Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is exerting unremitting efforts in order to boost his power to win the presidential elections set to take place on May 17th, 2017.He aims to renew his presidential mandate for another four years. In this context, Rouhani seeks to increase his popularity once again among the youth and middle class, which were the main demographics voting in the presidential elections of June 2013. These voting blocs enabled him to beat four conservative fundamentalist candidates in the first round of elections. However, this class heatedly criticized him after failing to keep most of his promises from the electoral campaign in 2013.
However, these efforts are still in their early stages and may face gradually increasing challenges with the presidential elections drawing near, especially after the map of potential presidential candidates revealed that the capability of the conservative fundamentalists to unite their lines behind one candidate to compete with Rouhani became clear.
Undoubtedly, the Republican candidate Donald Trump’s win in the U.S. presidential elections may present another variable which will have a role in determining Rouhani’s opportunities in renewing his mandate of presidency. In light of Trump’s interest in the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 and Iran’s support for terrorism, its presence in Syria, and its stance on the war against the Islamic State (ISIS), the US’s relationship with Iran’s president may shift.
Several Justifications:
It has become evident that President Rouhani is attempting to alter his political tone towards his main supporters. He gave two reasons why he did not keep f the electoral promises he announced in the period before the latest presidential elections:
The first reason is that he prioritized the nuclear deal with the P5+1, as it represents, in his view, the major focus for dealing with many of the issues Iran faces, particularly economic issues. Rouhani’s government, in this regard, relied on the fact that reaching the agreement and lifting off the international sanctions imposed upon Iran will result in bolstering its power to settle these issues especially after freezing the ban on Iranian cash abroad, Iran’s oil exports increasing once again, and the return of major foreign companies investing in Iran.
Nonetheless, many obstacles came in the way of Iran utilizing the economic returns of the nuclear agreement, and they did not provide the government with many options to deal with the issues, especially internal issues, for example, the continuation of U.S. sanctions which discourage investments from many western companies and banks. These internal issues, for examplelifting the house arrest of the Green Path of Hope movement leaders Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, are in addition to the continuing arrests of some supporters of Rouhani and are imposing severe restrictions on the public freedoms.
In other words, Rouhani’s government did not consider that its efforts to gain returns from the nuclear deal, particularly on an economic level, may face many tough challenges that would weaken its position internally, especially in light of the suspicions of the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, and the institutions run by the conservative fundamentalists of the feasibility of the deal with the U.S.
The second factor is the conservative fundamentalists’ zeal in fighting Rouhani’s efforts to settle the “remains” of the political crisis imposed by the 2009 protests in light of fear that this would result in widening Rouhani’s support base and the conservative movement, prior to the significant benefits Iran that seem close at hand.
Significant Escalation:
During a voting session to grant trust to three new ministers nominated by Rouhani to assume ministerial portfolios in his government on Nov. 1st, 2016, he cast accusations against “ enemy brothers spreading desperation among Iranians,” in reference to the conservative fundamentalists. In other words, by escalating relationships with his political adversaries, Rouhani sought to send a direct message to his supporters that the problem was not in his falling behind in keeping his electoral promises, but in the conservative fundamentalists’ insistence to keep him from doing so. The proof here is the pressure they imposed upon him, leading him to discharge three of his government ministers. The ministers discharged were the: Minister of Culture Ali Jannati (son of Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the head of the Iranian Guardian Council and Chairman of the Assembly of Experts), the Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports Mahmoud Goudarzi and the Minister of Education Ali Asghar Fani.
Undoubtedly, the conservative fundamentalists’ focus on discharging these three particular ministers is not limited to the reasons they adopted initially t, for example, the music concerts organized by the Ministry of Culture in Iranian cities, disclosing corruption cases to the Ministry of Education, especially those related to money embezzlement from the reserves fund of teachers, and the fall-back of the Iranian Olympic mission resulting in the Olypmic games taking place in Rio de Janeiro. On top of this, the three ministries understood the mood of the people, particularly the youth, upon which Rouhani relies in his endeavors in order to retain his position for a new presidential mandate. The conservative fundamentalist current seeks to weaken the popular base upon which Rouhani relies before the elections.
Military Actions:
Rouhani began taking counter-steps as a response to the pressures imposed by his political adversaries. It was evident that he was eager to nominate candidates for the three empty ministerial positions. However, these nominees were refused by the former Islamic Consultative Assembly, which was controlled by the conservative fundamentalists, in 2013. The Assembly accused the nominees of taking part in the protests organized by the Green Path of Hope movement, or by what the conservative fundamentalists call, “the disorder movement.” The ministers nominated are: Reza Salehi Amiri for the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance post, Fakhruddin Danesh for Minister of Education, and Masoud Soltanifar to take over the Minister of Youth and Sports position.
These nominees, as per several reports, belong to political parties and organizations that face pressures and accusations by the conservatives, which explains the refusal of many members of the Assembly to nominate them for ministerial positions in the government. However, the supporting masses of the conservative current settled the voting battle in favor of the president’s candidate. These supporters achieved significant results in the parliamentary elections which took place in February 2016.
It can be said that through his clash with the conservative fundamentalists, Rouhani seeks to endorse these designations in order to regain the support of his supporters in the reformist movement who voted for him in former elections. This will be difficult as the movement has heatedly criticized his administration’s performance over the last four years, however he has realized that this demographic is the most capable of supporting his efforts to renew his presidential mandate.
Of course, Rouhani may rely on the fact that he is the only viable candidate for this voting bloc, as his potential competitors will most likely be from the conservative fundamentalists. However, this does not negate the possibility that this group could vote for another choice, which may impose repercussions on the current president. These choices may include boycotting the elections, particularly if they are convinced of his inability to keep his promises, similarly to how they have reacted to conservative restrictions in the past.
In light of the aforementioned issues, it can be said that the steps Rouhani has recently taken do not ensure him the support of the reformist or the conservative movement in the upcoming presidential elections, particularly in light of his reluctance or ability to open more important agendas for these masses. This could lead to an escalation of tensions with his political adversaries and with the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who adopts a strict and conservative policy on most issues.
There are a number of indicators in the patterns between international powers, specifically the US and Russia, the main international actors regarding the Middle East region, and the militias that are involved in the same crises.
While Washington was previously critical of these various actors, going so far as to defend any opposition, this strategy has changed with the aim of supporting their own interests. For example, the utilization of the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, come as part of a strategy to combat terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda.
A number of views assess that this transformation is being caused by expected changes in the relationship between Washington and these actors in the near future, which in turn is caused by the security status in conflict zones.
As for Moscow, despite it adopting a preliminary stance that does not deal with or recognize any non-state actors, previous experience has led them to slowly change their policy and adopt a more American approach, mainly due to its experience during the Cold War. During that time, Russia affirmed that non-state actors were tools that helped to decide the Cold War in favor of Washington.
From this, groups must decipher why Russia has moved to become involved with these groups in Syria, specifically militias allied to Iran and the Assad regime, as opposed to the Kurdish groups that play a primary role in the war against ISIS.
America’s Understanding:
In parallel with the increasing intensity of military operations being led by the international alliance and partnering with Iraqi forces against ISIS in Mosul, the idea of attacking ISIS’s stronghold in Raqqa required arranging an alliance with NATO and Turkey that would play host to the operations against ISIS at the Incirlik base.
In light of this arrangement the US Secretary of Defense embarked on a regional tour to oversee the operations of Mosul. Washington is playing a pivotal role in coordinating and conducting the operations there and had undergone a tour to try and convince Ankara to agree to a joint role for the Kurdish Militias in Syria. This is the policy that the US has been following in order to reduce the tense relations between Baghdad and Arbil, yet the Syrian Democratic Forces have conducted premeditated military movements against Raqqa. The most striking aspect is that they called the operation, “the Anger of the Euphrates”. This was an attempt to respond to the Turkish operation of the Euphrates Shield in Syria which was also initiated as per the Turkish - American understanding with the “Syrian Democratic Forces”.
What is most striking is that Washington, prior to agreeing to an operation against Raqqa, provided air cover for the Kurdish militia movements towards the province of Raqqa. This is a sign of coordination between both sides, i.e. the Turks and the Kurds. This points to the fact that, according to a number of reports, Washington will commit to military ground support thereby revealing the extent of understanding between Washington and the Kurds.
In this regard, the transition has expanded from training to military support, as the Syrian Democratic Forces were equipped with weapons prior to the countryside battle of El Shaddady in in mid-December 2015. It also provided air cover prior to the battle to regain the region of El Hol in the east of El Hasaka.
It can be said that Washington is aiming to achieve the following objectives:
1. Creating a Diverse Military Force: this is achieved via a multitude of different powers that would allow critique to be lifted off of the US administration as it only dealt with Islamist powers in the case of Syria.
2. Creating a Balance of Power: the Syrian Democratic Forces are partly made up of Kurds and Arabs. This means the forces have members from the YPG Kurdish protection units, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Operations Room for the Euphrates Eruption, the Sanadid Forces, the Mechanized Island Brigade, the Military Council of Syrai and the Women Protection Units.
3. Limiting Turkish Ambitions: since the start of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has sought to establish a safe zone in northern Syria with the aim of protecting Syrians from attacks by the regime, and reducing the number of refugees on Turkish lands.
The position of Washington towards the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq has been one of criticism since the start of their involvement in the Tikrit operations and the acts of violence that were committed there. David Petraeus, the former head of the CIA, stated to the Washington Post that during the operation of Tikrit, specifically on Mar. 21st, 2015, a Sunni force was formed with the aim of stopping the infringements committed by the Popular Mobilization Forces against the Sunni population. They groups reached what became known as the principles of Tikrit with the Iraqi government. Later on, this agreement enacted procedural moves to encapsulate the Popular Mobilization Forces within the Iraqi Security Apparatus, without officially merging them in the army. Despite this, the Popular Mobilization Forces was given its own military wing that was part of the Head of the Armed Forces of Iraq, who was the Prime Minister at the time.
It is however, clear that the creation of a Sunni movement to counter the Popular Mobilization Forces was not successful and did not transform into a real plan, particularly with the recent changes in US position towards the militia. The US position changed from outright refusal in having the militia take part in the operation to free Mosul, to an acceptance that warned of any participation in ethnic violence. The US Ambassador to Iraq stated on June 7th, 2016, that Washington would, “respect the contributions of the Popular Mobilization Forces in the fight against ISIS”. These statements came at the same time as the operation to liberate Falluja, despite the UN monitoring infringements being committed by the Popular Mobilization Forces in the region of El Salaqawi, west of Falluja.
Aside from this, Washington has played a role in reducing the tensions between the militias of El Hashd El Shaabi and the Kurds, as a number of stand offs took place between them in 2014. One standoff occurred during an operation in the Sinjar Mountain region, while others have taken place in regions that Iraqi Kurdistan considers to be under their influence.
Prior to the launch of the operation to liberate Mosul, US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter visited Masoud Barzani the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, to strengthen the operation to liberate Mosul and to overcome the obstacles posed by the Hashd militia. Yet after a week of the operation, stand offs between the Kurds and the Hashd militia took place again on liberated lands, as the militia moved on its own to liberate areas in Tel Affar under US air cover.
Russian Movements:
From the start of Russian military operations in Syria, the Kurds have formed the spearhead of their operations, especially in the Ain El Arab and Kobani operations. This pushed Moscow to raise the level of relations by providing political and diplomatic cover for the Kurdish Democratic Union, and opening up space for a representative in Moscow. The leaders of the party were welcomed in a number of tours. This was an attempt on the part of Moscow to limit the support of Washington, as well as pressure the Turks after they downed a Russian military plane in November 2015.
In the field, Russia also coordinated with Iran regarding its operations with ethnic militias on the Syrian battlefield in terms of their positioning and movements. In October 2015, Amir Abdelaheen, the advisor to the head of the Shura Council of Iran, (formerly the Iranian Foreign Minister), revealed during in a political forum in London that there is a high level of coordination between Tehran, Moscow and the Syrian regime in that regard. This is despite the numerous sources that note confusion on the roles of the various militias, such as Hezbollah, which created a number of differences between the two sides.
A Number of Different Signs:
There are three main signs of unlikely partnerships occurring in the region:
First, there is strong competition among the international powers concerned with the crises in the region to create strong, influential relations with non-state actors on the ground in order to uphold their interests in the various conflict zones. Yet, the limitations of these relations are tied to the balance of power of all involved parties, international or regional, within each struggle.
Second, there are double standards in some cases. For instance, the Syrian Democratic Forces have succeeded in creating strong relations with the two sides, especially in light of its role in the war against ISIS and its reliance on a number of differing ethnicities, unlike other militias.
Third, these relations have gone beyond the limits of weakening or removing ISIS in Iraq and Syria, especially since there are delayed roles for some of these non-state actors, including those that sought to create political and military wings. In the long run, these actors are seek to become main parties in their respective areas when it comes time for security and political rearrangements post-crises.
