Although most countries around the world issued tentative reactions to the victory of Republican nominee Donald Trump in the American Presidential elections, choosing to wait for further clarifications on his administration’s foreign policy, Iran decided not to wait. Instead, Iran decided to issue urgent messages to the incoming Republican administration before it takes power in January 2017.

What is even more interesting is that this was undertaken by the government of Hassan Rouhani. This included statements by Rouhani himself after Trump was declared president-elect, in which he said, “Trump cannot cancel the nuclear agreement.” It also included indirect threats from Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif should the new US administration not adhere to the nuclear agreement, pointing out that “Iran has other options.”

Although Trump’s own statements regarding the nuclear agreement have been contradictory – he has indicated that he will dismantle the current agreement and renegotiate one with stricter limits on Iran – he later confirmed that he would not cancel the agreement, but would rather monitor it in a way that prevents Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, this has not stopped Iran from attempting to get ahead of the formation of the new Republican administration and clarifying the possible repercussions of any American backpedaling on their commitments to the agreement, all in an attempt to get the new administration to take back their threats and work on keeping the agreement alive.

Multiple Considerations:

Iran prioritizing sending this urgent message is due to a number of factors. First, it shows the particular interest the Rouhani government has in the application of the nuclear deal, seeing as it may be the “sole achievement” of his first term and the basis for his run for a second term in the May 2017 elections.

As such, the Rouhani government sees the application of this agreement, in spite of the numerous obstacles facing Iran before it reaps the benefits of the lifting of international sanctions, is a main point in supporting Rouhani’s claim for a second term, the chances of which have come under not insubstantial threats should Donald Trump act on the promises and statements he made during his campaign. Trump has previously called the nuclear deal “disastrous” and that it would lead to “nuclear holocaust,” sentiments shared generally with Republicans, who now control Congress.

Second, is that Trump’s attitude towards Iran, as well as the attitude of some who may end up on his cabinet, are not limited to the nuclear deal, but extend to Iran’s role in the region. This puts Trump and his team in stark contrast to the Obama administration, which turned a blind eye to Iran’s growing regional role and continued interventions in the domestic affairs of neighboring countries in order to prioritize the nuclear deal. In the Obama administration’s view, the Iran deal is one of its few foreign affairs wins, accompanied by its continuous failures to handle various crises from Ukraine to North Korea and Syria, in addition to the Middle East peace process, which has not moved much in the past few years.

Special Considerations:

This does not mean that the Trump administration’s anticipated interest in Iran’s regional role will lead it to enter into open conflict with Iran. Instead, it means that it may take on a more strict approach in dealing with some portfolios in which Iran is also involved, such as the war on terror, in light of the administration’s accusations of Iran being the world’s largest sponsor of terrorism.

In other words, the new administration is unlikely to enter into conflict with Iran except in portfolios it is already prioritizing and sees as crucial to the US’s interests and national security. This approach explains the administration’s continued linking between Iran’s regional role and its sponsoring of terrorist activities.

With all this in mind, this scenario seems to be gaining more and more credibility in light of Trump’s use of “America First” as his slogan and messages to Washington’s allies in the region that America’s security commitments to them may see significant changes; messages given significant importance in the political circles in Tehran.

Internal Balances:

Third, the continued efforts by Trump and his team to adopt strict policies regarding Iran - whether regarding the nuclear deal or Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism - and acting on these words will give the fundamental conservative wing an opportunity to pressure the Rouhani government over the next six months, leading up to the presidential elections in May, 2017.

This continued pressure might also strengthen the chances of a conservative nominee running against Rouhani, especially in light of the “inherent parallelism” between internal affairs in Iran and the US. These parallels became clear after Rouhani won the 2013 presidential election, itself a reflection of the Obama administration’s more flexible approach to Iran over the past eight years.

Inherent Threats:

In light of the above, the Rouhani administration preferred to move quickly and get ahead of any potential negative effects of Trump’s victory. To do that, it depended on three main variables: First, that the nuclear deal has international legitimacy, particularly from Security Council decision number 2213, signed only a week after the deal was reached. This meant that it was not just a bilateral deal between the US and Iran, but rather a deal between Iran and the P5+1 group at large.

With that, Iran is making sure that Trump’s threats to “cancel” the deal clash with realities on the ground, demonstrating that the deal has wide international approval from Europe and other international powers such as Russia and China.

Second, that Iran would once again move to reactivate its nuclear program should the deal fail. This appears to be what Foreign Minister Zarif was indicating when he mentioned that Iran had other options should the deal be canceled. This would explain Iran’s insistence, from the beginning of negotiations, not to give up the main components of its nuclear program, such as centrifuges, and to continue uranium enrichment at decreased level, in preparation for this potential outcome in light of the continued concerns expressed by the supreme leadership - represented by Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei - of America’s intentions towards Iran.

Third, that Iran would not respond to pressures from Trump’s America to renegotiate a new nuclear deal seeing as it had already reached the best possible outcome with the current deal and cannot take a bet on reaching a deal with better terms. This is definitely reflected in Zarif’s confirmations that he is uninterested in establishing relations with the new American Secretary of State in a Trump administration to match his relationship with current State Secretary John Kerry, seeing as there is no need for new negotiations with Washington, whether regarding the nuclear deal or other portfolios.

These messages from the Rouhani administration to President elect Trump do not, however, reflect a consistent Iranian policy, which will not come clear until the new American administration takes power and its foreign policy becomes clearer. Only then would it be possible to find out what the repercussions are, whether on the relationship between Washington and Tehran regarding the nuclear deal and other issues or on the internal balance of power in Iran going forward. This is especially true in light of many indications within Iran that there are portfolios that may line up with the Trump administration, such as the war on ISIS and the crisis in Syria.