In the aftermath of the Cold War and the breakup
of the Soviet Union, which considered by many as the
"End of History", liberalism maintained its domination on the global
stage. However, with the renewed conflict between Russia and the West, signs of
a new Russian ideology branded as "orderism"
emerged and found support in many parts of the world.
Democracy is a form of
modern political governance that “maintains binding consultation of equal
citizens and protects them from arbitrary action by governmental agents.”[1]The creation of a modern
consolidated democracy in the Western world was a long and painful journey. The
process of democratic transition depended on a “complex mix of historical facts
particular to each country”[2], and it involved the formation
of an efficient state bureaucracy, effective legal system, along with instating
economic and political freedoms.[3] Liberalism placed the individual
at the center of politics and emphasized the role of the state in promoting
progress through the democratic system of government.[4]
Fukuyama’s famous thesis on
the “end of history” declared the triumph of liberal democracy and the arrival
of a post-ideological world, where he argued that democracy cannot be replaced
by another ideology.[5] Proponents of this thesis
accept it as granted, given that modern democracies are free of serious
conflict, recognize global protection of basic human rights, and argue that their
economic activity is paramount. Liberals see international cooperation as
central for peace, prosperity, and justice.
Huntington’s opposing
vision, by contrast, portrays Western powers as trying to consolidate their
supremacy and being able to control most world institutions to use them to
their advantage.[6] However, only recently the
opposition was able to take full shape against liberalism, especially because
of the renewed conflict between Russia and the West, where the signs of the new
ideology emerged.
The basic political premise of orderism places more
emphasis on stability rather than on democracy, because Western liberal
democracy has failed to live up to its promise, and in some cases, has produced
inequality and chaos. Orderism places emphasis on conservative values related
to religion, while opposing the secular values promoted by Western democracy.
The new ideology claims that, on the global stage, international law is beaten
into submission by the rules of the strongest and the West adheres to the
global rule of law only when it suits its interests.[7]
On the other hand, a “West
vs. Rest” mentality, as Samuel Huntington argues, in a future conflict, liberal
states will inevitably beat non-liberal states, an idea that non-liberal states
resent. It is therefore no surprise that this ideology is gaining popularity
among countries in the periphery of Western democracies, such as Russia, Turkey
and Egypt who have all challenged the West in varying degrees.
This analysis sheds light on the basic features
of orderism, while taking into consideration that it has no ideologues. It is
rather the culmination of a number of realistic practices, statements and
official positions of politicians, namely Russian President Vladimir Putin, as
Russia is the birthplace of the new ideology that is gaining more acceptance in
more states.
FIRST- Prioritizing Stability
Several non-Western states,
such as Russia and Turkey, prioritize stability to counter security challenges
on their territory and in their regional
surroundings. In fact, this trend does not emanate from practical
considerations. Rather, theoretically, certain conditions should be met before
democracy can be promoted.
Advocates of orderism
believe that applying democracy in states that lack favorable conditions can
lead to adverse results, including the rise of extremists to power, election of
non-liberal leaders and even to civil wars. To prevent such scenarios, certain
conditions, including rule of law and effective state institutions, should be
ripe before adopting democracy. This is branded as democratic sequentialism.[8]
In her study of four advanced
democracies- Germany, Britain, United States and Japan- Professor of political
science Kathleen Thelen argues that institutional development should be
incremental and gradual and that it should not be accomplished instantaneously,
but rather in “critical junctures.”[9]
Critics of orderism believe
that assertion of certain hard-edged prerequisites’ associated with a gradual,
orderly path for development does not offer a real choice in most cases.[10] They do not see orderly
transition from anarchy to prosperity as inconsequential, stating that “dictators
are not the most likely implementers of well-sequenced reforms,”[11] and even stress that the
weaker the state’s administrative apparatus, the more likely is the rise of
chaos.[12]
However, proponents of
orderism stress that many states suffer from problems and setbacks in their
struggle for democracy[13], because the transition to
democracy is not achieved smoothly and following distinct phases,[14] where there is no one right
path, even when certain conditions, such as historical experience, help
facilitate transitions.
It should
be noted that many states that practically adopt orderism, such as Russia and
Turkey, pursue elections as the way to seize power, but they are accused of
having undemocratic practices such as suppression of freedom of the press and
the interference of the executive authority in the jurisdictions of the
legislative and judicial authorities, all of which are branded by international
literature as actions taken by a pseudo-democracy.
Although this opinion
appears to be rational, some states attempt
to protect democracy from security challenges. In
Tunisia, the Ennahda Movement, for instance, initially a ‘democratic party with
an Islamic reference,’[15] learned valuable
lessons from the Egyptian revolution,[16] made
concessions, and decided to separate political and religious activities. As
such, the Ennahda Movement was able to set a prime example of the successful
transition from dictatorship to democracy by drafting a secular constitution
and handed over power to a technocratic coalition government when it lost the
parliamentary elections in October 2014.
On the other hand, in other
cases such as in Iraq, disorder and turbulence cannot be attributed to attempts
to establish a democracy, but to the endeavors of the then-Prime Minister, Nouri
al-Maliki, and his supporters as they intended to consolidate the power of one
particular sect of religious majority to build a strong centralized government
and even target opposition leaders from other sects.[17] The Maliki government’s
repressive practices were what led to security challenges, and most and
foremost to the rise of ISIS.[18]
Turkey's experience, by
contrast, presented a unique example of adopting practices that support
democracy, then retreating from it. The ruling Justice and Development Party's
golden age of 2002-2007 was underpinned by steps to instigate substantial
democratic and liberal reforms for economic progress, ensuring the independence
of the judiciary, building civil-military relations, and ensuring minority
rights, thus raising its popularity.[19]
The AKP cleverly joined
pluralism of moderate, political Islam with the pragmatism of embracing
democracy, modernity, and liberal global economy.[20] It gained the lion’s share
of an increasingly vibrant, affluent, and young electorate, a phenomenon
reflecting the nation’s aspiration to refresh its collective memory of cultural
heritage and “to mature further as a democracy while retaining its Muslim identity.”[21]
However, critics argue that this earlier period
of reformation was followed by subtler attempts by Erdogan to weaken liberal ideas,
such as the rule-of-law, separation of powers, and freedom of the press in
order to propel the economy and create a pious and loyal middle-class. In the
post-2013 period, Turkey appears to have inclined towards a form of “orderism”
– a social contract originally branded by the Russian president Putin –
emphasizing traditions, religion, and creating a sense of solidarity around
neo-Ottomanism, thus “defying malicious attempts by foreign powers to undermine
and divide the country.”
SECOND- Emphasizing Religious Values
Many thinkers do not perceive
conflict between the principles of Islam and political liberalism, as
demonstrated by Turkey's experience in the early period under the AKP's rule.[22] Experience reveals that
liberalization can be accomplished even ‘in the most unlikely national and
regional settings’. Islam is not incompatible with modernity and indeed has
been a source of inspiration for Western thinkers in the Age of Enlightenment.[23] The mechanism of
consultation grounded in the Islamic tradition of “shura” (consultation) is a
case in point for this.
Nevertheless, some liberal
principles are faced with opposition in some societies. Some reject claims by
liberalism that it presents principles that can be implemented globally, and
assert that liberalism is closely associated with a specific cultural context.[24] That is, such societies are
governed by societal values rather than by individualism and hope to preserve
its own lifestyle[25] which is not necessarily in
conflict with democracy.
This comes as one of the issues with
religion. While Western states place emphasis on secularism, states embracing
the new ideology, namely Russia, emphasize religious values and their
importance for society.
For
example, Russian President Vladimir Putin- who is close to the Russian Orthodox
Church - emphasized said the importance
of religious values within society. Putin stated that "without the moral
values rooted in Christianity and other world religions, without rules and
moral values which have formed and developed over millennia, people will
inevitably lose their human dignity and become brutes and beasts. We think it
is right and natural to defend and preserve our Christian
moral values." Furthermore, Putin rejects Western rights group's
criticism over issuing an anti-gay law,[26] a position advocated by the
Russian Church.
Within this context, orderism beats liberalism as
it presents an alternative model to replace Western values, especially because
some widespread phenomena and practices, such as gay marriage and atheism, are
rejected even by segments in Western societies.
THIRD- Revival of the Glorious Past
Orderism resorts to the
"revival of the glorious past" as an alternative form of social
contract. Putin stated that the collapse of the USSR was the greatest
geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. His promise upon
rising to presidency was to revive Russia’s status as a great power. To
demonstrate its assertiveness, Russia annexed Crimea, waged a proxy war in
eastern Ukraine, dispatched forces to Syria to prop up the Assad regime,
strengthened its nuclear arsenal, and threatened NATO allies on the Russian
periphery.[27]
Despite the high cost of this policy- evident in the damage wreaked on the Russian
economy by reciprocal sanctions by Russia itself on one side, and European
Union and the United States on the other- Putin's popularity was not affected.
On the contrary, his anti-Western policies stirred national feelings and improved
his popularity at home.[28]
On the other hand, experts
in Turkish affairs believe that Ankara is embracing a sense of neo-Ottomanism
to revive the glories of the Ottoman Empire. However, former prime minister and
foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, stresses, in his book Strategic Depth,
that Turkey is a central power that should not be content with playing a
pivotal role in the Middle East or the Balkans because it is a central power
and not a regional power.[29]
This approach coincided with accusations of the West
attempting to weaken and divide Turkey, claims that were echoed widely in the
aftermath of the failed coup attempt in July 2016. That is, Turkey was
interested in escalating with the West, and the US in particular, and even
hinted that it supported the attempt. What helped Turkey in this context was
that Moscow sought to improve its relations with Ankara aiming to weaken the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[30]
FOURTH- Failure of Democracy, Sometimes
Among the main arguments of
Fukuyama was that what we are witnessing is the end of history, that is, the
end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of
western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.[31]The success of liberalism in
Western states does not necessarily mean that it does not suffer failures.
These failures emerge in times of economic crises
associated with the activity of extremist
movements, such as the extremist right-wing movements in several developed
European countries where they gained popularity, as evidenced by their rising popularity in successive
elections. Their extremist rhetoric poses a clear threat to democratic values
and is a grave
violation of minority rights. These developments threaten a possible rise of
extremist leaders to power in Western democratic states, which means the lines
between Western democracies and pseudo-democracies are fading.
Conclusion
While orderism as an ideology gained wide acceptance,
and although there are justifications for resorting to it temporarily due to
turmoil across the world, it is important that regimes, as they serve the
interests of their states, should not be tempted to take advantage of orderism to justify their authoritarian
practices.[32] Experience shows that
authoritarian structures are unlikely to continue[33], as evidenced by the experience of Arab Spring states. Beyond the initial stage of having a functioning state
bureaucracy, economic and political development should go hand-in-hand
with liberal policies.
On the other hand, adherents of liberalism
should refrain from presuming that other societies are ripe and readily accept
liberal values that can be universally applied based on the presumption that
liberal democracy fits all cultures in all circumstances. Otherwise, orderism will succeed and gain wider acceptance
in non-Western societies, especially because they already accept and respect
traditions while they do not exclude religious values.
To conclude, it is safe to say
that both liberalism and orderism suffer shortcomings and failures, in some
aspects, and that each state should choose its path that suits its history,
culture, and values, and, at the same time, seek to achieve societal
development and stability by guaranteeing real mechanisms for achieving the
peaceful transfer of power.
[1] Charles Tilly, Stories, Identities, and
Political Change, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. 4.
[2] Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom,
(New York: Norton, 2003), p. 71.
[3] Prof. Anna Seleny, International Politics:
Democracy, The Residency, Lecture 6, GMAP, The Fletcher School, Tufts
University, 2014.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Eliane Glaser, ‘Bring back ideology: Fukuyama’s ‘end
of history’ 25 years on’, The Guardian, March 21, 2014, accessible at: https://goo.gl/nU8d7k
[6] Prof. Anna Seleny, op.cit.
[7] Jochen Bittner, ‘The New Ideology of the New Cold
War’, The New York Times, August 1, 2016, accessible at: https://goo.gl/l2u4fS
[8] Thomas Carothers, How Democracies Emerge:
Sequencing Fallacy, Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, Number 1, January
2007, pp. 14 – 15.
[9] A.A. Camba, Book Review: How Institutions Evolve,
E-International Relations, June 12, 2012, accessible at: https://goo.gl/tQk9kt
[10] Sheri Berman, How Democracies Emerge: Lessons from
Europe, Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, no. 1, January 2007, p. 37.
[11] Edward D. Mansfield
and Jack Snyder, The Sequencing ‘Fallacy’, Journal of Democracy, Volume
18, no. 3, July 2007, accessible at:
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sequencing_Exchange.pdf
[12] Prof. Anna Seleny,
op.cit.
[13] Sheri Berman, The
Vein Hope for Correct Timing, Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, no. 3,
July 2007, pp. 15-16; accessible at:
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sequencing_Exchange.pdf
[14] Sheri Berman, op.cit., p. 13.
[15] Sumaya Ghannoushi,
‘Member of Tunisia’s Ennahda Party, Islam and Democracy: What’s the problem?’, Al
Jazeera, 2016, accessible at: https://goo.gl/IOcfJC
[16] Dr. Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi, The Mirage, (UAE:
ECSSR, 2015), 50.
[17] Ned Parker,
Welcome to the World’s Next Failed State, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, no.
2, March / April 2012, pp. 94 – 110.
[18] Ibid., 95.
[19] Murat Somer,
Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World,
Muslims and Secular Democracy, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 7,
2007, p. 1272.
[20] Anna Seleny, Tradition, Modernity, and Democracy:
The Many Promises of Islam, Perspectives on Politics, September 2006,
Vol. 4, no. 3, p. 488.
[21] Anwar Ibrahim, Universal Values and Muslim
Democracy, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, no. 3 July 2006, 8.
[22] Ziya Öniş, Sharing
Power: Turkey’s Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP Hegemony,
Insight Turkey, Vol. 15, no. 2, 2013, pp. 103- 122.
[23] Dr. Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi, op.cit., p. 34.
[24] Bhikhu Parekh, The Cultural Particularity of
Liberal Democracy, Political Studies, Vol. 40, Issue 1, August 1992, pp.
160– 175.
[25] Ibid., 170.
[26] Putin: Defending
national identity, based on religious values, Asianews.it, September 21,
accessible at: https://goo.gl/Xenf1s
[27] Mac Thornberry and
Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “Preserving Primacy,” Foreign Affairs, September /
October Issue, 2016 accessible at:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141444/daron-acemoglu/the-failed-autocrat.
[28] Vassilis Paipais, Greek Expectations:
Broaching the case for a European Exclusive Economic Zone, The London School of
Economics and Political Science, March 14, 2013, accessible at: https://goo.gl/fWCDW2
[29] Pyotr Iskenderov, Erdogan's Neo-Ottomanism
Shift: What Makes It So Dangerous?, Strategic Culture foundation, May 21, 2015,
accessible at: http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/05/21/erdogans-neo-ottomanism-shift-what-makes-so-dangerous-i.html
[30] Marc Pierini, Could Russia Play Turkey Off
Against the West, Carnegie Europe, August 2016; accessible at: https://goo.gl/iRyOvZ
[31] Eliane Glaser, op.cit.
[32] Jochen Bittner, op.cit.
[33] Fareed Zakaria, op.cit., p. 269.