*This article was published in the Trending Events periodical, issued by Future for Advanced Research & Studies - Issue 11, Jun 2015.
First: China’s long-term efforts to strengthen its claims in the South China Sea
China’s approach to strengthen its territorial claims in the South China sea has undergone a shift from a conciliatory approach in the mid-2000s towards a more assertive one. Such a conciliatory approach towards the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with regards to its claims was exemplified by signing the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’ (DOC) in 2003.
There are two causes behind the shift in approach that took place in late 2000s. First, the Chinese increasingly viewed that its moderate policy has not been effective in preventing other claimant states from advancing their own claims at the expense of China’s. It is critical to note that the South China Sea is estimated to hold around 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves.[1]Around the late 2000s, Chinese scholars viewed that the hydrocarbon resources in the area “are being exploited at an alarming rate and scale by other claimant states.”[2] They decided that a change in the Chinese approach ought to take place if Beijing wishes to be in a more favorable position. Second, Chinese legal experts increasingly arrived to the understanding that the international legal framework placed more emphasis on continuous occupation and effective control over historical claims. As much of China’s territorial claims towards the islands and land features in the sea are based upon historical claims, China started considering the 'alternative' route. As such, China decided that it needed to reinforce such occupation and control in order to put its claims under favorable dispute settlements.
Recent Chinese actions in the Sea should be viewed as part of this approach to bolster its territorial claims. China’s unilateral placement of an oilrig near the Paracel Islands that resulted in a bitter clash with Vietnam in May 2014 is part of its effort to strengthen its exploitation capabilities of the hydrocarbon resources in the area.[3] Chinese land reclamation efforts around the Spratly Islands can be seen as its effort to change facts on the ground in order to further strengthen its claims.[4] Such an assertive approach that stirs regional tensions is ironically part of Beijing’s efforts to gain better leverage through the occupation and control of future diplomatic and legal venues.
Second: Potential threats to peace and stability in the region
The most potent threat for the region is a situation that gets out of hand. It is easy to point out that all actors possess a common interest to maintain peace and stability so that prosperity can flourish regionally. Yet, it is also easy for smaller actors to pull in larger actors and exacerbate the tension, leading to outright arms conflict.
First, clashes between non-military elements can potentially lead to clashes involving militaries in respective countries. In the South China Sea, a clash among national coast guards can easily lead to a clash among national Navies. The clashes of Vietnamese and Chinese boats during the Chinese oilrig placement near the Paracel Islands was close to leading to an outright clash between the two countries, with ships colliding and each side blaming the other for initiating the clash.[5]. Anger over the clash was understandably more pronounced in Vietnam, evident in its large anti-Chinese riots. Second, another complicating factor that might exacerbate the situation is the web of alliances of claimant states that can pull in non-regional states. The United States can easily be pulled into a conflict with China by its alliance with either Japan or the Philippines. This has not even considered the American preference for freedom of passage in the South China Sea, which has prompted a confrontation between the Chinese Navy and an American surveillance plane around the area.[6]
The regional security architecture is supposed to mitigate this threat. Centered upon ASEAN, the regional security architecture, through various multilateral processes, provides a forum in which all actors can voice their concerns and dialogue, and prevent the situation from getting out of control. Yet, it remains to be seen whether this security framework is resilient enough when actors enact unilateral measures and how effective the confidence-building measures are in preventing an outright conflict.
Third: Other state reactions towards China
It is hard to say that there is a general consensus of response and sentiment towards the rise of China as a great power and potential hegemon in the region. There are of course countries with more stakes to be leery of China, in particular due to territorial spats in the South China Sea such as the Philippines, Vietnam and to a lesser extent Malaysia and Brunei. But overall it can not be said that Southeast Asia as a region will balance against China.
The so called “secondary states’” response towards China and its general rise to power is arguably made more ambiguous by China’s apparent ‘bipolar’ swing in its words and actions. For example, on the one hand, Chinese officials and even scholars adamantly emphasize its peaceful nature of its rise to power.[7]The catch-phrase “peaceful rise” even started to grow out of fashion and is eventually replaced with an even more benign term: “peaceful development”.[8] A most recent statement by Chinese scholar Wang Yizhou,Associate Dean of Peking University’s School of International Studies, reiterates China’s peaceful rise to the extent defering to US’ Global leadership.[9]
On the other hand, China’s actions such as the land reclamations in the South China Sea as well as its statements do not cohere with the normative peaceful statements espoused by its officials and scholars. In response to the growing concern from Southeast Asian states and also US’ continued surveillance over the South China Sea waters, China has grown increasingly agitated. It issued strong warnings[10], lodged formal complaints[11], and went as far as a warning that ‘war may be inevitable’ by a state-owned newspaper.[12]
China’s adamant claims to most parts of the South China Sea and its recent assertiveness is a cause of serious concern that cannot be overlooked by the secondary states in the region, even to non-claimant states such as Indonesia. Although there is no consensus among Southeast Asian member states of ASEAN on a particular stance in regards to China’s role in the region, but one thing is clear. There is a strong need to push through with a Code of Conduct to handle matters such as territorial disputes between ASEAN and China. China’s seeming avoidance to move from Document of Conduct (DOC) to Code of Conduct (COC) is contradictory to the normative statements of “peaceful development” that officials and scholars from China propagate to the world.
Fourth: The expected consequences of these confrontations
China’s new initiative to engage the region and build an economic belt called the Silk Road Economic Belt (SRE) and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is stated as a “road towards peace and friendship” for a “win-win cooperation”.[13] Some scholars, however, suspect that the positive-sounding initiative is another diversion from the push for China to come to the table and formalize a Code of Conduct regarding the South China Sea dispute with its Southeast Asian neighbors.[14] The South China Sea in and of itself, “one of the busiest international sea-lanes with many of the world’s busiest shipping ports”, is a vital route for global trade and indispensable for the region in particular. Thus it is worrying if China as the biggest claimant and strongest state has not come to the table on equal terms with others to negotiate the Code of Conduct, and instead proceeds with a new initiative of its own.
In the 154th Bergedorf Round Table, an annual Security Conference held by the Koerber Foundation, policymakers and scholars from around the globe met in Jakarta November 2013 to discuss peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. In it several general conclusions were clearly stated. It was argued that “the current escalation in the South China Sea needs to be seen against the background of the region’s economic success,” but the conflict is seen as “challenging the freedom of the sea lanes of communication and thus trade with Asia-Pacific.”[15] In the conference, many participants saw Chinese policy in the region as increasingly assertive. The threat and danger to security and stability in the region at this point is not in the realm of conventional military action, but still limited to the use of non-military (paramilitary, coastguard, etc) to gain de facto control over areas by China.[16]
Thus, for now, including the recent worrying land reclamation actions by China, frictions will not likely manifest into outright conflict or warfare. However, the immediate consequences are the erosion of trust and retraction of confidence building measures that will stall consolidation of multilateral forums, institutions, and relations in the region. China is not going to dominate militarily by intentions or actions at this point, but Southeast Asian countries do fear an economic domination. China needs to prove otherwise, considering the in-congruence of its actions and statements, particularly in the past few months.
[1] “South China Sea,” United States Energy Information Administration. February 7, 2013, accessed on May 24, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf.
[2] Du et al. “The Strategic Situation in the South China Sea Dispute and China’s Policy Responses” (Nanhai zhuquan Zhengduan de zhanlue taishi ji zhongguo de yingdui fanglue), Shijie dili yanjiu, 21: 2 (2012) 8.
[3] “Vietnam Says China Still Ramming Boats, Airs Sinking Video,” Bloomberg News, June 7, 2014, accessed on May 24, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-05/vietnam-says-china-still-harassing-boats-shows-video-of-sinking.html.
[4] Lee, Katy. “China is on a crazy mission to build artificial islands. What the hell is it up to?” Vox, March 13, 2015, accessed on May 24, 2015, http://www.vox.com/2015/3/13/8203713/south-china-sea-explained.
[5] “Vietnam and China ships ‘collide in South China Sea’,” BBC News, May 7, 2014, accessed on May 24, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27293314
[6] Reuters. “China and the US just had a confrontation over the South China Sea,” Business Insider, May 21, 2015, accessed on May 24, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-china-navy-warns-us-spy-plane-in-disputed-south-china-sea-cnn-2015-5?IR=T&.
[7] For one of its most prominent advocate on that argument, see: Zheng Bijian , “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status”, Foreign Affairs (Sept/Oct 2005 Issue).
[8] A term made into official policy under Hu Jintao. See: Sujian Guo, China’s “Peaceful Rise” in the 21st Century, (San Francisco: Ashgate, 2006).
[9] “China foreign policy expert sees nation rising peacefully in East Asia,” Nikkei Asian Review, May 22, 2015, http://asia.nikkei.com/Features/The-Future-of-Asia-2015/China-foreign-policy-expert-sees-nation-rising-peacefully-in-East-Asia (accessed May 26, 2015).
[10] Ankit Panda, “China Issues 8 Warnings to US Surveillance Plane in South China Sea,” The Diplomat,May 21, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/china-issues-8-warnings-to-us-surveillance-plane-in-south-china-sea/ (accessed May 26 2015).
[11] “South China Sea dispute: China lodges formal complaint with US after spy plane spotted over construction site,” ABC News, May 26, 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-26/china-lodges-complaint-against-us/6496584 (accessed May 26 2015).
[12] Sui Wang Lee, “China state paper warns of war over South China Sea unless US backs down,” Reuters, May 25, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/05/25/southchinasea-china-usa-idINKBN0OA07N20150525, (accessed May 26, 2015).
[13] “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” official document issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization, March 2015.
[14] Prashanth Parameswaran, “Will China Change its South China Sea Approach in 2015?, the Diplomat, January 8, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/will-china-change-its-south-china-sea-approach-in-2015/, (accessed May 26, 2015).
[15] 154th Bergedorf Round Table, “Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific,” Koerber Foundation Conference Report, November 1-3 2013, Jakarta.
[16] Ibid.