أخبار المركز
  • د. أيمن سمير يكتب: (بين التوحد والتفكك: المسارات المُحتملة للانتقال السوري في مرحلة ما بعد الأسد)
  • د. رشا مصطفى عوض تكتب: (صعود قياسي: التأثيرات الاقتصادية لأجندة ترامب للعملات المشفرة في آسيا)
  • إيمان الشعراوي تكتب: (الفجوة الرقمية: حدود استفادة إفريقيا من قمة فرنسا للذكاء الاصطناعي 2025)
  • حسين معلوم يكتب: (تفاؤل حذر: هل تشكل الانتخابات المحلية فرصة لحلحلة المسار الليبي؟)
  • أحمد عليبة يكتب: (هاجس الموصل: لماذا يخشى العراق من التصعيد الحالي في سوريا؟)

Regional Expansion

Implications of Al-Shabab's escalation of attacks inside and outside Somalia

16 أغسطس، 2022


Somalia recently witnessed a remarkable escalation of attacks by the al-Shabab, not only inside Somalia but also in the Horn of Africa, especially in Kenya and Ethiopia, as the terror group is seeking to expand across the region.

 

Signs of Escalation

 

The signs of the al-Shabab group’s escalation of activity can be outlined as follows:

 

1.     Internal escalation:

In recent weeks, al-Shabab increased its activity carrying out attacks almost every day. The most recent attack took place on August 2, where a military vehicle was targeted with a landmine in the heart of Somalia's capital city of Mogadishu. The attack left several civilians dead and several others injured. The attack coincided with intense fighting between al-Shabab and the Somali army in Hiran region.

Before that, in an attack on the town of Baidoa on July 29, al-Shabab killed Somalia’s southwestern regional state Minister of Justice Sheikh Hassan Ibrahim Lugbur. An earlier attack carried out by the group in the city of Jowhar killed several people including Minister of Health Abdi Moalim and Minister of Women Asho Khalif Haji of the Hirshabelle State of Somalia.

 

2.     Extraterritorial expansion:

Al-Shabab recently began to expand its activity into the Horn of Africa. The group carried out attacks on the military bases of the special forces of Ethiopian police force in the towns of Aato and Yeed in southwestern Bakool region on the Ethiopian border. In the attack, 17 police officers were killed. The group went 70 kilometers deep into the heart of Ethiopia via the Afder Zone of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State using 16 vehicles to carry out an unprecedented attack considered the largest in Ethiopia since the terror group was established. In the attack, al-Shahab fighters hit several villages in the Afdr Zone and clashed with the Ethiopian forces for three days. Several police officers were killed and the Somali Regional State announced that it foiled the group’s attack and killed more than 100 of its fighters. Moreover, the group, on August 2, carried out an attack on a base of the Kenyan army in Mandira County, in the former North Eastern Province of Kenya. The attack left several soldiers injured.

 

3.     Attacks on African troops:

Al-Shabab intensified its attacks on the troops of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in Somalia’s south and heartland. The latest attack, in early 2022, hit a base of ATMIS in Golweyn, a town in Lower Shabelle, where Ugandan troops deployed. Earlier in May, al-Shabab blasted a base of African Union troops, including from Uganda, killing more than 50 people.

 

Multiple Drivers


The following are motives that can explain the al-Shabab’s current escalation of terrorist activity.

 

1.     Responding to the Somali President’s strategy:

Al-Shabab group escalated its attacks in response to the new strategy launched by the country’s new president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud which aims to mobilize regional and international support to launch a comprehensive war against the terror group to degrade it. The move coincides with efforts to dry up the group’s main sources of funding to possess negotiating power during any talks with the group. This was confirmed by Prime Minister Hamse Abdi Barre who threatened to launch a security operation against al-Shabab that will be centered on several villages in southern and central Somalia.

 

Within the framework of the new strategy, Barri announced on August 2 the formation of his government and the appointment of Muktar Robow, a former deputy leader and spokesman for al-Shabaab as Minister of Religion. Robow who defected to the government in 2017. Robow’s appointment can help reinforce the government forces’ presence in Bakool region where large swathes of territory were seized by al-Shabab. Because this region is Robow’s birthplace, his appointment can encourage more al-Shabab members to defect from the terror group.

 

2.     Escalation to counter United States’ intervention:

In recent months, US special forces returned to Mogadishu as the US renewed airstrikes against al-Shabab militants. In mid-July, a US airstrike killed two senior members of the group. The US troops are in close coordination with Somalia’s security agencies to intensify attacks against al-Shabab, which prompted the group to respond to the US intervention and confirm that it is willing to intensify its attacks and that it is not willing to back down. 

 

3.     Al-Shabab’s new strategy:

About one year ago, the leader of al-Shabab Ahmed Umar, AKA Ahmed Diriye, announced that the group’s new approaches include expansion outside Somalia into the region to attack western interests in the Horn of Africa. The group may take advantage of Ethiopia’s preoccupation with the ongoing domestic conflicts as well as Kenya’s focus on preparations for the presidential elections held this month. 

 

The Ethiopian government accused al-Shabab group of attempting to penetrate the Ethiopian heartland to support the rebel Oromo Liberation Army, which belongs to the largest ethnic group in the country and is an ally of the Tigray People's Liberation Front against Addis Ababa. Despite Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed’s tendency to engage in a dialogue with the front, he appears to be adamant on using military force against the Oromo Liberation Army which seeks to gain self-government or secession from Addis. Moreover, al-Shabab also seeks to gain footholds in the mountainous areas on the border between Somalia and Ethiopia to use them as launching pads for its attacks.

 

Potential Implications

 

Al-Shabab’s increasing activity and growing regional ambitions can have the following consequences:

 

1.     Mounting threats to the Horn of Africa:

The outgoing commander of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) General Stephen Townsend warned that al-Shabab group has evident ambitions and plans to increase its attacks inside Ethiopia in the coming period. Townsend’s warning echoes similar statements made by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiye Ahmed in February.

 

Moreover, al-Shabab also seeks to attack Kenya and there is concern that the elections would result in violent domestic conflict that the group would take advantage of, to intensity attacks inside Kenya and even penetrate the country further into Nairoubi. There are assessments warning against the group’s expansion of activity to outside the Horn of Africa as it is planning to channel support and funding to other terror groups operating in Africa, and in Nigeria and Mozambique in particular.

 

2.     Potential regional arrangements:

Threats posed by al-Shabab to the Horn of Africa are likely to drive the consolidation of new security arrangements and wider coordination between regional countries to close in on the influence of the group. On the other hand, lack of coordination about these movements might lead to escalation of tensions between the involved regional states. President of the Somali Region of Ethiopia Mustafa Muhumed Omar announced plans to create a security buffer zone inside the Somali border to counter the increasing attacks carried out by al-Shabab. But this position raised concerns of some regional officials in Somalia who accused some Ethiopian military officials of attempts to expand into Somali territory. This prompted Addis Ababa to send a high-ranking military delegation led by Major General Tesfaye Ayalew, head of deployment unit of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, to Somalia to hold talks with Somali officials in Mogadishu.

 

3.     Preparing for dialogue with al-Shabab:

Western reports indicated that al-Shabab now controls about 70 percent of territory in southern and central Somalia. The Somali government controls only the capital Moghadishu and the capital cities of the country’s regions, while al-Shabab dominates most rural areas as the group has grown more resilient to changes and various efforts to close in on it.

 

Because of this situation, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in July, announced that eliminating the group solely through the use of  military force is not possible. That is why he also indicated that his government is open to all alternative ways of dealing with the group, including dialogue. He also noted that his government upholds the principle of reaching a peaceful solution through a combination of security strategies and negotiations with al-Shabab. Mogadishu might even seek, in the beginning, to try to dry up the flow of funding to the group in coordination with Somalia’s regional and international partners to weaken it before any dialogue with it is launched.

 

A report from Africa Confidential notes that despite shrinking Qatari influence on the Somali issue after former president Mohamed Farmago lost the elections, Doha is still seeking to restore its role through brokering dialogue between the Somali government and al-Shabab.

 

In conclusion, al-Shabab group escalated its attacks between 2015-2021 and appears to be re-escalating once again in the coming period, which makes it harder to defeat it through traditional approaches. That is why, there is an urgent need for creating a comprehensive strategy in coordination with regional states and international partners to counter threats posed by al-Shabab.