The security and military cooperation agreement signed between Iran and China during the visit of the Chinese Minister of Defense Chang Wanquan to Iran on the 14th of November 2016 indicates that Iran seeks to expand the margin of its available choices internationally. This is especially true in light of the fact that the strong relations it established with Russia do not negate the fact that there are significant unresolved conflicts to which Tehran pays special interest. Many within Tehran harbor serious suspicions towards Moscow and continuously warn against the risks of relying on it as the main international ally for Iran.

Undoubtedly, this orientation may go in line with the escalation of the regional threats which interest both Beijing and Tehran, in the same way that the instability situation in Afghanistan is ongoing and that the ISIS was able to control several areas inside Afghanistan, in addition to the increase in the number of Chinese extremists who join the terrorist organizations in Syria.

Numerous Aims:

Although raising the level of economic cooperation between the two countries during the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Iran on 23 January 2016 is in both countries’ interests, it does not negate the fact that Tehran seeks to achieve more than economic cooperation with China. This is evident in the agreement signed between Tehran and Beijing, whose commercial exchange volume for 2015 amounted to roughly $52 billion and to approximately $600 billion on cooperation agreements and memorandums over the past 10 years.

The first of these aims is reducing pressure on Tehran by relying on Russia. Despite their mutual interest, such as their stances on the Syrian crisis, Tehran still has many fears of continuing to rely on Russia as a major international force in the global field.

Those who were suspicious of Russia’s intentions towards Iran relied on several indicators. These included Russia deliberately disclosing its use of the Iranian Noje Airbase in its military operations in Syria. This infuriated Iran, whose Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan stated that this was a display of power by Moscow. 

Russia previously halted implementation of the S-300 missiles deal since 2010 to avoid international pressures by the US. They began manufacturing them following the change in the international situation as a result of the nuclear deal with Iran and the P5+1 on 14 July 2015.

Regional Pressures:

The second aim related to the threats imposed by the regional crises, which interest both parties, particularly the Afghan crisis. ISIS was able to maintain its power within Afghanistan by taking advantage of the unstable security and political situation, as well as the escalation of conflict between the government and the Taliban. ISIS’ presence in Afghanistan may increase in the coming period due to the pressures imposed on them in Iraq and Syria, particularly in light of the military operations of the international alliance, as well as regional and local parties against ISIS, including the ongoing operation to liberate Mosul.

Thus, numerous reports point to the existence of a trend within Tehran and Beijing that highlights the importance of opening channels of communication with the main parties in Afghanistan, the most important of which is the Taliban. Coordination with the latter may be a significant variable in confronting ISIS threats, in light of the ongoing conflict between ISIS and the Taliban since the ISIS’ appearance in Afghanistan.

Iran was the first to adopt this strategy with the Taliban, despite the historical conflict between both, which nearly resulted in war in 1998 after the Taliban’s assassination of 11 Iranian diplomats in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif. Tehran believed that opening channels of communication with the Taliban could help in furthering its influence in Afghanistan and providing points of pressure that can be used to confront the Afghan government.

As a result, Iran received numerous delegations from the Taliban over the years. Many reports also pointed out that the movement held talks with Iranian officials during a delegation visit headed by Tayyab Agha, chief of the political office, to open a representative office in Iran. Other reports also revealed that the former Emir of the Taliban Mullah Akhtar Mansour was present in Iran before he was killed on 21 May 2016 at the Pakistani borders by an American drone.

Meanwhile, it appears that China started adopting the same policy, albeit with great caution, which is reflected in its keenness to call for a Taliban delegation to visit. The delegation was headed by Abbas Stanikzai, the chief of the movement’s political office in Qatar, and they discussed the latest developments in Afghanistan, particularly after the assassination of Akhtar Mansour, which put new obstacles on keeping the peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government under the auspices of China, the US, and Pakistan.

ISIS Elements of China:

China’s fears of possible terrorist attacks, which encouraged it to open channels of communication with the Taliban, are of particular importance, in light of numerous reports indicating that ISIS has begun to attract a number of extremist terrorist organizations which are present near the Chinese borders. For example, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan announced its split from Al Qaeda and pledged allegiance to ISIS in December 2014. Furthermore, a number of Chinese citizens joined terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq, particularly Jabhat Fateh Alsham, formerly known as Al-Nusra Front, and ISIS. 

Thus, many currents believe that raising the level of security and political coordination with Iran, as well as economic relations, may be the gate to dealing with these potential terrorist threats, which does not tolerate with the facts present. These facts point out that the policy, which Iran adopts on the regional scale, is one of the reasons for the spread of the terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq, and that Iran may be prioritizing understandings with other parties than China, like the US. This means that China’s engagement with Iran on the political and security level will unlikely achieve significant results, in light of Iran’s insistence to continue adopting such policy, which on the long term could impose negative repercussions on China’s interests in the region.

Neutralization of Conflicts:

In terms of the third aim, Iran seeks to send reassuring messages to China, specifically with regard to the high level of relations with India, particularly after signing the trilateral agreement between India, Iran, and Afghanistan in May 2016 to develop Iran’s Chabahar port on the Arabian Sea. The agreement will enable India to reach the Central Asian markets through Afghanistan without passing by Pakistan, China’s ally, due to the existing conflicts, which according to many currents results in the escalation of the competition with China, which in turn seeks to achieve the same aims through the Pakistani port Gwadar.

Hence, the reasons for Iran’s keenness to hint at the potential of adding China to the project can be explained, as it believes that this could reduce China’s potential discontent towards Iran’s tendency to develop its relations with India.

Other Variables:

However, this in whole does not deny the existence of other variables that may govern the limits of military and security cooperation between Iran and China, for example, the US, as Iran may prefer to prioritize security coordination with Washington with regard to the Afghan file, along the lines of the Iraqi file. This may be the reason for the many reports that pointed out to the Iranian role in the assassination of the Taliban Emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour by an American drone during his return from Iran.

Moreover, China does not only give special interest to its relations with the U.S. but it also considers the potential impact of its close relations with Tehran on its relations with Washington. This was clearly reflected in the Chinese situation from Iran’s joining of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Beijing showed precaution toward this step, despite Russia’s support in this regard, in light of its fears of an imbalance of power inside the organization in favor of anti-American orientations, which seems to be an aim that Russia sought, through supporting the request for Iran to join.

Undoubtedly, the different priorities of Tehran and Beijing, at the end, indicate that the security and political cooperation between the two parties may have a limit, in light of many existing variables that could impede its development in the next phase, particularly in case unexpected changes take place in the nuclear agreement, which is the main variable that pushed the international powers to re-engage with Iran on different levels.