It appears that Iran not only seeks to send clear warning signs to  incoming US president Donald Trump regarding the nuclear deal, but also to focus on affirming its regional influence, especially in states currently suffering from crises, most notably Syria. This comes at a time when a number of views have emerged that believe the Iranian spread will receive very special attention from the Trump administration in light of a number of these views adopting a harsh stance towards Iran,beyond the nuclear  agreement.

Iran has begun to affirm its ability to move its militias in order to take part in the Syrian conflict alongside the Assad forces. The main training regime of these forces relied on the fact that there are no border limitations in achieving their objectives, and in being able to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, as well as spreading its influence amongst states in the region.

In that respect, the head of the armed forces, General Mohamed Baqary, on the eve of the Nov. 24th, 2016, Malek El Ashtar event, decreed that it might be possible to send the Baseeg militia to areas of resistance (in reference to Syria), in case they get the green light from the Ayatollah. More important than this though, is the affirmation by Baqary in other statements of the capability to establish Iranian naval bases on the coasts of Syria and Yemen, or even to establish floating bases on remote islands.

Important Timing:

Without a doubt,statements made by Iranian officials cannot be separated from other developments on the regional and international stage in the recent period. This is represented firstly by the suggestions put forth by the UN envoy to Syria, Stefan Di Mistura, who visited Iran on Nov.11th, 2016 and sought to give a political role to the opposition in Eastern Aleppo in return for the withdrawal of the Gabhet Fath El Sham militia (previously El Nusra Front) from there. This was met with complete refusal from Iran, as they see this step as lacking purpose and as more of a transitional move, noting that the projects to divide Syria cannot be taken seriously and will therefore not easily pass through the assembly. 

Secondly, the win of the Republican candidate, Donald Trump, in the US presidential elections is considered a threat by Iran to its nuclear agreement (even though it will receive priority attention from Iran) and to other ongoing regional issues. For instance, the role of Iran in Syria is not clearly defined in Trump’s vision for Syria in the current phase. When the time comes, Iran hopes they will be able to affect changes on American policies towards the Syrian crisis.

Thirdly, if Iran responds to the Nov. 22nd, 2016, passing of a law through the US Congress which extends sanctions on Iran for another 10 years, it will be to prioritize implementing the nuclear deal after Trump forms his cabinet. The law is currently awaiting confirmation by the US Senate.

A Number of Goals:

In light of this, it can be said that Iran will seek to achieve a number of goals  through statements by its military officials. These goals are as follows: 

1. Respond to the invitation made by Hassan Rouhany on Nov. 23rd, 2016: specifically, the role of military institutions in cases of a political and electoral nature. This comes despite the fact that Rouhany was hinting at the coming elections being held in May 2017. This shows that he has been seeking, since the start of this term in 2013, to reduce the role of military institutions inside the Iranian political process, as well as their role in foreign policy. Rouhany sees that this influence reduces his role as president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As it stands now, he does not have the keys to this authority in light of the role that the Ayatollah plays in the Iranian republic, to the benefit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard who claim that their movements and actions are all in the name of Khamenei.

The leaders of the Revolutionary Guard have sought, through a number of statements, to send a message to Rouhany that the efforts he is exerting in this regard will end in failure for two main reasons:

Firstly, that the Ayatollah will refuse these calls, as he sees that the Guard as seeking to preserve the principles and gains of the revolution. Secondly, that the political position of Rouhany is in constant decline, not just due to the fact that the elections are coming closer, but also as a result of the international and regional developments. These developments range from  whether Trump’s election win increases the chances of an escalation of tensions between Iran and the US, to 0the increasing tensions with regional states due to Iran’s constant interference in the affairs of the region. 

2. Reinforcing the Syrian regime to end the battle for Aleppo in conjunction with its allied militias in order to face up to the armed opposition: This battle will have a primary role in dictating the way that future battles in Syria will go. Iran will also seek to confirm that the point of moving the Baseeg militias to Syria to combat ISIS, which will most likely be moved to the city of Raqqa after its forces withdraw from Mosul due to the military operations there . This might be an effort to absorb some of the critiques that regional and international players would dictate as a result of Iran sending the Baseeg militias.

3. A confirmation by Iran that its role is to dictate possible outcomes of the Syrian revolution:since the militias that support Al Assad move based on Iranian orders. Militias currently taking orders possible include  Hezbollah, Lewaa El Fatemeen, Lewaa El Zayneen, and maybe even El Hashd El Shaabi after the end of the battle of Mosul.

From here, this could explain why Hezbollah organized a march in the Qaysar Area in Homs on Nov. 14th, 2016. This could be seen as a green light from Iran and as another clear indicator of its role in Syria. This is particularly an issue since Hezbollah made it clear during the march when they exposed the fact that  a number of US weapons that they own as a sign that Iran’s influence is not limited to Lebanon or Syria, and that any effort that is undertaken to undermine their influence in Syria will not achieve any results that coincide with Iran’s vision.

It can be said then, that Iran will seek to reinforce its influence and presence inside of Syria in a way that will note, as opposed to what is being said, that the threats towards Iran are rising steadily, and that the direction of the Syrian conflict could take a turn not in line with its interests in the region, actually creating a serious threat to Iran