Regionalism is a state that sits between the rigid nation-state driven by geopolitical competition and the international system marked by hierarchal global power politics. From this 'middle space' emerged military and economic alliances, the EU being the clearest example. Such regional blocs' main goal is to leverage collective strengths, geographical proximity, and shared interests.
This article explores regional interactions and alliances emerging in 2023 based on historical precedent and recent political and economic developments, especially among some of the most influential players in the region.
Precedents in the Middle East
The region has seen several military alliances in the past. They emerged in light of common perceived threats and took different forms, such as the Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty and the Baghdad Pact, subsequently known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).
During the Second World War, for instance, Britain quickly realised that it had to find new streams to recover its economy, which had been strained by its Mediterranean U-boat Campaign. In April of 1941, Britain established the Middle East Supply Center (MESC), the agency that had complete control over the flow of civilian supplies to the Middle East during the war. It secured vital supplies such as food and medicine, either through importing from other regions or by incentifying local production via a regional partnership between Egypt, Palestine, and Syria. The centre expanded, encouraging more production to lift some of Britain's economic constraints, and continued well until the end of the Second World War, though recognising the value of regional alliances remained. It has been argued that the League of Arab States may have been inspired by Britain's MESC.
The Aftermath of the Arab Revolts
Regional alliances either enjoyed limited or no success for various reasons. First, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict created internal and international pressure on Arab states. Second, the emergence of the nation-state system in the Middle East created barriers that hindered forming of deep alliances. And the first two decades of the twentieth century did not present an opportunity for the Arab states to build coalitions that could work, having experienced political stalemate for the first decade or the tumultuous repercussions of the "Arab Spring" in the decade that followed.
The most notable outcome of that period was the rise of Political Islam that sought to present the Islamic Kilafa as an alternative to the status quo. Add to this; many Arab states were plunging into civil and sectarian wars that left them completely devastated and prone to regional intervention by Turkey and Iran in particular, who used the ongoing state of dysfunction instigated by the regional unrest. And since 2015, the ripples of the Arab spring are still being felt across the region, manifesting in Iran-backed armed insurgency and terror attacks against Saudi and the UAE. Other states reacted with a heightened sense of nationhood confined by rigid identity, looking inwards to building equal rights to citizenship and economic and social development.
The end result has been the emergence of different blocs across the region. On the one hand, a reform 'quadripartite alliance' between Saudi, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain, and on the other, a bloc of countries that are aligned with the ethos of the Muslim Brotherhood.
New Regionalism
The 'Linkage Politics' hypothesis in International Relations theory stipulates that states' internal politics hugely influence their foreign policy. In this view, it may be understood that domestic efforts to reform would reflect on a state's regional relations and alliances. Reform, therefore, is multidimensional, and its success hinges on rationality, modernisation, and not ideology. Influenced by their vision for development and stability, reform countries have adopted a 'zero problems' policy through a network of alliances based on common economic, security, and political interests that would take down regional barriers and accelerate development.
Thus, new diplomacy and foreign policy have taken shape. The Egypt-Saudi maritime border agreement brought the two countries closer, yielding major development projects that link the Saudi northern region Al-Ula with the rapidly developing Sinai in Egypt, which creates a new residential strip south of Jordan, Palestine, and Israel. In the Mediterranean, a maritime border agreement between Egypt and Cyprus facilitated a new gas forum that includes Palestine, Israel, and Jordan, and three European countries (Cyprus, Greece, and Italy), facilitated by Egypt who would oversee the implementation of an agreement that would secure economic benefits for all parties.
A similar approach has been adopted in other parts of the region, opening new doors for cooperation. While some efforts remain slow, the New Levant initiative, for instance, is building links for Arab gas fields from Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt through to a possible gas line that branches to Syria and Lebanon in case it signs a maritime deal with Israel.
The Road to 2023
Al-Ula declaration, released on January 5, 2021, marked a new period of political stability in the region, having facilitated the resolution of diplomatic hurdles between Qatar and the four GCC countries. Other diplomatic initiatives opened the doors for peaceful conflict resolution: with Israel through the Abrahamic Accords on the one hand and with Iran and Turkey on the other. Other forums around natural gas opportunities in the region have given Arab states more reasons for cooperation, the latest example being the gas export agreement between Egypt and Israel and the EU to replace Russian gas following the Ukrainian war.
A new regionalism is expected to be seen in 2023. New relations are being forged slowly but surely, to adapt to new global realities and with an eye on economic and social development. The old narrative of Arab unity has become dated. In its place, we are seeing a network of alliances that bridge regional interests in what we may term a 'strategic marathon'. The Arab interest remains at the heart of these networks, exchanging and aligning interests. The US President Biden's meeting with leaders of nine Arab countries in July this year, and President Xi Jinping's visit to Saudi in early December, are quite telling in terms of power balance, not only politically and militarily but culturally as well. Not only the conditions for the Arab renaissance are religious or civic, but they are also driven by development.
Challenges Ahead
The aftermath of the Arab Spring remains present across the region. And 43 years have passed since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, yet the concept of the 'state' remains alien to the idea of 'revolution'. In Turkey, what was achieved in the first decade of the 21st century is heavily undermined by volatile geopolitical surroundings. Now, Turkey has stepped into an ambiguous phase of past glory revivalism and a dream to establish a neo-Ottoman Empire. And at the heart of the Middle East remains the most problematic player – Israel.
We may summarise that regionalism has produced a complex web of relations across many areas and has forged new alliances. However, it hasn't yet gotten Israel out of the Palestinian problem. What emerges from these networks are small and large opportunities that manifest in reality without having to depend on foreign powers.
