There are a number of indicators in the patterns between international powers, specifically the US and Russia, the main international actors regarding the Middle East region, and the militias that are involved in the same crises.

While Washington was previously critical of these various actors, going so far as to defend any opposition, this strategy has changed with the aim of supporting their own interests. For example, the utilization of the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, come as part of a strategy to combat terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda.

A number of views assess that this transformation is being caused by expected changes in the relationship between Washington and these actors in the near future, which in turn is caused by the security status in conflict zones. 

As for Moscow, despite it adopting a preliminary stance that does not deal with or recognize any non-state actors, previous experience has led them to slowly change their policy and adopt a more American approach, mainly due to its experience during the Cold War. During that time, Russia affirmed that non-state actors were tools that helped to decide the Cold War in favor of Washington. 

From this, groups must decipher why Russia has moved to become involved with these groups in Syria, specifically militias allied to Iran and the Assad regime, as opposed to the Kurdish groups that play a primary role in the war against ISIS.

America’s Understanding:

In parallel with the increasing intensity of military operations being led by the international alliance and partnering with Iraqi forces against ISIS in Mosul, the idea of attacking ISIS’s stronghold in Raqqa required arranging an alliance with NATO and Turkey that would play host to the operations against ISIS at the Incirlik base.

In light of this arrangement the US Secretary of Defense embarked on a regional tour to oversee the operations of Mosul. Washington is playing a pivotal role in coordinating and conducting the operations there and had undergone a tour to try and convince Ankara to agree to a joint role for the Kurdish Militias in Syria. This is the policy that the US has been following in order to reduce the tense relations between Baghdad and Arbil, yet the Syrian Democratic Forces have conducted premeditated military movements against Raqqa. The most striking aspect is that they called the operation, “the Anger of the Euphrates”. This was an attempt to respond to the Turkish operation of the Euphrates Shield in Syria which was also initiated as per the Turkish - American understanding with the “Syrian Democratic Forces” 

What is most striking is that Washington, prior to agreeing to an operation against Raqqa, provided air cover for the Kurdish militia movements towards the province of Raqqa. This is a sign of coordination between both sides, i.e. the Turks and the Kurds. This points to the fact that, according to a number of reports, Washington will commit to military ground support thereby revealing the extent of understanding between Washington and the Kurds. 

In this regard, the transition has expanded from training to military support, as the Syrian Democratic Forces were equipped with weapons prior to the countryside battle of El Shaddady in in mid-December 2015. It also provided air cover prior to the battle to regain the region of El Hol in the east of El Hasaka.

It can be said that Washington is aiming to achieve the following objectives:

1. Creating a Diverse Military Force: this is achieved via a multitude of different powers that would allow critique to be lifted off of the US administration as it only dealt with Islamist powers in the case of Syria.

2. Creating a Balance of Power: the Syrian Democratic Forces are partly made up of Kurds and Arabs. This means the forces have members from the YPG Kurdish protection units, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Operations Room for the Euphrates Eruption, the Sanadid Forces, the Mechanized Island Brigade, the Military Council of Syrai and the Women Protection Units.

3. Limiting Turkish Ambitions: since the start of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has sought to establish a safe zone in northern Syria with the aim of protecting Syrians from attacks by the regime, and reducing the number of refugees on Turkish lands.

The position of Washington towards the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq has been one of criticism since the start of their involvement in the Tikrit operations and the acts of violence that were committed there. David Petraeus, the former head of the CIA, stated to the Washington Post that during the operation of Tikrit, specifically on Mar. 21st, 2015, a Sunni force was formed with the aim of stopping the infringements committed by the Popular Mobilization Forces against the Sunni population. They groups reached what became known as the principles of Tikrit with the Iraqi government. Later on, this agreement enacted procedural moves to encapsulate the Popular Mobilization Forces within the Iraqi Security Apparatus, without officially merging them in the army. Despite this, the Popular Mobilization Forces was given its own military wing that was part of the Head of the Armed Forces of Iraq, who was the Prime Minister at the time.

It is however, clear that the creation of a Sunni movement to counter the Popular Mobilization Forces was not successful and did not transform into a real plan, particularly with the recent changes in US position towards the militia. The US position changed from outright refusal in having the militia take part in the operation to free Mosul, to an acceptance that warned of any participation in ethnic violence. The US Ambassador to Iraq stated on June 7th, 2016, that Washington would, “respect the contributions of the Popular Mobilization Forces in the fight against ISIS”. These statements came at the same time as the operation to liberate Falluja, despite the UN monitoring infringements being committed by the Popular Mobilization Forces in the region of El Salaqawi, west of Falluja. 

Aside from this, Washington has played a role in reducing the tensions between the militias of El Hashd El Shaabi and the Kurds, as a number of stand offs took place between them in 2014. One standoff occurred during an operation in the Sinjar Mountain region, while others have taken place in regions that Iraqi Kurdistan considers to be under their influence. 

Prior to the launch of the operation to liberate Mosul, US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter visited Masoud Barzani the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, to strengthen the operation to liberate Mosul and to overcome the obstacles posed by the Hashd militia. Yet after a week of the operation, stand offs between the Kurds and the Hashd militia took place again on liberated lands, as the militia moved on its own to liberate areas in Tel Affar under US air cover. 

Russian Movements: 

From the start of Russian military operations in Syria, the Kurds have formed the spearhead of their operations, especially in the Ain El Arab and Kobani operations. This pushed Moscow to raise the level of relations by providing political and diplomatic cover for the Kurdish Democratic Union, and opening up space for a representative in Moscow. The leaders of the party were welcomed in a number of tours. This was an attempt on the part of Moscow to limit the support of Washington, as well as pressure the Turks after they downed a Russian military plane in November 2015.

In the field, Russia also coordinated with Iran regarding its operations with ethnic militias on the Syrian battlefield in terms of their positioning and movements. In October 2015, Amir Abdelaheen, the advisor to the head of the Shura Council of Iran, (formerly the Iranian Foreign Minister), revealed during in a political forum in London that there is a high level of coordination between Tehran, Moscow and the Syrian regime in that regard. This is despite the numerous sources that note confusion on the roles of the various militias, such as Hezbollah, which created a number of differences between the two sides. 

A Number of Different Signs:

There are three main signs of unlikely partnerships occurring in the region:

First, there is strong competition among the international powers concerned with the crises in the region to create strong, influential relations with non-state actors on the ground in order to uphold their interests in the various conflict zones. Yet, the limitations of these relations are tied to the balance of power of all involved parties, international or regional, within each struggle. 

Second, there are double standards in some cases. For instance, the Syrian Democratic Forces have succeeded in creating strong relations with the two sides, especially in light of its role in the war against ISIS and its reliance on a number of differing ethnicities, unlike other militias. 

Third, these relations have gone beyond the limits of weakening or removing ISIS in Iraq and Syria, especially since there are delayed roles for some of these non-state actors, including those that sought to create political and military wings. In the long run, these actors are seeking to become main parties in their respective areas when it comes time for security and political rearrangements post-crises.