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Breaking the Isolation

Implications of Iranian FM’s Africa tour

09 سبتمبر، 2022


Iran's Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, on August 27, wrapped up a tour to Africa during which he visited Mali, Tanzania and Zanzibar. The tour, Amir-Abdollahian’s first to Africa since he took office, shows Iran’s interest in the continent. 

Implications of the tour 

Ahead of his tour to Africa, Amir-Abdollahian announced that Asia, neighboring countries and Africa are priorities for Iran’s foreign relations. This may explain why he was accompanied by a large delegation including high-ranking government officials, businessmen from big commercial and economic organizations based in Tehran. Within this context, the implications of the Iranian top diplomat’s tour to Africa can be outlined as follows:

1.   Promoting relations with Bamako: 

The Iranian foreign minister began his tour to Africa from Mali, where he met senior government officials including the head of the National Transitional Council Assimi Goita. While in Mali, Amir-Abdollahian reiterated that both countries are willing to promote bilateral relations in the coming period. 

Malian and Iranian experts held a meeting on August 23 in the presence of Secretary-General of the Malian foreign ministry Aly Tounkara, as well as the head of central and western Africa department at the Iranian foreign ministry. Topics discussed at the meeting included bilateral relations, security and fighting terrorism, education agriculture and technology. 

Earlier this year, in February, Mali’s foreign affairs minister, Abdoulaye Diop, visited Tehran, which indicates that Amir-Abdollahian’s recent visit to Bamako was aimed at building on previous agreements. 

In Bamako, the Malian foreign minister and his Iranian counterpart headed the first session of the Joint Iranian-Malian Committee on Cooperation, set up to promote economic cooperation between the two countries. Moreover, the Iranian officials handed over 100,000 COVIran Barekat vaccines as part of one million vaccines donated by Iran to the African country. 

As part of Iran’s use of religion to penetrate other countries, western reports revealed that Tehran has been active in Mali for several years trying to build Shi’ite religious schools and seminaries in Bamako. The Mustafa International School is one of the schools Iran is trying to use to build a launchpad for its regional expansion. 

2.   Reinforcing influence in Tanzania: 

Tanzania was the second stop-over in the Iranian FM’s Africa tour. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s largest city, economic and industrial capital and home to the country’s largest seaport, Amir-Abdollahian met Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan, and his counterpart Liberata Mulamula. 

The Iranian FM reiterates that Iran is ready to invest in several sectors in Tanzania, including mining, agriculture, fishing and animal farming. The two countries set up a joint economic committee to oversee joint projects. Moreover, Amir-Abdollahian indicated that his country is seeking to increase the number of Iranian companies operating in Tanzania and receive facilitations for visas to Tanzania. 

It should be noted that in Tanzania, among other countries, activities aimed at proselytizing Shi’ism, through building schools and seminaries and study missions, picked up significantly in recent years. Moreover, Tanzania does not oppose such Shi’ite religious activities and even back them.

3.   Expanding presence in the Indian Ocean: 

Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous region of Tanzania, was the third and last stopover of the Iranian FM’s Africa tour. Amir-Abdollahian arrived in the east African archipelago on August 25 to meet its president Hussein Ali Mwinyi and present him with an official invitation to visit Iran. 

Amir-Abdollahian emphasized his country’s preparedness to offer all forms of support to Zanzibar, in the oil and gas industry in particular. Zanzibar is of a high geostrategic importance for Iran’s bid to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean and build on its existing presence in some archipelago countries such as the Comoros. 

Multiple goals

The following goals can explain why the Iranian FM made his tour to Africa. 

1.   Circumventing western sanctions:

Talks are ongoing between Iran and western powers to reach a new nuclear agreement that would ease economic sanctions imposed on Iran. However, Iran appears to be moving now to avoid any faltering in the talks and is seeking new vents for its exhausted economy. That is why Tehran seeks to reinforce its relations with Africa, and West African countries in particular. As part of these efforts, Tehran is planning to establish an advanced technology exhibition in Bamako to showcase Iranian products and open up new markets in West Africa. 

This coincides with reports on Tehran’s plans to open 7 commercial centers in Africa by the end of 2023. Moreover, Tehran is working to increase trade with Africa from USD1.2 billion to USD 2.5 billion by the end of the current year, and to USD 5 - 6 billion by 2026. 

The coming period Iran and Tanzania will intensify talks and resolve the issue of entry visas to the African country. The Iranian FM handed over an official invitation to the Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan to visit Tehran before the end of the current year. 

2.   Taking advantage of geopolitical shifts: 

West Africa is currently experiencing geopolitical shifts driven by intensified international and regional competition in the region coinciding with France’s waning influence in Mali and the growing regional presence of China and Russia in West Africa. 

Tehran seeks to take advantage of these developments to strengthen its presence in West Africa. Some situation assessments noted the potential for coordination between Russia and Iran in Mali, especially in light of their previous experience in Syria. 

3.   Exploiting Mali’s need for military support: 

Mali is currently facing an intensifying and widening wave terror attacks. According to some assessments, Iran and Mali are currently likely in talks over receiving military support from Iran. Additionally, the assessments noted that Iran will likely be involved in Mali to support the ruling Transitional Military Council, especially as Russia is now busy waging its war in Ukraine. 

Iran’s intervention in Mali may be carried out by sending military experts from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to the African country. The assessments do not even exclude the possibility of Tehran’s transportation of weapons and equipment to Bamako, especially in light of reports about Bamako’s request to acquire Iranian drones. 

4.   Mining African uranium:

Iran is interested in establishing a foothold in Tanzania, where, according to western reports, uranium is smuggled to Iran through the port of Dar es Salaam. Accordingly, Amir-Abdollahian’s visit to Tanzania came as part of bids to reinforce Tehran’s access into the heart of Africa to secure routes for Iranian illegal trade in the region. 

5.   Strengthening presence in the Indian Ocean: 

Iran is attracted to the strategic location of semi-autonomous Zanzibar where the first seeks to secure a foothold in the African country to strengthen its presence in the international shipping routes. This is especially so because Tanzania and Zanzibar are both close to Mozambique Channel, which has now become at the center of international attention as a potential alternative to shipping and trade routes of the Red Sea which Iran is planning to use as leverage by causing disruptions to international trade in times of crisis. 

Iran’s moves in Tanzania and Zanzibar cannot be viewed separately from Tehran’s ties with the al-Shabaab terrorist organization in Somalia though which Iran managed to transport shipments of weapons to the Houthi militia in Yemen as well as to Tanzania, Kenya and Mozambique. 

In conclusion, Iran’s intensifying moves in Africa are aimed at strengthening its presence in Africa, after its waning interest in the continent under former president Hassan Rouhani. This renewed interest was clearly voiced by President Ebrahim Raissi, who emphasized that reinforcing relations with African countries will be prioritized by Iran’s foreign policy in the coming period.