أخبار المركز
  • د. أحمد أمل يكتب: (تهدئة مؤقتة أم ممتدة؟ فرص وتحديات نجاح اتفاق إنهاء الخلاف الصومالي الإثيوبي برعاية تركيا)
  • سعيد عكاشة يكتب: (كوابح التصعيد: هل يصمد اتفاق وقف النار بين إسرائيل ولبنان بعد رحيل الأسد؟)
  • نشوى عبد النبي تكتب: (السفن التجارية "النووية": الجهود الصينية والكورية الجنوبية لتطوير سفن حاويات صديقة للبيئة)
  • د. أيمن سمير يكتب: (بين التوحد والتفكك: المسارات المُحتملة للانتقال السوري في مرحلة ما بعد الأسد)
  • د. رشا مصطفى عوض تكتب: (صعود قياسي: التأثيرات الاقتصادية لأجندة ترامب للعملات المشفرة في آسيا)

New Forms of Regional Intervention in the Middle East

29 نوفمبر، 2016


Borders have become one of the most prominent factors behind the escalation in conflicts and expanding scope of regional intervention in the Middle East in light of the complex interests of and roles played by actors in those conflicts. This issue has garnered importance and momentum in recent times in light of four key considerations. The first involves the controversy incited by the initiative proposed by UN Envoy to Syria Steffan di Mistura to save Eastern Aleppo in November 2016 which included the establishment of an internal administration for opposition forces in the neighborhoods of Eastern Aleppo, in exchange for Fatah Al-Sham Front (formerly Al-Nusra Front) forces agreeing to leave the area.

This initiative represents the extent of the ideas proposed by various international forces which have been involved in the Syrian crisis since March 2016 and which divided Syria, undermining its unity as one state. This process granted vast power to regional authorities in those areas. Other ideas have been proposed by Iran, the Al-Assad regime, and Hezbollah to form what is called a “Useful Syria” as a last resort for addressing developments in the Syrian crisis.

The second involves the warnings issued by the French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault on 20 November that “the entire war will lead Syria to become divided and strengthen the influence of ISIS.”

The third involves Hezbollah’s keenness to organize a military parade in Syria’s Al-Qaseer in the southern Homs countryside on 14 November this year in a trans-border message to forces involved in the Syrian crisis. This act strove to highlight the fact that the future of and role played the party has become linked to the potential future of the crisis, not just domestic developments in Lebanon.

The fourth relates to the recent statements made by President of the Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani on 15 November 2016. He stated: “I agree with the US’ decision not to withdraw from the Kurdish areas which have been restored from ISIS,” adding that “After all of these sacrifices, it is impossible to accept that we deal directly with the center of the provinces.” Despite this, regional leaders were keen to emphasize that these statements were taken out of context. They also asserted that the statements garnered more attention because the Kurds hope to invest in the war against ISIS in order to achieve gains on the ground; Barzani himself confirmed this when he said that “the new borders will be drawn with blood.”

New Projects:

Perhaps it can be said that these initiatives and developments have shed light on new perceptions and visions proposed to address the issue of borders in the Middle East. Some parties in the Middle East, whether state or non-state actors, strive to re-engineer independent political borders in conflict areas and replace them with new types of unconventional borders.

Realistic reports have revealed that the new borders are already under construction, especially for parties which began drawing borders and calculated their roles in these conflicts in a manner consistent with their aspirations in the area. The most important of these include:

1. Acquisition: This was evident in the project undertaken by Hezbollah, who acquired the Al-Qaseer area in Syria and subsequently moved, according to several reports, a portion of its military arsenal there. These reports were verified after Hezbollah held a military parade in Al-Qaseer in the southern countryside of Homs, close to the Syrian border with Lebanon.

Of course, this parade is tied strongly to recent developments on the domestic, regional, and international spheres, such as the consultations taking place within Lebanon to form a new government after the presidential vacuum crisis was solved by election General Michel Aoun as President. Republican candidate Donald Trump also recently won the US presidency and Iran has moved to send new messages to Washington regarding possible paths for the nuclear deal after Trump’s administration is formed.

These messages on the whole reflected the statements made by the Deputy Secretary General of Hezbollah Naeem Qassem where he said: “We are present in Syria and are not in need of any interpretations or justifications. We stand with the Syrian army and state, and if we did not move into Syria, terrorists would have infiltrated Lebanon. The subject of our involvement in Syria will not be a topic for debate among the Lebanese at present.”

In other words, through this step, which has acquired increasing importance after the party intentionally disclosed that it had weapons owned by the Lebanese army in its possession, Hezbollah hopes emphasize that they will not back down from their role in the Syrian conflict which serves Iran’s goals and ambitions. Iran continues to insist that more support be provided to the Bashar Al-Assad regime in order to escalate the intensity of the conflict and halt efforts to reach a settlement.

Several reports have indicated that through this, Hezbollah aims to send a message that has made gains through its involvement in the Syrian conflict by asserting its control over major areas within Syria such as Al-Qaseer.

It cannot be ruled out that this step, which was likely taken in coordination with Iran, also represented a message to Russia in light of reports indicating fears within Tehran that Russia may move to establish a settlement to the crisis which would not please them, especially if Moscow was able to reach a potential agreement with the new administration in Washington. This is what always pushes Tehran to assert their influence on the ground in Syria as a major party which cannot be ignored.

2. Emotional borders: This project has pushed Turkish President Recept Tayyip Erdogan to express a new Turkish vision to the developments taking place on the regional and international levels. In an official statement commemorating the 78th anniversary of the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of modern Turkey, Erdogan said: “We address those who try to determine the history of our country and our nation for 90 years.” He added: “We cannot be locked up in 780,000 square kilometers…our natural borders are one thing and emotional borders another. Our brothers in Crimea and the Caucasus, Aleppo and Mosul may be outside our natural borders but are well within the emotional ones.”

Of course, this new Turkish vision suits the rising intensity of relations between Turkey and Iraq due to Turkey’s repeated warnings that the Popular Mobilization militia participated in the battle to liberate Mosul with ISIS, and Turkey’s focus on the invasion of Tal Afar, a city boasting a Turkmen majority. Turkey threatened to intervene to prevent new violations from being committed against the residents of these areas as was the case in other locations such as Fallujah.

3. Incorporeal borders: These are the borders of the Iranian project, one of the reasons behind the expanding scope of regional crises and the terror organizations which are promoted by Iranian officials, especially leaders of the Revolutionary Guard. The Guard plays a major role in Iran’s foreign policy, especially in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria.

On 5 November 2016, the leader of the Basij forces Mohamed Reza Naqdi said that “The banner of the revolution flies in four Arab countries,” adding that during the maneuver carried out by Basij forces in Khuzestan in Northern Iran, “The banner of the revolution now flies in many countries, including Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.”

Pivotal Variables:

Of course, the trend among these parties toward taking more procedural steps to achieve their goals is linked to many variables, the most important of which includes the extent of relevant forces accepting those crises with the potential variables they may impose, especially in terms of the balance of forces on the ground, borders forged by agreement and conflict with other local parties who pursue approaches of no lesser importance. This was the case for Kurdish forces, for example, who are currently striving to consolidate their control over the areas they helped regain from ISIS, indicating overall that border conflicts will escalate in the near future in light of the expanding breadth of differences and diverging interests among major forces involved in the conflict.