The swift fall of Bashar Assad's regime in Syria on December 8, 2024, has led to an escalation of military clashes in northern and northeastern Syria. These conflicts primarily involve the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose largest component is the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), against Turkey and Syrian pro-Turkish military factions.
Throughout the Syrian war, Kurdish forces, particularly the YPG, have strengthened their presence in northern Syria with U.S. support. In 2015, they established the SDF, which became the local partner of the international coalition against ISIS. However, Turkey refuses to recognize these Kurdish forces, viewing them as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which it designates as a terrorist organization. Between 2016 and 2019, Turkey carried out three military operations against them in northern Syria.
The ongoing clashes between Kurdish fighters and Ankara-backed factions in northern and northeastern Syria have resulted in the factions gaining control over the cities of Tal Rifaat and Manbij. These developments have heightened the possibility of Turkey launching a new military operation against the Kurds to push them away from its southern border. The likelihood of such an operation is further increased by the ongoing fighting around Ain Issa (Kobani), Raqqa, and continued targeting in Hasakah.
However, for Turkey to proceed with such an operation, Ankara may need to secure approval from international powers with a presence in Syria, particularly the United States, which is the SDF's primary supporter.
Triggers of Confrontations
Regions under Kurdish control in northern and northeastern Syria hold significant strategic value, constituting Syria's "oil and gas reservoir." The SDF controls the largest oil fields in Syria, including:
1- The strategic importance of Kurdish-held areas:
The Kurdish-controlled regions in northern and northeastern Syria possess significant strategic value, serving as Syria's primary "oil and gas reservoir." These areas, under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), encompass the largest oil fields in the country. Notable among these are the Rmelan and al-Suwaydiya fields in Hasakah province, as well as the Al-Omar field in Deir ez-Zor province.
During the former Assad regime's rule, Syria relied heavily on Iranian oil imports due to sanctions imposed by the U.S. Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. However, with the regime's departure, Iranian oil supplies are expected to cease. This situation may necessitate a new agreement between the incoming Syrian administration, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, and the SDF. Such an agreement would likely focus on rehabilitating Syria's oil sector to meet the country's energy needs.
2- Current military confrontations in Northern Syria:
Over the past month, military clashes have escalated between factions of the "Operation Dawn of Freedom," part of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern and northeastern Syria. The Turkish-backed factions have successfully seized control of Tal Rifaat and Manbij, with their sights now set on capturing Raqqa and Hasakah. Their primary objective is to eliminate the SDF's presence near Turkey's southern border.
Ankara's long-term strategy may involve continued military interventions even after Assad's departure from power. This approach could potentially reshape areas of influence in northern Syria, aligning them more closely with Turkish interests.
Ankara's Objectives
Turkey's motivations for continuing military confrontations with Syrian Kurds are multifaceted, influenced by both internal and external factors. The primary drivers include:
1- Preventing a Kurdish state:
Ankara fears that establishing a Kurdish entity in northern Syria could embolden Kurds within Turkey to demand greater rights or even seek independence. Preventing the formation of a Kurdish state or autonomous entity in Syria remains a top priority for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government, which views such an entity on its southern border as a direct threat to Turkey's territorial integrity.
On December 25, Erdogan vowed to "bury Kurdish fighters alive in Syrian territory if they do not lay down their arms," adding, "We will achieve our goal of making Turkey free from terrorism in the coming period using all tools available to our state." He reiterated on December 28 that Turkey would begin 2025 with new steps to enhance security along its southern border and eliminate "external terrorist threats."
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan echoed these sentiments in a televised interview on December 13, stating that Turkey seeks a "Syria free from terrorism" and aims to dismantle the YPG. Fidan offered the Kurdish fighters two choices: dissolve themselves or face destruction. In a subsequent phone call with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on December 28, Fidan emphasized that the presence of Kurdish fighters in Syria cannot be tolerated.
2- Strengthening regional influence:
Turkey seeks to play a pivotal role in shaping Syria's post-Assad future. Ankara perceives a strong Kurdish presence in Syria as a potential threat to its regional influence and ability to influence Syria's political resolution. Therefore, confronting Kurdish forces may be integral to Turkey's strategy for securing its future role in Syria and the broader Middle East.
3- Securing domestic popular support:
Turkey's approach to the Kurdish issue extends beyond external affairs, carrying significant domestic implications for Erdoğan's government. Amid escalating tensions with the PKK (designated as a terrorist organization by Ankara) and internal political pressures, the Turkish government may view engagement with Syrian Kurds as an opportunity to galvanize public support and reinforce its domestic standing.
The SDF's Position
1- Multiple challenges:
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) confront escalating challenges from multiple directions. Turkey, viewing the SDF as a direct threat to its national security, poses a significant concern. Additionally, the new Syrian administration that emerged after Assad's regime presents another source of pressure. The SDF's key challenges encompass.
a. The Turkish challenge
Turkey's significant military presence in northern Syria poses a constant threat to the Syrian Democratic Forces' (SDF) control. Ankara could launch further military operations to strengthen its influence and weaken the Kurdish presence along its southern border. Moreover, Turkey may pressure the U.S. to reduce its military and political support for the SDF.
In shaping Syria's future, Ankara is likely to push for political arrangements that marginalize and weaken the SDF, potentially forcing the Kurdish forces to accept settlements that require relinquishing gains made in recent years. Furthermore, Turkey will seek to impose policies that sideline these Kurdish groups, aiming to prevent them from playing any significant role in Syria's political landscape.
b. The new Syrian administration
In the post-Assad era, Syria's transitional government, bolstered by strong Turkish support, poses fresh challenges for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in their bid for influence across northern Syria. Ankara-backed Syrian factions are actively engaged in military operations to reclaim territories currently under SDF control, as evidenced by ongoing clashes in the region.
2- Available options:
In light of the challenges and the shifting balance of power in Syria, particularly Turkey's growing influence, the SDF faces limited options to counter current pressures and threats. However, several key strategies remain available:
a. Strengthening international alliances
The United States remains the SDF's most crucial international ally. By emphasizing its role as an effective force in combating terrorist organizations, especially ISIS, the SDF can work to reinforce its ties with Washington and other Western nations. Continued U.S. support could ensure the SDF maintains its significance as a player in Syria.
b. Building local alliances
To strengthen its position, the SDF could seek to form alliances with other local Syrian factions. Potential partners include groups opposed to Turkish intervention or those seeking independence from external influences.
c. Tactical concessions
Under mounting pressure, the SDF may be compelled to make tactical concessions on both political and military fronts. These concessions could include agreeing to reduce its military role in exchange for political guarantees or compromising with the new Syrian administration and Turkey as part of a broader political settlement.
The SDF may subsequently attempt to open channels of dialogue with Al-Sharaa, aiming to reach a political settlement that ensures their autonomy or a degree of independence within Syria. In this context, Al-Sharaa met with an SDF delegation on December 30, marking the first talks between Kurdish leaders and the new administration since Assad's ouster. Reports suggest this meeting was a preliminary step toward establishing a framework for future dialogue.
On December 29, Al-Sharaa had stated that Kurdish forces should integrate into a unified Syrian army, saying, "Weapons should only be in the hands of the state, and those who are armed and qualified to join the Ministry of Defense will be welcomed." He added, "We are open to dialogue with the SDF under these conditions."
Similarly, on December 17, Murhaf Abu Qasra, the military commander of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Minister of Defense in the new Syrian administration, announced that the transitional authority's control would extend to areas held by Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria.
SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, on December 27, expressed readiness to integrate into the new Syrian army under a "suitable negotiated framework." He stressed the importance of maintaining a unified Syria while leaving the political system's structure to the Syrian people and constitutional discussions.
Reflecting its flexibility, the Syrian Democratic Council (MSD), the political wing of the SDF, announced on December 22 its willingness to engage in dialogue with Turkey.
Conclusion
The escalation of Turkish-Kurdish tensions in Syria following Assad's regime collapse remains a strong possibility, given the persistent friction between these factions. Despite Washington's efforts to prevent this scenario, the complexities of Syria's political and military landscape, coupled with ongoing clashes between Turkey and its allied factions against the Kurdish-led SDF, make this outcome increasingly likely. Such a development would significantly impact Syria's future in the post-Assad era.
