its role in the city of Hodeidah, its port and the ports of Ras Issa and Saleef. The five points on Taiz were assigned exclusively to the UN. The deployment of UN forces headed by retired Dutch major general Patrick Cammaert reinforce the same role.
3- Not assigning any roles to the Arab Coalition: This point may become a bone of contention in the future, although the UN envoy praised the supportive roles of the coalition in pushing the Yemeni crisis from the battleground to the negotiating table again after a two-year deadlock following the failure of the Kuwait negotiations at the end of 2016, no role was assigned to the coalition in the missions of the first round of negotiations. The Red Cross will be in charge of bringing in humanitarian assistance through the port.
4- The legitimate government to restore control of Hodeidah: The agreement provides for a cease-fire in the entire of Hodeidah governorate, as well as the withdrawal of all troops from the city and the port, while the UN will take over the role of “port control”. In addition, the legitimate government’s local forces will establish order in the city, which will help restore legitimacy since government institutions and security agencies loyal to the legitimate government will establish control over the city.
5- The economic dossier: The problem arises from the fact that the agreement states that the revenue from ports will be deposited in the central bank, although the latter is still experiencing a management crisis. This controversial point can be settled in the parallel negotiations taking place in Amman, the Jordanian capital. This point may cause many problems, key among them is the problem related to the staff, as there are those who have been dismissed from their jobs and replaced by members of the Houthi group and its loyalists. In addition, the legitimate government and the Houthis are expected to share the management of the economic dossier under the supervision of the UN.
The Future of Settlement
The central question of any proposed and prospective settlement frameworks center on the stance toward the Houthis, their roles in the future of Yemen, and their position in the next settlement, which can be outlined in five indicators as follows:
1- The nature of the UN role: The UN role has been expanded to dominate the management of a number of dossiers, especially the port of Hodeidah, in addition to the humanitarian assistance, a remarkable shift in the nature of its role, from “mediation” to “guardianship” of the Yemeni issue. Additionally, the recognition of the Houthis, as a negotiating party in the Yemeni conflict, risks transforming the Houthis into a party to any settlement in Yemen. Moreover, the clause that provides for the Houthis sharing power in any future political and constitutional arrangements will preserve the Houthis’ role in any political system ahead, and it is even expected that any abuses or crimes committed by them would be overlooked.
2- Polishing the image of Al-Houthi: The speech delivered by Griffiths contained paragraphs praising the Houthi delegation and Abdul Malik al-Houthi, indicating that he had the credit for the flexibility exhibited by the Houthis in the negotiations through his keenness to communicate daily with his delegation in Sweden, and thus did not show him as a militia leader, but rather as a politician keen on the success of the negotiations. And hence as a statesman who can be a party to any future political settlement.
3- Loaded hints: Griffiths referred to the three basic references for the Stockholm negotiations, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative, the outcome of the National Dialogue and UN Resolution No. 2216, but at the same time referred to additional references such as the “final version of the national dialogue outcome”, the version in which the Houthis played a role in drafting before the military coup they carried out on the capital Sanaa.
4- Security and political representation: Although the political representation of Houthis is acceptable in the transitional period, their security representation poses a fundamental dilemma, as it practically means integrating the Houthi militias in state security and military institutions in any future settlement. It should be rejected because it will reproduce a new Hezbollah in Yemen, which would possess armed forces that can be used against the opposing political parties.
5- Neutralizing the Houthi role in Taiz: The Houthi movement has been besieging Taiz for three years, and the agreement did not provide for ending the siege. Instead, it was agreed to reopen the crossings to bring in the assistance, as well as a joint committee of the two parties comprising representatives from the international community and the UN, one week after the conclusion of the Sweden negotiations, to negotiate a final status agreement.
In conclusion, it can be argued that the agreement reached in Sweden is a partial one addressing the fallout from the Yemeni war, chiefly the humanitarian crisis and the status of Hodeidah and Taiz governorates, not the crux of war, which will likely be tackled in subsequent negotiations.
